# Cover for: Intellectual Property arrangements: Key points and recommendations, Productivity Comission Draft report – April 2016  Intellectual Property arrangements: Key points and recommendations

Draft report – April 2016

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Overview

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| Key points |
| * Intellectual property (IP) arrangements need to balance the interests of rights holders with users. IP arrangements should:
* encourage investment in IP that would not otherwise occur
* provide the minimum incentives necessary to encourage that investment
* resist impeding follow‑on innovation, competition and access to goods and services.
* Improvements are needed so Australia’s copyright and patent arrangements function effectively and efficiently.
* Australia’s patent system grants protection too easily, allowing a proliferation of low‑quality patents, frustrating the efforts of follow‑on innovators, stymieing competition and raising costs to the community. To raise the quality of patents, the Australian Government should:
* increase the degree of invention required to receive a patent, abolish the innovation patent, redesign extensions of term for pharmaceutical patents, limit business method and software patents, and use patent fees more effectively.
* Australia’s copyright system has progressively expanded and protects works longer than necessary to encourage creative endeavour, with consumers bearing the cost.
* A new system of user rights, including the introduction of a broad, principles‑based fair use exception, is needed to help address this imbalance.
* Better use of digital data and more accessible content are the key to reducing online copyright infringement, rather than increasing enforcement efforts or penalties.
* While Australia’s enforcement system works relatively well for large rights holders, reforms can improve outcomes for small‑ and medium‑sized enterprises.
* Recent self‑initiated reforms of the Federal Court, with an emphasis on lower costs and informal alternatives, should improve enforcement outcomes and replicate many of the benefits a dedicated IP court would offer.
* Changes to the Federal Circuit Court are one option for improving dispute resolution options for small‑ and medium‑sized enterprises.
* Commercial transactions involving IP rights should be subject to competition law. The current exemption under the Competition and Consumer Act is based on outdated views and should be repealed.
* Improving IP governance arrangements would help promote a coherent and integrated approach to IP policy development and implementation.
* Multilateral and bilateral trade agreements are the primary determinant of Australia’s IP arrangements. These agreements substantially constrain domestic IP policy flexibility.
* An overly generous system of IP rights is particularly costly for Australia — a significant net importer of IP, with a growing trade deficit in IP‑intensive goods and services.
* The Australian Government should focus its international IP engagement on encouraging more balanced policy arrangements for patents and copyright, and reducing transaction and administrative costs for parties seeking IP rights in multiple jurisdictions.
* Improving the evidence base and analysis that informs international engagement (especially trade agreements with IP provisions) would help the Australian Government avoid entering agreements that run counter to Australia’s interest.
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Draft recommendations, findings and information requests

### Chapter 2: The analytical framework

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| DRAFT Recommendation 2.1In formulating intellectual property policy, the Australian Government should be informed by a robust evidence base and have regard to the principles of:* *effectiveness*, which addresses the balance between providing protection to encourage additional innovation (which would not have otherwise occurred) and allowing ideas to be disseminated widely
* *efficiency*, which addresses the balance between returns to innovators and to the wider community
* *adaptability*, which addresses the balance between providing policy certainty and having a system that is agile in response to change
* *accountability*, which balances the cost of collecting and analysing policy–relevant information against the benefits of having transparent and evidence–based policy that considers community wellbeing.
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### Chapter 4: Copyright term and scope

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| DRAFT Finding 4.1Australia’s copyright system has expanded over time, often with no transparent, evidence‑based policy analysis demonstrating the need for, or quantum of, new rights.  |
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| draft Finding 4.2While hard to pinpoint an optimal copyright term, a more reasonable estimate would be closer to 15 to 25 years after creation; considerably less than 70 years after death. |
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| DRAFT Recommendation 4.1The Australian Government should amend the *Copyright Act 1968* (Cth) so the current terms of copyright protection apply to unpublished works.  |
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### Chapter 5: Copyright accessibility: licensing and exceptions

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| DRAFT Recommendation 5.1The Australian Government should implement the recommendation made in the House of Representatives Committee report *At What Cost? IT pricing and the Australia tax* to amend the *Copyright Act 1968* (Cth) to make clear that it is not an infringement for consumers to circumvent geoblocking technology.The Australian Government should seek to avoid any international agreements that would prevent or ban consumers from circumventing geoblocking technology. |
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| DRAFT Recommendation 5.2The Australian Government should repeal parallel import restrictions for books in order for the reform to take effect no later than the end of 2017. |
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| DRAFT Recommendation 5.3The Australian Government should amend the *Copyright Act 1968* (Cth) (Copyright Act) to replace the current fair dealing exceptions with a broad exception for fair use. The new exception should contain a clause outlining that the objective of the exception is to ensure Australia’s copyright system targets only those circumstances where infringement would undermine the ordinary exploitation of a work at the time of the infringement. The Copyright Act should also make clear that the exception does not preclude use of copyright material by third parties on behalf of users.The exception should be open ended, and assessment of whether a use of copyright material is fair should be based on a list of factors, including:* the effect of the use on the market for the copyright protected work at the time of the use
* the amount, substantiality or proportion of the work used, and the degree of transformation applied to the work
* the commercial availability of the work at the time of the infringement
* the purpose and character of the use, including whether the use is commercial or private use.

The Copyright Act should also specify a non–exhaustive list of illustrative exceptions, drawing on those proposed by the Australian Law Reform Commission.The accompanying Explanatory Memorandum should provide guidance on the application of the above factors. |
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### Chapter 6: Patent system fundamentals

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| DRAFT Recommendation 6.1The Australian Government should amend ss. 7(2) and 7(3) of the *Patents Act 1990* (Cth) such that an invention is taken to involve an inventive step if, having regard to the prior art base, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the relevant art. The Australian Government should state the following in the associated Explanatory Memorandum:* the intent of this change is to better target socially valuable inventions
* the test should be applied by asking whether a course of action required to arrive at the invention or solution to the problem would have been obvious for a person skilled in the art to try with a reasonable expectation of success.

The Australian Government should explore opportunities to further raise the overall threshold for inventive step in collaboration with other countries in international forums. |
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| DRAFT Recommendation 6.2The Australian Government should incorporate an objects clause into the *Patents Act 1990* (Cth) (Patents Act). The objects clause should describe the purposes of the legislation as being to enhance the wellbeing of Australians by providing patent protection to socially valuable innovations that would not have otherwise occurred and by promoting the dissemination of technology. In doing so, the patent system should balance the interests of patent applicants and patent owners, the users of technology — including follow–on innovators and researchers — and Australian society as a whole. The Australian Government should amend the Patents Actsuch that, when making a decision in relation to a patent application or an existing patent, the Commissioner of Patents and the Courts must have regard to the objects of the Patents Act. |
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| DRAFT Recommendation 6.3The Australian Government, with input from IP Australia, should explore the costs and benefits of using higher and more pronounced renewal fees later in the life of a standard patent, and making greater use of claim fees to limit the breadth of patent protection and to reduce strategic use of patents. The Australian Government should seek international cooperation on making greater use of patent fees to help ensure that patent holders are not overcompensated and to limit the costs of patent protection on the community. |
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### Chapter 7: Innovation patents

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| DRAFT Recommendation 7.1The Australian Government should abolish the innovation patent system. |
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### Chapter 8: Business methods and software patents

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| DRAFT Recommendation 8.1The Australian Government should amend s. 18 of the *Patents Act 1990* (Cth) to explicitly *exclude* business methods and software from being patentable subject matter. |
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### Chapter 9: Pharmaceutical patents

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| DRAFT Recommendation 9.1The Australian Government should reform extensions of patent term for pharmaceuticals such that they are calculated based only on the time taken for regulatory approval by the Therapeutic Goods Administration over and above one year. |
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| draft Recommendation 9.2Regardless of the method of calculating their duration (draft recommendation 9.1), extensions of term in Australia should only be granted through a tailored system which explicitly allows for manufacture for export in the extension period. |
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| DRAFT Recommendation 9.3There should be no extension of the period of data protection, including that applicable to biologics.Further, in the context of international negotiations, the Australian Government should work with other nations towards a system of eventual publication of clinical trial data in exchange for statutory data protection. |
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| draft Recommendation 9.4The Australian Government should introduce a transparent reporting and monitoring system to detect any pay-for-delay settlements between originator and generic pharmaceutical companies. This system should be administered by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.The monitoring should operate for a period of five years. Following this period, the Australian Government should institute a review of the regulation of pay-for-delay agreements (and other potentially anticompetitive arrangements specific to the pharmaceutical sector).  |
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| draft Recommendation 9.5The Australian Government should reform s. 76A of the *Patents Act 1990* (Cth) to improve data collection requirements. Thereafter, extensions of term should not be granted until data is received in a satisfactory form. After five years of data has been collected, it should be used as part of a review to consider the ongoing costs and benefits of maintaining the extension of term system.  |
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### Chapter 10: Registered designs

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| Draft Recommendation 10.1Australia should not join the Hague Agreement until an evidence-based case is made, informed by a cost–benefit analysis. |
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| DRAFT Finding 10.1Despite the deficiencies of the registered design system, Australia has committed internationally to protecting designs and there is no clear superior alternative. |
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### Chapter 11: Trade marks and geographical indications

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| DRAFT Recommendation 11.1In order to improve the effectiveness of the trade mark system, the Australian Government should:* restore the power for the trade mark registrar to apply mandatory disclaimers to trade mark applications, consistent with the recommendation of the Advisory Council on Intellectual Property in 2004
* repeal part 17 of the *Trade Marks Act 1995* (Cth) (Trade Marks Act)
* amend s. 43 of the Trade Marks Act so that the presumption of registrability does not apply to the registration of marks that could be misleading or confusing
* amend the schedule of fees for trade mark registrations so that higher fees apply for marks that register in multiple classes and/or entire classes of goods and services.

IP Australia should:* require the Trade Marks Office to return to its previous practice of routinely challenging trade mark applications that contain contemporary geographical references (under s. 43 of the Trade Marks Act). Challenges would not extend where endorsements require goods and services to be produced in the area nominated
* in conjunction with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, link the Australian Trade Mark On-line Search System database with the business registration portal, including to ensure a warning if a registration may infringe an existing trade mark, and to allow for searches of disclaimers and endorsements.
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| DRAFT Recommendation 11.2The Australian Government should amend s. 123 of the *Trade Marks Act 1995* (Cth) to ensure that parallel imports of marked goods do not infringe an Australian registered trade mark provided that the marked good has been brought to market elsewhere by the owner of the mark or its licensee. Section 97A of the Trade Marks Act 2002 (New Zealand) could serve as a model clause in this regard. |
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### Chapter 12: Plant Breeder’s Rights

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| DRAFT Recommendation 12.1The Australian Government should proceed without delay to implement the Advisory Council on Intellectual Property 2010 recommendation to amend the *Plant Breeder’s Rights Act 1994* (Cth) to enable essentially derived variety declarations to be made in respect of any variety. |
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### Chapter 14: Competition policy

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| DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 14.1The Australian Government should repeal s. 51(3) of the *Competition and Consumer Act 2010* (Cth) (Competition and Consumer Act).The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission should issue guidance on the application of part IV of the Competition and Consumer Act to intellectual property. |
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### Chapter 15: IP and public institutions

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| DRAFT Recommendation 15.1All Australian, and State and Territory Governments should implement an open access policy for publicly‑funded research. The policy should provide free access through an open access repository for all publications funded by governments, directly or through university funding, within 12 months of publication. The policy should minimise exemptions.The Australian Government should seek to establish the same policy for international agencies to which it is a contributory funder, but which still charge for their publications, such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. |
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### Chapter 16: Institutional and governance arrangements

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| DRAFT Finding 16.1Model agreements on intellectual property would have the benefit of being fully transparent to Australian industry and to the broader community, as well as to foreign governments, so that all stakeholders are aware of what Australia sees as the ideal outcomes from a treaty. |
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### Chapter 17: International cooperation

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| DRAFT Finding 17.1Approaches to international cooperation and lowering transaction costs will be most effective when pursued multilaterally rather than through bilateral arrangements. Moreover, harmonisation of laws is not the sole, or necessarily desirable, form of cooperation. Other approaches to international intellectual property cooperation can achieve their goals at lower cost and with greater flexibility. |
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| DRAFT Recommendation 17.1Australia should revive its role in supporting opportunities to promote global cooperation on intellectual property policy among intellectual property offices through the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World Trade Organization to avoid duplication and reduce transaction costs. |
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### Chapter 18: Compliance and enforcement

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| DRAFT Recommendation 18.1The Australian Government should expand the safe harbour scheme to cover the broader set of online service providers intended in the *Copyright Act 1968* (Cth). |
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| DRAFT Finding 18.1The evidence suggests timely and cost‑effective access to copyright-protected works is the most efficient and effective way to reduce online copyright infringement. |
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## Requests for further information

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| Information request 5.1Other than for libraries and archives, to what extent are copyright licence conditions being used by rights holders to override the exceptions in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)? To what extent (if any) are these conditions being enforced and what are the resulting effects on users?Would amendments to the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) to preserve exceptions for digital material have any unintended impacts? |
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| Information request 5.2Is the code of conduct for copyright collecting societies sufficient to ensure they operate transparently, efficiently and at best practice?  |
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| Information request 5.3Will the Australian Government’s proposed reforms to simplify and streamline education statutory licences result in an efficient and effective scheme? Should similar reforms be made to the operation of the government statutory licence scheme? |
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| Information request 6.1The Commission is seeking further information from participants on the likely costs and benefits from reforming patent filing processes. Would there be any unintended consequences from requiring applicants to construct their claims in the two–part form that applies in Europe or articulating why their invention is non–obvious? Are there better approaches available? |
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| Information request 6.2The Commission is seeking information from participants on the costs and benefits of an exemption from infringement for experimental activities that use a patented invention. Are there any examples in Australia where the efforts of researchers have been hindered by the lack of such an exemption? |
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| Information request 8.1What approaches or tests could be used to differentiate between inventions where the contribution of embedded software is trivial and inventions where the contribution of embedded software is genuinely deserving of patent protection? Should such tests be implemented in law or patent examination practices? |
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| Information request 9.1How can transparency requirements for pay‑for‑delay settlements be implemented in a manner that retains effectiveness but minimises compliance cost? * Should there be public reporting of aggregated data?
* How can the system adequately capture agreements that involve the transfer of non‑monetary benefits such as licences or transfer of rights?
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| Information request 11.1To what extent — in terms of incidence and costs — is trade marked metadata used in a way to confuse consumers? Is such a problem likely to get worse or better? |
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| Information request 11.2To what extent and in what form does consumer confusion arise from the provision of wine and spirit geographical indications? Under what circumstances should wine and spirit geographical indications be amended or repealed? Who should make such decisions?  |
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| Information request 12.1Would extending essentially derived variety coverage to all plants reduce the potential for patent ‘sniping’ of varieties protected by Plant Breeder’s Rights?The Commission is also seeking feedback on the practicalities of developing and implementing a market–impact test to complement existing tests of essentially derived variety status. |
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| Information request 13.1What would be the implications of repealing the Circuit Layout Act 1989 (Cth)? Are there better ways to provide circuit layout rights? |
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| *Information request 14.1**Is there any evidence that grant‑back obligations or economic hold‑up are widespread problems in Australia? Is there a risk of these becoming problems in the future?* |
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| Information request 16.1What institutional and governance settings would best ensure that IP policy benefits from a policy champion and is guided by an overarching policy objective and an economywide perspective?Would vesting IP policy responsibility in a single department further these goals, and if so, which department would be best placed to balance the interests of rights holders and users, including follow‑on innovators?Are there any complementary or alternative measures that would help facilitate more integrated and evidence‑based IP policy‑making? |
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| Information request 16.2Is there merit in establishing a clearer separation between policy and administrative functions for intellectual property, and if so, where should the dividing line lie?What mechanisms are available for transparently setting out the separation of IP policy and administration responsibilities?  |
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| Information request 16.3What features should be included in a model agreement covering intellectual property if one were to be adopted? |
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| Information request 17.1How extensively have mechanisms such as the Patent Cooperation Treaty and patent prosecution highways been used to reduce the transaction costs of obtaining IP protection overseas? Have Australian businesses utilised opportunities for licensing through SourceIP? Are there other options that would facilitate and promote the licensing and transfer of intellectual property between Australia and other countries? |
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| Information request 18.1Would changes to the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court improve access to dispute resolution by small– and medium–sized enterprises? Should additional rules be introduced, such as caps on the amount of costs claimable in a case? What is the upper limit on damages claims the court should hear?Are there resourcing impediments to the proposed reforms to the Federal Circuit Court?Can greater use be made of cost orders in the Federal Court, including for discovery, to reduce costs further? Should additional Federal Court rules be introduced, such as caps on the amount of costs claimable in a case? |
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# 2 Assessing the IP system — an analytical framework

| Key points |
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| * The economic characteristics of knowledge are such that there will be an underprovision of ideas and innovation within an economy without some form of intervention by government. Intellectual property (IP) rights are intended to encourage more creative and innovative activity by providing a legal and exclusive right to stop others from using the expression of ideas without permission or payment.
* IP arrangements can correct the underprovision of new innovative products and processes to the benefit of society, but in so doing they create winners and losers. ‘Stronger’ IP rights are not necessarily ‘better’ from a community wide perspective.
* The reach of IP and IP policy has expanded over the decades, is far‑ranging, and is still growing. The evolution of how IP rights are assigned, used and enforced has advanced without a clearly articulated policy objective for the IP system. The lack of a policy objective has hindered past IP reform efforts.
* In the Commission’s view, the objective of the IP system should be to maximise the wellbeing of all Australians. In so doing, the IP system should provide incentives for innovation, investment and the production of creative works (that would otherwise not occur), while not unreasonably impeding further innovation, competition, investment and access to goods and services.
* The Commission has adopted four principles by which to assess and frame a well‑functioning IP system now and in the future. These principles are:
* effectiveness — that the IP system encourages the creation and dissemination of valuable ideas that would not have occurred in the absence of the system
* efficiency — that ideas are generated by the most efficient creators, traded efficiently, and do not impede competition
* adaptability — that the IP system adapts to changes in technology, competition and economic conditions
* accountability — that changes to the IP system are transparent and evidence‑based and reflect community values.
* The Commission has adopted an economic framework to assess the different dimensions of the IP system. An economic approach is appropriate as it considers the effects on all parties of current arrangements and potential reforms, and only seeks change where total benefits to the Australian community are likely to exceed total costs.
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3 How does the system fare?

| Key points |
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| * Australia’s intellectual property (IP) arrangements are not as effective as they could be.
* IP arrangements do not always result in additional innovation or creative works. And not all IP is socially valuable.
* Australian firms tend to ‘adopt and adapt’ innovations. Therefore disseminating and building on the knowledge of others is key. Low value patents can impede this innovation.
* In some cases, IP arrangements are hampering rather than encouraging the use of creative works. This is exacerbated by the long duration of copyright.
* Australia’s IP arrangements fail to strike an efficient balance between incentives for creators and costs to users.
* IP policies fail to account for overlapping rights. Protection can be sought under more than one right and firms are subsidised by a number of innovation policies.
* For some rights the length of protection is too long, often years or even decades longer than the commercial life of products. In the case of pharmaceuticals, extended patent terms impose significant costs on taxpayers and consumers.
* Australians are paying more than their overseas counterparts due to market segmentation, through parallel import restrictions and geoblocking.
* Multilateral and bilateral trade agreements substantially constrain the adaptability of Australia’s IP arrangements.
* Transparent and evidence‑based policy helps ensure the public can hold the Australian Government and its agencies to account for policy decisions and use of public resources.
* Australia has various checks and balances to ensure consistent application of IP regulations.
* However, there are clear areas for improvement. Responsibility for IP policy and administration is fragmented and, in some areas, policy development (especially in trade agreements) has suffered from a lack of transparency and a weak evidence base.
* Australia’s stance on IP rights is out of kilter with its position as a net importer of IP intensive goods and services. The costs associated with deficits in Australia’s IP arrangements are borne by Australian consumers, largely to the benefit of overseas rights holders.
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# 4 Copyright term and scope

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| Key points |
| * Copyright protects the original expression of literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, as well as published editions, films, recordings and broadcasts. Some important exceptions aside, the exclusive right to prevent works from being copied, performed, published, communicated or adapted without consent is aimed at incentivising investment in new creative output.
* An effective and efficient copyright system balances the cost of ensuring sufficient incentives to create new works against the community benefits that stem from the dissemination of creative works.
* Australia’s copyright system has expanded over time. New rights have been granted to cover more uses of copyright material. Some see this as highly problematic for consumers, however:
* in some instances, the expansion of scope has been justified — as for much online material
* the digital age has probably helped more than hindered access to copyright material for consumers
* in other cases, such as the introduction of moral rights, while the expansion in scope has no rationale, the costs are likely to be low and are kept low by either existing laws or the lack of credible enforceability.
* Nevertheless, there have been several major backward steps in copyright law.
* The term of protection for most works is now more than 70 years and considerably longer than necessary to incentivise creation of most works (with a commercial life less than 5 years). The current duration of copyright imposes costs on the community and access to works is restricted, particularly for works not commercially available but still subject to copyright protection.
* Extensions of term are particularly costly for existing copyrighted works. Such extensions create no additional incentive but impose additional costs on users.
* The solutions to the current problems are limited by international agreements, but scope exists to collaborate with other countries to seek mutual amendment to institute more consumer‑favourable copyright laws, including shorter protection terms of between 15‑25 years after creation of new works.
* Perpetual copyright protection of unpublished works should also be removed.
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# 5 Copyright licencing and exceptions

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| Key points |
| * Copyright licencing is common in Australia. It enhances the overall efficiency of the copyright system, ensuring creative works are brought to market and consumers have a variety of ways to access copyright material.
* Copyright collecting societies act on behalf of their rights holder members. Despite some concern with the potential market power collecting societies may exercise, it is likely they increase efficiency.
* Geoblocking results in Australians paying higher prices (often for a lesser or later service) than consumers overseas. Consumer rights to circumvent geoblocks should be enshrined in the *Copyright Act 1968* (Cth).
* Australia’s current exception for fair dealing is weighted too much in favour of rights holders. Adopting an expansive ‘fair use’ exception is likely to improve the balance between the rights of copyright holders and accessible use by consumers and intermediate users, and therefore deliver net benefits for Australia.
* Specifically, Australia’s exceptions for fair dealing are too narrow and prescriptive, do not reflect the way people actually consume and use content in the digital world, and are insufficiently flexible to account for new legitimate uses of copyright material.
* Fair use exceptions operate in other comparable jurisdictions, such as the United States, where it is well established.
* A new user right of ‘fair use’ should be implemented to balance the excessive term and scope of copyright protection with user rights.
* At its heart, Australia’s fair use exception should permit all uses of copyright material that do not materially reduce the incentives to create and disseminate creative works.
* The approach set out by the Australian Law Reform Commission in its 2014 report *Copyright and the Digital Economy* is still too restrictive. The exception should go further and permit, for example, the use of orphan works and works not being supplied commercially by rights holders.
* A range of illustrative purposes, coupled with a proposed objects clause, should reduce residual uncertainty from adopting fair use in Australia.
* The Australian Government should immediately repeal the remaining parallel import restrictions on copyright‑protected works, taking effect no later than the end of 2017.
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6 The patent system: focussing on the fundamentals

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| **Key points** |
| * The Australian patent system is failing to meet the principles of a well‑functioning intellectual property system.
* The rules and processes for granting patents have led to a non‑trivial number of patented inventions that do not benefit the community, which has reduced the system’s effectiveness.
* The strength of rights provided to patent holders is excessive and firms are using the system strategically. These outcomes have reduced the system’s efficiency.
* As a result, the current arrangements are frustrating the efforts of follow–on innovators and researchers and raising the costs of innovation, imposing costs on consumers of technology and the broader community.
* Achieving a more effective and efficient patent system is constrained by provisions in international agreements such as the Trade–Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement and bilateral and regional trade agreements.
* Nonetheless, some important policy reforms can be achieved.
* The effectiveness of the patent system would be improved by introducing reforms that help the system to better target socially valuable and additional inventions.
* The case for raising the inventive step required to receive a patent is compelling, and would better ensure that patented inventions are socially valuable.
* Introducing a suitably worded objects clause to the *Patents Act 1990* (Cth) would help to improve the likelihood that decisions made with respect to the application and design of the Act would promote the public interest. An objects clause would also help to ensure that the system remains adaptable and fit for purpose as new sectors and technologies emerge.
* Reforming patent application processes to elicit better information from applicants would improve decision making, and depending on the information provided, could make the nature of a patented invention clearer to follow–on innovators, helping them to avoid infringement and better identify and build on the current technology.
* The efficiency of the patent system would be improved by making greater use of patent fees to help ensure that patent holders are not overcompensated and to limit the costs of protection imposed on the community.
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7 The innovation patent system

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| **Key points** |
| * The objective of the innovation patent system (IPS) is to promote innovation by Australian small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). While the Commission has been mindful of this policy objective, in assessing the IPS it has considered the welfare of the whole community.
* There are very few innovation patents in force. In 2014 there were around 6000 active innovation patents in Australia, compared to over 120 000 standard patents.
* There are problems with the current design of the IPS.
* The innovative step is lower than for standard patents — which itself only requires a ‘scintilla’ of invention. This has contributed to a multitude of low value innovation patents, which creates uncertainty for other innovators and financiers and increases the likelihood that patent thickets will develop.
* Innovation patents can be used strategically, either to target alleged infringers of standard patents or to increase uncertainty over the scope of rights for competitors.
* Perversely, these outcomes are particularly harmful for SMEs. Not only is the IPS likely to be failing its stated objective, it may be making it *harder* for SMEs to innovate.
* Reforms would be required should the IPS be retained.
* There would be strong grounds for setting the innovative threshold at the same level as the inventive threshold under the standard patent system. This would help to exclude obvious inventions from patent protection.
* Options to address strategic behaviour include reintroducing mandatory examination, and limiting the period in which damages could apply until after the official publication of the claims that have been infringed.
* The Commission’s view, and that of other experts, is that the IPS should be abolished.
* While a reformed IPS would offer a marginal improvement to the welfare of the community, there would be greater benefits for the community if the IPS was abolished. SMEs would be expected to be major beneficiaries from abolishing the IPS.
* Reforming the IPS would also reduce its cost advantage for SMEs. There are preferred (and more direct) ways to reduce costs and timing delays for applicants, some of which are already being canvassed by IP Australia and the Australian courts.
* Addressing the flaws of the IPS would see innovation patents largely revert to their predecessor, petty patents. It would therefore represent a return to an approach already found to be lacking — tantamount to a policy Groundhog Day.
* Abolishing the IPS would simplify the overall patent system, reduce administrative and transaction costs, and remove the ability for patent holders to use innovation patents for strategic purposes.
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8 Business methods and software patents

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| **Key points** |
| * There is a clear case to exclude business methods and software (BM&S) from patentable subject matter.
* Evidence suggests BM&S patents do not encourage new, valuable innovation (and they can be used to block the implementation of new ideas). Excluding them from patentable subject matter would also bring Australia into alignment with the approaches taken in other jurisdictions and would not impinge on international obligations.
* Business methods are a way of operating ‘any aspect of an economic enterprise’, and encompass a broad range of ideas and activities. Software is a set of instructions that allow computing devices to function.
* With the rise of the digital economy, many business methods are implemented *by* software, making it difficult to separate the two. In some cases, innovations in BM&S are afforded protection by the patent system.
* The patent protection that has been afforded to BM&S in Australia has generally been excessive, ineffective and not in the interests of the community:
* Patent term is far longer than the development cycle of BM&S.
* Patents have rarely spurred software innovation, but provided strong incentives for strategic behaviour to block competitors and hinder software development. In some cases, the BM&S is obsolete by the time a patent for it is granted.
* The costs of ill–fitting arrangements are accentuated since BM&S patents are used more extensively by foreign holders, rather than domestic firms.
* The open source movement demonstrates that incentives to innovate and disseminate new software can occur in the absence of patent protections. Copyright also covers software, raising questions about the need for multiple forms of intellectual property protection.
* Other countries have narrowed the intellectual property protection afforded to BM&S, either as the result of court action or by directly changing patent law. Recent cases in Australia have ‘wound back’ the scope of patent protection afforded to some BM&S.
* With software also embedded in otherwise patentable inventions, a challenge for patent policy is determining where to draw the line. The Commission is seeking feedback on this issue.
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# 9 Pharmaceuticals – getting the right policy prescription

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| Key points |
| * Pharmaceuticals are an archetypal patentable product with high research and development costs coupled with the ease of copying. Proponents reasonably argue that, without patent protection, many otherwise valuable medicines would not be developed.
* Beyond general patent protection, pharmaceuticals are also subject to specific arrangements including extensions of patent terms and data protection.
* An extension of term (EoT), of up to five years, is argued to be necessary compensation for regulatory delays that can reduce the market life of a patent.
* In extending market exclusivity, EoTs impose considerable costs on consumers, government, and ultimately taxpayers (through the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme).
* EoTs should therefore be carefully targeted, and only available in instances of unreasonable regulatory delay.
* EoTs should be offered as tailored rights specific to the domestic market, rather than extensions of existing patents.
* Data protection is afforded to the test data used for regulatory approval for a period of five years. Data protection is an automatic right, it is not assessed and cannot be challenged. Given this, and the detrimental impacts on competition, the duration should not be extended.
* Instead, the Australian Government should seek the cooperation of other countries towards the eventual publication of protected data.
* Biologic drugs differ from standard pharmaceuticals in that they are difficult, and costly, to copy and produce. There is a lack of evidence that patents are providing insufficient protection for biologics.
* Extending data protection for biologics is likely to overcompensate the majority of products and increase costs to consumers.
* Despite a range of sector‑specific benefits, some pharmaceutical companies use the patent system strategically to effectively extend their period of market exclusivity.
* The practice of incremental patenting known as evergreening is likely occurring to some extent in Australia and is best addressed on a case‑by‑case basis, through proposed changes to the inventive step test for patents.
* While there is no evidence of ‘pay‑for‑delay’ settlements in Australia, this may simply reflect the lack of monitoring arrangements, rather than the absence of such activity. In jurisdictions where ‘pay‑for‑delay’ settlements have been monitored and proven, their costs have been substantial. Australia should introduce such monitoring arrangements to detect and deter such behaviour.
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10 Registered designs

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| **Key Points** |
| * Registered design rights serve a niche role in Australia’s intellectual property rights system: protecting the appearance of products that have an industrial or commercial use.
* To enforce a design right in Australia, the design must be both registered and examined and certified (to confirm the design is new and distinctive).
* Only a small proportion (some 20 per cent) of registered designs holders seek to have their designs examined and certified.
* Stakeholders have highlighted various concerns with Australia’s design rights system, including:
* low uptake of design rights
* lack of harmonisation with designs laws in other countries
* lack of adaptability to changes in technology and industry practices
* lack of evidence that design rights generate net benefits to Australia.
* Despite these concerns, there is no clear superior alternative, other than improving the existing system.
* The Advisory Council on Intellectual Property’s recent review of Australia’s designs system considered options for improving the registered design system, including:
* increased international harmonisation and streamlining of procedures for acquiring registered design rights internationally (including whether to join the Hague Agreement)
* measures to address poor public understanding of designs law and its benefits
* changes to better adapt designs law to new technologies and industry practices.
* There is an absence of strong evidence that joining the Hague Agreement would be in Australia’s interests. The benefits to business from reduced administrative costs may be small and there would be costs to Australia associated with the requirement to extend Australia’s term of protection from 10 to 15 years.
* Some measures to address poor public understanding of designs law, such as clearer terminology, appear to have merit.
* There is a lack of evidence to support the case for extending the scope of design protection to virtual and partial designs.
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# 11 Trade marks and geographical indications

| Key points |
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| * Trade marks can help consumers find goods and services by making it easier to differentiate between producers. They can also encourage businesses to build and maintain a positive reputation. But trade marks can also be used in ways that can limit competition and the welfare of the community.
* An effective trade mark system needs to strike a balance so marks are not granted excessively and do not mislead consumers. A balanced system focusses on the quality of marks and geographical indications granted, as well as their number. Evidence suggests that legislative change has resulted in an imbalance, with a greater number of trade marks being registered than was previously the case.
* A better balance between incumbent firms and new competitors can be achieved by returning powers to the Trade Marks Office to ‘disclaim’ rights over excessive terms sought by incumbents. Abolishing defensive trade marks and raising fees for applications that seek overly broad trade mark rights would also contribute to a better balance.
* Evidence also suggests trade marks are resulting in consumer confusion, especially in relation to geographic terms. This confusion can be redressed by empowering the Trade Marks Office to probe claims made in such marks more rigorously. The ‘geographical indications’ used for wine and spirits may also be contributing to consumer confusion, but the extent of this is unclear.
* There is also confusion around rights afforded by a business name relative to a trade mark. A more effective system to address this problem requires linking business registrations with IP Australia’s trade mark database, which would reduce the risk of unintentional infringement of trade marks, especially by small businesses.
* Parallel imports of legitimately trade marked goods are often prevented by law that has become unclear and unworkable. This is to the detriment of competition and especially to Australian consumers. Amending the *Trade Marks Act 1995* to explicitly allow for parallel imports would benefit the community.
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12 Plant Breeder’s Rights

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| Key points |
| * Plant Breeder’s Rights (PBR) are a *sui generis* regime of intellectual property (IP) rights used to protect innovations in plant breeding. PBR are similar to patents in that they provide rights‑holders with a time‑limited right (20 to 25 years, depending on the type of plant) to exclusive control over the commercial use of a registered plant.
* PBR protection is less extensive than patent protection because of the breeder’s exception which allows new plant varieties to be used immediately as inputs to further breeding programs. The breeder’s exception recognises the incremental and long‑term nature of conventional plant breeding.
* The introduction of PBR in 1994 was expected to encourage greater investment in plant breeding and lead to greater private sector involvement. To a large extent, these goals have been achieved.
* Faster rates of genetic gain were also anticipated, although the evidence on this is mixed. PBR are strongly supported by plant breeders however, and the potential to profit from the development of successful new varieties provides a strong incentive to innovate.
* However, plant breeders and other stakeholders have expressed concern that the scope of protection provided by PBR is being undermined by technology changes, opening the door for an increase in unauthorised copying.
* Amending the *Plant Breeder’s Rights Act 1994* to enable essentially derived variety declarations to be made in respect of any variety would close a loophole that potentially allows downstream breeders to copy and sell existing PBR protected varieties without facing the likelihood of infringement.
* The use of a market‑impact test to support existing tests of difference between plant varieties could further reduce the risk of fraudulent or copycat breeding and ensure that initial and follow‑on breeders share appropriately in the value each has contributed to a new plant variety.
* In conjunction with the introduction of PBR, the development of end point royalty (EPR) systems has been central to the success of commercial plant breeding in Australia. In much of the agriculture sector, revenue from EPRs now fully funds commercial plant breeding operations.
* There is scope for greater use and efficiency of EPR systems, particularly in the horticulture and nursery sectors. Compliance with royalty and licensing agreements is best achieved through closer cooperation and consultation. Industry groups should lead efforts to promote awareness and understanding of the rules regarding PBR.
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13 Circuit layout rights

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| **Key points** |
| * Australia’s introduction of circuit layout rights in 1989 was part of multilateral trade negotiations.
* Dedicated rights to protect Intellectual Property (IP) in circuit layout designs were first introduced in the United States in the 1980s in response to concerns about unauthorised copying. At the time, the United States also pushed hard for other countries to recognise circuit layout rights. Australia responded by introducing the *Circuit Layout Act 1989* (Cth).
* There is little evidence that unauthorised copying of integrated circuits remains problematic in Australia or internationally. A number of factors have seen unauthorised copying become increasingly unworkable and unprofitable:
* customers are demanding unique and customised integrated circuits
* the technology required to manufacture integrated circuits is more complex and shorter lived
* research, production and setup costs are increasing.
* In addition to the ‘natural’ protections afforded by these changes in market circumstances, circuit layouts can also be protected by other IP rights — for example, patents can protect semiconductors within the integrated circuit. Protection can also be afforded through trade secrets and use of contracts.
* While there is little evidence that the circuit layout rights system is used much at all, and the Commission questions the need for a *sui generis* right — Australia’s obligations under TRIPS means some form of protection for integrated circuits must be afforded in law.
* Retaining a *sui generis* right may still be in Australia’s best interests compared to the alternatives. The protection afforded by the circuit layout rights system is more limited than those provided under other forms of IP rights.
* Australia’s experience with circuit layout rights provides a cautionary tale. The community would be better served by IP rights that are motivated by the underlying economics of protecting ideas, rather than a desire to be a party to multilateral agreements.
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14 Intellectual property rights and competition law

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| **Key points** |
| * Section 51(3) of the *Competition and Consumer Act 2010* (CCA) exempts licensing or assignment of intellectual property (IP) from certain competition provisions of the CCA.
* The rationale for the exemption has largely fallen away. IP rights and competition are no longer thought to be in ‘fundamental conflict’. IP rights do not, in and of themselves, have significant competition implications.
* Rather, competition implications arise in those cases where there are few substitutes or where the aggregation of IP rights may create market power.
* At present, the immediate costs and benefits of removing the exemption under section 51 (3) are finely balanced. Arguably, however, the nexus between IP arrangements and competition policy will take on greater importance as the level of licensing and cross licensing (especially in pharmaceutical and communications markets) increases.
* The Commission considers that commercial transactions involving IP rights, including the assignment and licensing of such rights, should be subject to the CCA in the same manner as transactions involving other property and assets. Accordingly, section 51(3) of the CCA should be repealed.
* However, distinctive treatment of IP rights is needed under the CCA.
* Regulatory guidance on the application of competition law to IP would adequately address any potential compliance costs and uncertainty. This proposed approach is similar to current approaches in Europe and the United States.
* Reforming per se provisions in the CCA along the lines suggested by the Competition Policy Review would address legitimate concerns that socially valuable activities are not impeded.
* There is no case for extending part IIIA of the CCA to IP.
* The imperatives for compulsory access and the effects on incentives to invest in IP differ across the types of IP. The existing access provisions for each type of IP allow for these differences.
* Replacing the existing compulsory access arrangements with part IIIA would likely impose higher barriers to access and impede innovation.
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# 15 IP and public institutions

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| Key points |
| * Australian Governments provide significant funding for research. Some publicly‑funded research has the potential to be commercialised and IP arrangements can play a role in facilitating commercialisation.
* Commercialisation incentives generated by IP arrangements must be balanced against their potential to limit the dissemination of knowledge.
* IP policy has the potential to alter the balance of activities that are undertaken by Australian research institutions. IP policy should seek to be neutral in respect of its influence on the balance as determined by Australian research institutions.
* An important mechanism for diffusion of knowledge from publicly‑funded research is publication in academic journals. Access to this material is limited by copyright.
* All Governments should adopt open access policies for the results of publicly‑funded research. The Australian Government should encourage international agencies of which it is a funder to adopt a similar policy.
* Current policy settings allow institutions that receive public funding to assert ownership rights over IP that results from that funding. International experience suggests that this is more effective than the alternatives of government ownership or ‘professor privilege’.
* Evidence has not been presented to support more interventionist approaches to the management of publicly‑funded IP, such as use it or lose it provisions, which would allow public funders to appropriate IP if it is not utilised by its owner.
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16 Intellectual property’s institutional and governance arrangements

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| **Key Points** |
| * A range of public institutions have a role in Australia’s intellectual property (IP) system. The three main public institutions are IP Australia, the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science, and the Department of Communications and the Arts.
* IP Australia is responsible for administering Australia’s patents, trade mark, designs, and plant breeder’s rights systems and shares responsibility for policy development for these rights with the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science.
* The Department of Communications and the Arts is now responsible for administering copyright and circuit layout rights.
* Stakeholder concerns about current institutional and governance settings include:
* IP policy‑making responsibility is fragmented
* IP policy development often lacks transparency, meaningful consultation and supporting evidence, especially IP negotiations in international trade agreements
* potential conflicts between IP Australia’s dual roles of regulator and policy adviser
* a lack of independent and integrated policy advice.
* Institutional and governance settings that support coherent policy development and decision making are of enduring importance:
* A ‘policy champion’, with an integrated and economywide focus, along with an overarching policy objective, would help achieve a balance of perspectives in IP policy. The Commission is seeking feedback on the merit of IP policy consolidation in achieving this outcome and where policy responsibility should reside.
* IP policy responsibilities should be set out more clearly and transparently. The Commission is seeking feedback on where the dividing line between IP policy development and administration should be set and how to make the delineation more transparent.
* IP policy development would benefit from expert independent input and external scrutiny. However, expert advice does not necessarily have to come from a standing body.
* Further improvements are needed to better develop the evidence base upon which IP provisions in trade agreements are based. Model agreements on IP would have the benefit of being fully transparent to Australian industry and the broader community, as well as to foreign governments, so that all stakeholders are aware of what Australia sees as the ideal outcomes from a treaty.
* The Commission is seeking further information on the merits and design of a model agreement for IP.
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# 17 International cooperation in IP

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|  Key points  |
| * Australia is a net importer of intellectual property (IP) and most applicants that use Australia’s IP system also seek IP protection abroad.
* There can be benefits from pursuing international cooperation to reduce the transaction costs of seeking IP protection in multiple jurisdictions and to facilitate trade and capital flows in IP‑intensive goods and services.
* Australia is extensively involved in various multilateral fora and initiatives to advance cooperation on IP administration between patent offices, including mechanisms through the World Intellectual Property Office such as the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the Patent Prosecution Highway for fast tracking applications.
* Lack of progress in multilateral forums has accelerated agreement making on IP provisions in preferential trade agreements including by Australia.
* Some bilateral agreements have led to stronger standards for protection than those set out in the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade‑Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, imposing costs on Australia and other countries.
* The inclusion of IP provisions in preferential trade agreements adds to the complexity and costs of negotiating IP in international agreements and reduces domestic policy flexibility.
* A range of approaches to international regulatory cooperation offer alternatives to harmonisation of IP standards. Such efforts will be most effective when pursued multilaterally rather than through bilateral arrangements.
* Further efforts to promote cooperative mechanisms through the World Intellectual Property Organization, and other systems used by international IP offices, should aim to reduce duplication of international search activity, lower transaction costs, and facilitate the licensing and transfer of IP rights across borders.
* The Commission is seeking information on the effectiveness of current initiatives and other potential cooperative mechanisms to promote IP licensing and transfer between Australia and other countries.
* There is scope for unilateral action on the part of the Australian Government to achieve more balanced IP arrangements within the confines of international obligations. However, some reforms to specific areas of the IP system are best pursued multilaterally.
* The Commission has identified specific areas of IP arrangements where Australia should work multilaterally to change IP rules, including changes to patentability criteria and data exclusivity arrangements for pharmaceuticals.
* While the technology behind a digital copyright exchange to facilitate licensing is still under development, Australia will likely benefit from involvement in such initiatives. This should be an industry‑led endeavour.
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18 Compliance and enforcement of IP rights

| Key points |
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| * Enforcement is a key factor in the overall efficiency and effectiveness of Australia’s intellectual property (IP) system.
* Little concrete data exists on the rate of IP infringement in Australia, and even less on the economic consequences for IP rights holders or those seeking to innovate and create.
* Online copyright infringement remains problematic for rights holders. Evidence suggests many people infringe copyright because of the ongoing difficulty and cost in accessing content.
* Changes to the law to encourage Internet service providers to cooperate with rights holders, as well as litigation, have only had a modest impact in reducing infringement. Further legislative change is unlikely to improve compliance with the law.
* Instead, evidence suggests infringement declines with better content availability and most consumers prefer paid, legal consumption. As such, an effective approach to reducing infringement is the timely release of content to Australian consumers. This requires action by rights holders and their intermediaries.
* While Australia’s enforcement system works reasonably well for large rights holders, reforms can improve outcomes, including for small‑ and medium‑sized enterprises (SMEs).
* The Commission does not see a strong case to establish a dedicated IP court along the lines of the UK’s IP Enterprise Court.
* Instead, recent self–initiated reforms of the Federal Court, with an emphasis on lower costs and informal alternatives, should improve enforcement outcomes and replicate many of the benefits a dedicated IP court may offer.
* Changes to the Federal Circuit Court could further improve dispute resolution options for SMEs, including expanding and separating its jurisdiction from the Federal Court to hear lower value disputes, especially involving SMEs.
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