MASTER BUILDERS
AUSTRALIA

Housing Supply Regulation

Productivity Commission

15 June 2026

WHO WE ARE

Master Builders is the nation's peak building and construction industry association, which was federated on a national basis in 1890. Master Builders' members are the Master Builder State and Territory Associations. Over 130 years, the Master Builders network has grown to more than 32,000 businesses nationwide, including the top 100 construction companies. Master Builders is the only industry association representing all three sectors: residential, commercial, and civil construction.

The Master Builders network also delivers vocational education and training through its network of registered and group training organisations across Australia. This includes trade qualifications in building and carpentry as well as ongoing professional development training.

Membership with Master Builders is a stamp of quality, demonstrating that a builder values high standards of skill, integrity, and responsibility to their clients.

Master Builders' vision is for a profitable and sustainable building and construction industry.

Introduction

On 1 June, the Productivity Commission issued a call for submissions in response to a request from the Government to examine how regulations across all levels of government can be improved to speed up delivery of new housing and boost construction productivity.

The Terms of Reference ask the Commission to focus on 3 specific areas of regulation:

1. Approval processes (for example, development, building and post-approvals, including any barriers to the uptake of more productive methods of construction).

2. Availability and use of land for housing (for example, land release, land-use controls).

3. Processes and frameworks to deliver new and utilise existing housing infrastructure (for example, growth infrastructure planning, developer contributions model).

The government has also asked the Commission to identify examples of regulations that most affect housing supply, housing affordability and construction productivity.

Master Builders takes this opportunity to respond to the Productivity Commission's inquiry and provides the following responses to the Commission's seven information requests. Our responses are grounded in the practical experience of the 32,000-plus businesses, most of which are small to medium-sized, and often sole traders that build Australia's homes and infrastructure.

Australia's Housing Crisis

Australia has a housing shortage. The National Housing Accord, agreed by National Cabinet, set an aspirational target of 1.2 million new well-located homes over the five years to June 2029. As of February 2026, a backlog of approximately 72,800 homes has already accumulated in the first 18 months of the Accord period. At current trajectories, Master Builders Australia forecasts that approximately 1,020,000 homes will be delivered over the Accord period, representing a shortfall of 180,000 homes against the target.

The residential construction sector has simultaneously experienced significant productivity decline. Multi-factor productivity in construction is 18.6 per cent lower than its 2013–14 peak, and labour productivity has declined in seven of the ten years to 2023–24 (ABS construction industry productivity data). This has translated directly into higher costs and longer build times: the average detached house now takes 11.5 months from approval to completion, up from 8.6 months a decade ago; apartment construction averages 32.9 months, up from under 21 months.

The Productivity Commission's December 2025 Inquiry Report, Creating a more dynamic and resilient economy, estimated that regulation adds between $135,000 and $320,000 to the cost of a newly built house and $40,000 to $175,000 to a new apartment (pp. 185–186). The Centre for International Economics (2025) estimates that regulatory costs, statutory taxes, and infrastructure charges together contribute up to 49 per cent of the cost of a greenfield house and land package in Sydney.

We need action now

While Master Builders will continue to contribute to inquiries of this nature, we are of the view that numerous Federal and State inquiries and reports have highlighted the challenges and proposed solutions to the matters raised.

In fact, the Productivity Commission's own Chair Danielle Wood's recent essay titled 'The Red Tape Impulse' has laid bare a regulatory landscape that converts good intentions into a business quagmire.

Ms Wood points to the regulatory burden pushing many "potentially feasible developments into the 'doesn't stack up' column, leading to fewer houses being built".

As the Head of the National Housing Supply and Affordability Council told the Senate recently, "...gaining approvals is not really the bottleneck now. The bottleneck is achieving a feasible development."

This is on the back of a report by the Productivity Commission finding that the regulatory costs on housing construction are as high as $47.5 billion per year, translating up to $320,000 per average new house. This has serious implications for the affordability of housing, and to put this into perspective, a house deposit doesn't even cover the red tape.

These inefficiencies are not just frustrating and costly for builders and aspiring homeowners; they have broader economic consequences, putting a drag on GDP, productivity and growth. They are directly contributing to the gap between housing supply and housing need defined in the government's housing targets.

Cutting unnecessary regulation and putting downward pressure on the cost per new house is an essential part of the policy mix to get more Australians into the housing market.

We know the answers; what's needed now is action, encouraging investment, improving efficiency, cutting red tape, growing the workforce and delivering enabling infrastructure.

Response to Information Requests

Information Request 1: Which regulatory reforms should governments prioritise to get more homes built more quickly?

Master Builders recommends governments prioritise four reform categories in the following order of expected positive supply impact.

First, approval process rationalisation is the single highest-leverage reform.

The Productivity Commission's own 2025 research paper *Housing construction productivity: Can we fix it?* identified a slow and complex approvals system as a primary driver of poor productivity outcomes.

A developer seeking to build new housing in Australia must navigate development approval, building approval, construction and infrastructure/utility approval sequentially, each with its own documentation requirements, fees, and assessment timelines. These run consecutively rather than concurrently, adding months to project timelines and imposing financing holding costs that directly reduce project feasibility. Concurrent assessment pathways, binding statutory timeframes for consent authorities, and a single digital lodgement portal for all approval documentation would each reduce this burden materially.

Second, the National Planning Reform Blueprint commitments made by states and territories, including zoning reforms permitting medium density 'as of right', must be accelerated and evaluated against measurable supply outcomes. To date, monitoring under the Blueprint progress reports has tracked process commitments rather than demonstrated supply impacts.

Third, infrastructure contribution reform is necessary to restore project feasibility.

Developer contributions and infrastructure charges must be paid at the earliest stages of a project, years before any return on investment is realised. The time value of these front-loaded costs is a direct deterrent to medium and higher-density infill development. Reforms should include contribution caps, payment deferral mechanisms linked to project milestones, and transparency requirements governing how contribution levels are calculated.

Fourth, utility connection performance must be regulated.

Builders across Australia consistently report delays of six months or more in obtaining electricity and water connections for new developments. These delays impose financing costs, extend build timelines, and in some cases cause projects to be deferred or abandoned.

No nationally consistent data is collected on utility provider performance against connection timeframes. Master Builders recommends the immediate development of such a framework, linked to financial incentives and penalties.

Example – Queensland Builder

Tier III midsize Builder, Residential Unit Development

After more than a year coordinating Council, Unity Water, Energex, Telstra and NBN Co, at a total cost of $1.7m, the project is now effectively blocked by Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads (DTMR) representatives through delays in issuing required permits.

This blockage places critical, long-lead service relocation bookings at risk. Loss of these bookings could significantly impact project timelines and costs, putting overall delivery in jeopardy. We now face serious project risk with no clear escalation pathway.

Information Request 2: Which steps of the housing regulatory approvals process are the most onerous, time consuming and costly? Why? How could the burden be reduced without compromising regulatory objectives?

Industry experience consistently identifies three stages of the approvals process as disproportionately burdensome.

The pre-application and documentation preparation stage imposes the highest upfront cost.

Environmental reports, heritage assessments, infrastructure reports, built form reports, community impact reports, and various certification documents must be assembled before a development application can be lodged.

For smaller builders and developers, who represent 98 per cent of Australia's construction businesses, commissioning this suite of consultants represents a material financial commitment with no guarantee of approval.

The post-development approval, pre-construction stage is the least understood but increasingly significant bottleneck. After development approval is received, developers must still obtain infrastructure approvals, finalise subdivision approvals where required, and negotiate development contribution agreements before construction can commence. These steps are not parallelised and

their sequencing is not governed by statutory timeframes in most jurisdictions. The uncertainty they create is a financing risk that elevates the cost of capital for development projects.

The lack of consistency across local government magnifies these challenges.

Australia's 537 local government areas each operate largely distinct planning frameworks, with variations in documentation requirements, assessment criteria, and performance standards for processing times.

A builder operating across multiple LGAs cannot create standardised systems or documentation libraries; each project requires bespoke preparation. This structural inefficiency is particularly damaging to productivity in a sector dominated by small firms.

Example - Queensland Siting and setback requirements

While the Queensland Development Code (QDC) establishes baseline standards, these are not applied uniformly across the state. Each of Queensland's 77 local governments can vary the requirements in their planning scheme. In practice, this results in significant variation even between neighbouring councils. For example, front setbacks can range from around 4 metres to 6 metres depending on the local government area, and that is just one variable. The effect is to restrict economies of scale in housing design and delivery.

The Queensland Government is currently working to replace the current requirements with a Queensland Housing Code, and again it will not be mandatory for Queensland local government to adopt the new requirements as one consistent set of rules.

Information Request 3: Which recent reforms to approvals have been the most and least effective in increasing new housing supply?

The most effective recent reforms have been those that reduce the number of sequential decision points developers must navigate and provide certainty of outcome.

Complying development certificates (CDCs) in New South Wales represent the most established example of a fast-track approval pathway in Australia. By enabling development that meets prescribed standards to be approved by a private certifier without a council assessment process, CDCs have materially shortened approval timelines for eligible projects. Industry feedback indicates that CDC pathways typically deliver approval significantly faster than standard development applications across comparable project types. For example, NSW Planning's data indicates that complying development (CDC) approvals are usually completed in about 20–25 days, whereas development applications (DAs) generally take around 70–120 days.

Of course, the receipt of the approval is only the start and from there the journey to deliver a habitable new home is a lengthy one. As the chart below illustrates, the build times for new house in NSW has lengthened considerably since the pandemic. In 2018-19, there was typically about 9.5 months between approval being granted and the new home being completed. Latest figures for 2024-25 indicate that it now takes 12.3 months to complete a new house in NSW. NSW's experience with longer home building times is matched in the other states and territories.



That's not the worst of it. For higher density homes, building delays have deteriorated even more sharply. For apartments in NSW, the approval-to-completion timeframe is now 37.1 months – almost a whole year longer than the build times which prevailed prior to the pandemic (26.4 months in 2018-19). The worsening build times for NSW apartments are included in the chart below. This is a similar trend to that seen in other states.



Several jurisdictions have established housing delivery units or cross-agency coordinating bodies in recent years, but where these bodies lack authority to override consent authorities or impose binding deadlines on assessment processes, they add an additional layer of engagement without reducing the underlying burden.

AI-assisted assessment tools are at an early stage but show genuine promise for routine residential applications. Several councils are piloting automated pre-lodgement compliance checking that allows applicants to identify and resolve non-compliances before lodgement. This reduces both requests for further information during assessment and the incidence of refused applications, both of which are significant sources of delay. However, integrity and security within these systems must be ensured to build trust and confidence.

Example – Negative impact – unanticipated regulatory burden

A reform introduced in the 1990s is now contributing to unintended negative consequences, evident in the evolving expectations placed on Statutory Building Surveyors (SBS) across Australia. This shift is particularly apparent in the way SBSs undertake building control functions, including both design and construction acceptance.

Master Builders has received consistent feedback from our members that SBSs are increasingly requesting additional and, in some cases, extensive information during the building permit (design acceptance) process. Moreover, there is a growing expectation for detailed reports and independent consultant certifications to verify that completed construction complies with the National Construction Code (NCC).

These requirements are often not clearly defined prior to builders entering into contractual agreements. Consequently, they introduce uncertainty and place an unanticipated burden on projects (adversely impacting productivity, extending timelines, and increasing costs).

We consider that this shift is being driven by heightened government expectations of the SBS role, coupled with increased concerns regarding professional liability and insurance exposure. These pressures are further compounded by the complexity of the NCC, which can contribute to inconsistent interpretation and risk-averse assessment practices.

Information Request 4: Which specific zoning and land-use controls most limit the supply of new housing? What are the benefits to consider of specific land-use controls. How does this vary across particular Australian jurisdictions or areas?

The Productivity Commission's own 2025 interim report found that restrictive zoning rules are the biggest regulatory barrier to building homes, leading to less building activity and lower density than would be optimal. Industry experience is consistent with this finding. The controls that most constrain supply are those that restrict residential density in locations where demand for housing is highest.

Single-dwelling covenants and low-density residential zone designations in inner and middle-ring suburbs of major cities are the most significant constraint. Where zoning permits only detached housing on minimum lot sizes of 450 to 600 square metres, the economics of medium-density development, which is the typology most aligned with demonstrated demand in established suburbs, are structurally foreclosed regardless of how efficiently the approvals process operates. Height limits and floor space ratio (FSR) caps that apply across broad residential zones rather than at the site level compound this problem by making higher-yield apartment development unviable on sites where the land value already reflects medium-density potential.

Heritage and neighbourhood character overlays are a secondary but material constraint.

These overlays are frequently applied to broad areas rather than individual buildings or streets of heritage significance, and their practical effect is to prevent any residential development that departs from the prevailing built form, including the replacement of modest dwellings with townhouses or apartments. The benefits of heritage and neighbourhood character protections are real and legitimate, but their geographic scope in Australian cities frequently exceeds what the underlying heritage values justify.

Minimum car parking requirements embedded in planning schemes represent a controls category that imposes cost without commensurate benefit in locations well-served by public transport. The requirement to provide one or more basement or at-grade car spaces per dwelling directly increases construction cost, reduces achievable yield on constrained sites, and in some typologies is the single factor that makes a project commercially unviable.

Example – Queensland Design and Siting Codes as a Constraint on Supply and Innovation

In Queensland, the absence of standardised, mandated design and siting requirements across local government areas has created inconsistency that directly constrains both housing supply and innovation in construction methods.

Planning codes that standardise basic siting and design requirements for detached houses, secondary dwellings, and small attached dwellings allow for consistency, reduce uncertainty, and improve productivity. This is particularly important for facilitating innovation in Modern Methods of Construction,

where prefabricated and modular elements require predictable site and built form parameters to be commercially viable.

The Queensland Productivity Commission addressed this directly in its Final Report, Opportunities to Improve the Productivity of the Queensland Construction Industry (October 2025), recommending the introduction of a standardised Housing Code for Queensland (Recommendation 21). Work is currently underway on a Queensland Housing Code that would set out standardised siting and design requirements. However, the Code will not be mandated, meaning its adoption by councils remains voluntary. Master Builders regards this as a missed opportunity. Without mandating the Code, the heterogeneity of design and siting requirements across Queensland's local government areas will persist, continuing to impose inconsistency costs on builders and inhibiting the uptake of more productive construction methods.

The Queensland Productivity Commission's Recommendation 24 on efficient use of zoning and overlays further identifies the way in which zone and land-use controls in Queensland limit housing supply, a finding that Master Builders supports. The Commission found that overlays and land-use controls in Queensland were frequently applied beyond what their underlying objectives required, adding cost and complexity to residential development without commensurate benefit.

Information Request 5: How important are land release arrangements in limiting housing supply relative to other zoning controls?

Land release arrangements, which include the sequencing of greenfield subdivision approvals, the timing of plan registration and Torrens title issuance, and the conditions under which staged development applications can be made, are a significant but underreported constraint on housing supply, particularly on the urban fringe where greenfield development is the primary supply mechanism.

In practice, the land release process operates as a separate constraint from zoning. Land can be zoned residential in principle while remaining unavailable for development because plan of subdivision approval, infrastructure delivery agreements, or lot registration has not been completed.

Master Builders members consistently report that the time between a developer acquiring a greenfield parcel and being able to commence construction on registered lots is typically three to five years in major capital cities, with a significant portion of this delay attributable to subdivision approval processes, plan registration queues, and the sequencing of development contribution negotiations.

Relative to zoning controls, land release arrangements are particularly constraining because they involve multiple agencies, including the planning authority, the land titles office, and the relevant utilities, whose processes are not coordinated and whose performance is not publicly reported. Zoning reform, even where it is substantive, does not address this constraint. A site rezoned to permit medium-density development is of no supply benefit if it cannot obtain plan of subdivision approval within a commercially viable timeframe.

Information Request 6: How do development contributions and contributions frameworks affect project feasibility and new housing supply?

The magnitude, timing and design of infrastructure charges/developer contributions are devastating for the feasibility of new home building projects.

The terms 'developer contributions and infrastructure charges are used interchangeably. They among the most significant and least transparent cost inputs to new housing development. Worst of all, they are imposed very early in the project's life. This causes their financial damage to snowball over the life of the project.

Their impact on project feasibility is particularly acute because they are paid at the earliest stages of development, which are often before detailed design has been finalised and well before any sales revenue is realised. The initial burden of developer contributions gets magnified over time because finance costs are at play – riskier projects are penalised with higher finance costs. Because they are levied at the very beginning of the project's life, developer contributions have more time than any other cost item to mushroom in value over the project's lengthy construction lifespan. This effect has worsened since the pandemic because projects delays have stretched out even further over recent years.

The table below summarises how new home build times in Australia has grown considerably longer over the past decade.

Australia: average time taken to build new homes - 2011-12 to 2024-25 (number of months)									
	Average time from approval to commencement (months)			Average time from commencement to completion (months)			Average time from approval to completion (months)		
	New Houses	New Townhouses	New apartments	New Houses	New Townhouses	New apartments	New Houses	New Townhouses	New apartments
2011-12	2.16	2.73	3.00	7.05	9.72	17.61	9.21	12.45	20.61
2012-13	2.13	2.34	2.76	6.60	9.24	17.91	8.73	11.58	20.67
2013-14	2.04	2.25	2.82	6.42	9.36	18.54	8.46	11.61	21.36
2014-15	1.98	2.19	2.94	6.60	8.79	18.00	8.58	10.98	20.94
2015-16	2.07	2.22	3.48	6.60	9.09	17.85	8.67	11.31	21.33
2016-17	2.10	2.46	4.14	6.42	8.91	18.99	8.52	11.37	23.13
2017-18	2.04	2.49	4.68	6.57	9.21	19.59	8.61	11.70	24.27
2018-19	2.13	2.70	4.56	6.66	10.35	20.13	8.79	13.05	24.69
2019-20	2.04	2.64	5.07	6.54	10.59	23.07	8.58	13.23	28.14
2020-21	2.04	2.40	5.43	6.60	10.29	26.13	8.64	12.69	31.56
2021-22	2.55	2.55	4.20	7.92	11.07	26.49	10.47	13.62	30.69
2022-23	2.31	2.40	4.29	10.02	12.51	25.98	12.33	14.91	30.27
2023-24	2.31	3.06	5.43	10.41	12.90	27.69	12.72	15.96	33.12
2024-25	2.28	3.09	4.17	9.21	11.73	28.74	11.49	14.82	32.91
Source: Master Builders Australia analysis of ABS Building Activity (8752.0)									

For many prospective projects, the current design of infrastructure contributions is enough to prevent them from being proceeded with. For the new housing projects that do go ahead, the imposition of infrastructure charges forces them to proceed at a smaller scale – and at a higher cost.

The Centre for International Economics (2025) estimates that regulatory costs, statutory taxes, and infrastructure charges together contribute up to 49 per cent of the cost of a greenfield house and land package in Sydney in 2023–24. The Productivity Commission's December 2025 Inquiry Report No. 109, Creating a more dynamic and resilient economy (pp. 185–186), estimates that regulatory costs add between $135,000 and $320,000 to the cost of a new house. While these figures encompass a broader set of costs than infrastructure contributions alone, contributions frameworks are a material component.

Research from 2021 by NHFIC (the precursor to Housing Australia), found that developer contributions exacerbate the cost of new homes by between 8 per cent and 11 per cent.

Based on typical costs in 2021, this results in:

- An extra $25,000 to $85,000 being added to the cost of a new home in NSW;
- New homes in Victoria being between $37,000 and $77,000 more expensive; and
- Queensland's new homes suffering a cost deterioration of between $29,000 and $42,000.

These estimates are about five years old and cost escalations since then mean that the burden of developer contributions has got even bigger.

The frameworks themselves impose uncertainty as well as cost.

The process for calculating development contributions varies significantly across jurisdictions and, within states, across local government areas. Contribution plans are frequently not kept current with infrastructure costs, creating situations where developers cannot determine their contribution liability with confidence until late in the planning process. Where contributions are negotiated rather than set by a published plan, the outcome is dependent on the capacity and discretion of the consent authority, which is itself a source of delay.

Government also has a responsibility for the delivery of new community infrastructure and has a real role to play in unlocking land that would otherwise be cost prohibitive if left to developer contributions. In Queensland, the government's $2 billion Residential Activation Fund is reported as unlocking 98,000 homes and the additional $2 billion in joint Federal and State funding will unlock a further 51,000 homes

Example – Queensland Council – Infrastructure Charge Reductions and Housing Supply

Evidence from Queensland local government demonstrates a direct and measurable correlation between reductions in infrastructure charges and increases in development activity. The examples below illustrate both the supply response that can be achieved through contribution reform and the scale of development that charge settings currently suppress.

Gold Coast City Council – Construction Kickstart (October 2012 to October 2013)

Gold Coast City Council offered a 100 per cent discount on infrastructure charges for projects that substantially commenced within six months, and a 50 per cent discount for projects commencing within six to twelve months, each subject to a three-year completion requirement. Council reported that the scheme generated approximately 9,500 jobs and more than $885 million in building projects across 282 projects, including 55 industrial developments, with an estimated 2,000 ongoing jobs

resulting. ABS data confirmed a significant period of development growth for the Gold Coast following the scheme's introduction.

Toowoomba Regional Council – Temporary Urban Consolidation Incentives (January 2013 to June 2014)

Toowoomba Regional Council offered temporary discounts on infrastructure charges for unit development within urban redevelopment areas. An independent review by Economics Associates estimated the economic benefit to the Toowoomba economy at over $234 million, including $112.29 million in additional output, $16.83 million in additional income, and 347 FTE additional employment. Approximately 281 medium-density dwelling approvals were directly attributed to the policy, representing a significant uplift in dual occupancy and multi-dwelling unit approvals. The total value of discounts granted by Council was $3,136,682, representing a highly cost-effective use of public subsidy relative to the economic and supply response achieved.

Brisbane City Council – Student Accommodation Incentive (July 2014 to June 2017)

Brisbane City Council's reduced infrastructure charges for purpose-built student accommodation resulted in $6.5 million in development activity across 49 projects proposed for the city, accommodating up to 13,000 additional students. Developers reported that reduced infrastructure charges were a direct factor in their investment decision. Student One chief executive Tim Weston noted that reduced development costs were passed on to residents through more competitive room rates, demonstrating the flow-through affordability benefit of contribution reform beyond the direct supply response. These examples collectively demonstrate that infrastructure charge settings are a direct lever on development supply, and that reductions calibrated to targeted typologies or locations can generate substantial and measurable responses.

Information Request 7: What other regulations relating to housing-enabling infrastructure should be a priority for reform?

Utility connection delays are the most underreported regulatory constraint on housing supply in Australia.

Builders and developers across all jurisdictions report significant delays, which are often in the region of six to twelve months or longer, in obtaining electricity, water, and telecommunications connections for new housing developments. These delays do not arise from the absence of regulatory permission; they arise from the operational capacity and sequencing priorities of network utilities, many of which are natural monopolies with no competitive incentive to prioritise residential connection requests.

Unlike planning and zoning constraints, utility connection delays receive almost no systematic measurement or public reporting. There is currently no nationally consistent data on average connection timeframes across utility providers or across states. Without this data, it is impossible to identify the worst performers, establish performance benchmarks, or design effective incentive mechanisms. In its submission to the Select Committee on Productivity (February 2026), Master Builders recommended the development of a nationally consistent performance framework with financial rewards and penalties linked to connection timelines. This recommendation is equally applicable in the context of housing supply regulation.

A second infrastructure priority is the regulatory framework governing growth infrastructure planning; specifically, the coordination between land use planning decisions and forward infrastructure programming by utilities and transport agencies. In multiple Australian jurisdictions, residential land is zoned, and development is approved without firm commitments from network utilities on connection timing. The result is that development approvals are issued in good faith by planning authorities but

cannot translate into housing completions because the supporting infrastructure is not available or is made the responsibility of the project proponent as a significant and late cost addition. This coordination failure is a systemic problem that is not addressed by planning reform alone and requires a direct regulatory response.

Example – Queensland Electricity Connection Delays

Master Builders Queensland members report that electricity connections originally expected to take six months are now routinely extending to eighteen months, in some cases past project completion. The Queensland Productivity Commission's Final Report, Opportunities to Improve the Productivity of the Queensland Construction Industry (October 2025), made six specific recommendations (Recommendations 58 through 64) to improve utility connection processes, recognising these delays as a material productivity constraint. The following examples, drawn from Master Builders Queensland member experience, illustrate the practical impact of connection delays on project delivery and cost.

A childcare centre in Queensland where the enquiry to connect was made at the beginning of the project illustrates the unpredictability of the connection process. A 160-amp switchboard was initially quoted. Mid-project, Energex required a reassessment by a suitable engineer, increasing the fee from $150,000 to $325,000 and requiring a new transformer at an additional cost of $30,000. Twelve months after construction was completed, and the building was due to open, electricity was still not connected.

In a separate case, a final payment under a Connection Contract for a pad mount application fell outside the 30-day due date during the Christmas shutdown period, despite the payment being received within the seven days stated on the reminder notice. Despite all prior information requirements and payments having been met throughout a lengthy process, the late payment caused the connection work to be removed from the program. The connection date was moved to October 2024, six months after construction was due to be complete and sixteen months after the initial application was made in July 2023.

In another example, a site was suitably prepared on the planned connection date. Still, roofers had subsequently delivered trusses that the technician assessed as obstructive. Members report a widespread perception that the practice of issuing non-compliances at the point of connection is used deliberately to remove jobs from the connection schedule without recording them as unmet Guaranteed Service Level (GSL) obligations. As one member noted: “If the work does not appear in their work schedule it does not get highlighted as uncompleted in their metrics.”