# B Transport services

Air and sea transport services play a key role in the Australian and New Zealand economies and trans-Tasman trade. Unlike most of the world’s integrated regions that share a land border, Australia and New Zealand are separated by more than 2000 kilometres of ocean. Both countries are also geographically distant from international markets. Reflecting the key role of transport services across the Tasman:

* Australia is the leading source of visitor arrivals in New Zealand and vice versa. In 2011, there were over 40 300 flights between Australia and New Zealand, and 5.65 million passengers moving between the two countries (BITRE 2012).
* Australia and New Zealand rely on shipping as the primary form of transport for exports and imports. The majority of Australia’s and New Zealand’s international goods trade, by volume, is carried by ship. Shipping also plays a dominant role in transporting goods across the Tasman.
* Australia and New Zealand have relatively high international air and sea transport costs for passengers and cargo compared to other OECD countries. For example, average air transport costs (for cargo) are around 40 percent higher than for other OECD countries (Golub and Tomasik 2008). While this is largely due to the distance of Australia and New Zealand from their trading partners and the density of traffic, it does highlight the relative importance of efficient transport services for the two economies.

More efficient and effective sea freight and air services can reduce costs for businesses and improve the welfare of consumers in both economies. While the efficiency of these industries is largely dependent on factors controlled by the industries themselves, governments can play a role by improving the regulatory and institutional frameworks in which they operate.

## B.1 Air services

The air services sector worldwide remains highly regulated, despite its role in facilitating growth in trade of goods and services. International air services are governed by a complex system of negotiated bilateral rights, and sometimes multilateral rights, between countries through air services agreements (ASAs) (box B.1). The bilateral framework for ASAs was originally established through the Chicago Convention in 1944, which starts from the principle of each government having exclusive sovereignty over a country’s airspace and allows various freedoms to be granted to carriers from other countries (box B.2).

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| Box B.1 Trade in air services through air services agreements |
| International trade in air services cannot occur unless it is explicitly permitted, unlike trade in most goods and services, which is generally free unless specifically restricted. Two governments (bilateral partners) must act to open up services between their two countries through negotiation of bilateral ASAs. ASAs set out the terms and conditions under which airlines can fly. Included in ASAs are provisions on:   1. **Freedoms of the air**: determine the rights of carriers to operate cargo and passenger flights to, from and beyond bilateral partners (box B.2). More basic agreements grant ‘transit rights’ (3rd and 4th freedoms), while few ASAs grant the 7th freedom or cabotage rights (8th and 9th freedoms — enabling foreign airlines to operate domestic flights). 2. **Multiple or single designation**: determines the number of carriers that can operate on a route. Restrictive ASAs allow only a single airline as national carrier, while more liberal agreements allow multiple airlines. 3. **Cooperative arrangements**: some ASAs allow cooperative arrangements between designated airlines, such as code sharing (in which two or more airlines share the same flight). 4. **Capacity**: regulates the number of weekly services each designated airline can operate and the number of seats. Under more liberal agreements, capacity can be unlimited, particularly to regional airports. 5. **Pricing**: prescribes airfares, including double approval (a change in fares requires approval of both parties — more restrictive) or double disapproval (a change in fares can be effected unless both parties object — less restrictive) systems. The least restrictive ASAs allow free pricing. 6. **Designation, ownership and control**: provisions designed to restrict the benefits of an ASA to the airlines of the signatory countries. Restrictive ASAs stipulate that designated airlines have to be ‘substantially owned and effectively controlled’ by nationals. Liberal ASAs allow higher levels of foreign investment in airlines. 7. **Exchange of statistics**: restrictive ASAs often contain a provision on the exchange of statistics between the signatory parties to monitor traffic, verify adherence to quantitative restrictions or for security reasons. |
| *Sources*: Jomini et al. (2009); WTO (2006). |
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| Box B.2 The nine freedoms of the air |
| ’Freedoms of the air’ describe the rights exchanged in air services negotiations. They specify the permitted airline routes between the negotiating partners, and where appropriate, other countries.  **First freedom**: To fly over one country en-route to another.  **Second freedom**: To make a technical stop (such as for refuelling) in another country.  **Third freedom**: To carry freight and passengers from the home country to another country.  **Fourth freedom**: To carry freight and passengers to the home country from another country.  **Fifth freedom** (beyond rights): To carry freight and passengers between two countries by an airline of a third country on a route with an origin or destination in its home country.  **Sixth freedom**: To carry freight and passengers between two countries by an airline of a third country on two routes connecting its home country.  **Seventh freedom**: To carry freight and passengers between two countries by an airline of a third country on a route with no connection in its home country.  **Eighth freedom** (consecutive cabotage): To carry freight and passengers within a country by an airline of another country on a route with an origin or destination in its home country.  **Ninth freedom** (standalone cabotage)*:* To carry freight and passengers within a foreign country on a route that has no connection with the airline’s home country. |
| *Sources*: Findlay and Round (2006); PC (1998a). |
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Within this highly regulated environment, the air services arrangements between Australia and New Zealand are relatively liberal. That said, there remains potential for further liberalisation, both within the trans-Tasman arrangements as well as in air services more broadly.

### Australian and New Zealand air service regulation

Although air services are excluded from the formal CER Services Protocol, a number of agreements have been negotiated between Australia and New Zealand (boxB.3) that specify the terms and conditions under which air services can be provided. A Single Aviation Market (SAM) has been in place since 1996 and, in August 2002, the Australian and New Zealand Governments signed an ‘Open Skies’ Agreement. This agreement enables airlines of either country to operate between Australia and New Zealand without any regulatory restrictions on capacity, frequency and routes. It also enables them to operate without these restrictions within both countries and to third countries on routes with an origin or destination in the home country. However, for airlines to be able to take advantage of this agreement, they must meet certain designation criteria, including requirements regarding the ownership and control of the airline (NZ PC 2012).

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| Box B.3 Air services agreements between Australia and New Zealand |
| In 1992, the Australian and New Zealand Governments concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which lifted capacity restrictions across the Tasman, introduced multiple designation and set out phased liberalisation towards full trans-Tasman market access and greater fifth freedom (or ‘beyond’) rights by 1994. In 1996, Australia and New Zealand signed the Single Aviation Market (SAM) arrangements. The arrangements allowed a SAM carrier to operate without restrictions across the Tasman. Excluded were unlimited fifth freedom rights, which continued to be governed by third country bilateral air services agreements and the 1992 MOU (ICAO 2007).  Negotiation of an Open Skies Agreement was concluded in 2000, and the agreement was officially signed in 2002. It formalised the provisions of the SAM arrangements, eliminated the restriction on fifth freedom rights, permitted cabotage (domestic services) and allowed seventh freedom rights for cargo services. The arrangements were further relaxed following agreement in 2007 for the mutual recognition of aviation‑related certification, enabling Australian and New Zealand airlines to operate flights to, from and within either country on the basis of their home certification. |
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The designation criteria under the Open Skies Agreement create two categories of carriers, with different eligibility constraints, and accordingly different operational rights. It distinguishes between ‘designated airlines’ and ‘SAM airlines’.

* For designated airlines, which can only operate internationally between Australia and New Zealand and beyond to third countries, eligibility is based on incorporation and principal place of business. Effective control of the airline must also be vested in the country designating the airline or nationals of that country.[[1]](#footnote-1)
* SAM airlines can operate unrestricted services between the two countries as well as domestic services in each country. In contrast to designated airlines, SAM airlines must be majority owned and effectively controlled by Australian and New Zealand interests, as well as satisfy other criteria regarding board membership, head office and operational base.[[2]](#footnote-2)

The agreement between Australia and New Zealand grants all freedoms for passenger and cargo movement, with the exception of the seventh freedom for passengers (NZ PC 2012). In contrast to many other ASAs, the agreement also grants full cabotage rights to SAM airlines — that is, SAM airlines are permitted to operate domestic services in Australia and New Zealand.

Consequently, the agreement between Australia and New Zealand is one of the most liberal in the world (Vowles and Tierney 2007). The routes between New Zealand and the eastern seaboard of Australia are among the most competitive in the region, with passenger services provided by Qantas, Air New Zealand, Jetstar, and Virgin Australia. Third country carriers, such as Emirates and LAN Airlines, provide trans-Tasman services through separate bilateral agreements between their home countries and Australia/New Zealand, and extensive code sharing arrangements also exist on flights across the Tasman (box B.4). However, Qantas and Air New Zealand continue to carry the dominant share of trans-Tasman passengers (BITRE 2012). Australian airlines (such as Jetstar, and previously Qantas and Virgin Blue) have also entered the New Zealand domestic market.

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| Box B.4 Competition in the trans-Tasman aviation market | | |
| Following the liberalisation of the trans-Tasman aviation market from 1996, the number of flights and passengers increased considerably. Several carriers entered and exited the market and airfares have fallen significantly. Although these changes are generally driven by broader market changes, such as the entry of low cost carriers and wider liberalisation, the Single Aviation Market has played an enabling role, with the trans‑Tasman market considered one of the most competitive in the region.  Figure **Changes in trans-Tasman air services 1996–2011**a | | |
|  | Box B.4, figure: Changes in trans-Tasman air services 1996-2011. Figure depicts changes in passenger numbers, available seats, flight numbers, market share and airfares between Australia and New Zealand from 1996 to 2011. |  |
| a Airfares are in 2011 prices. The 1996 market share figures for Air New Zealand and Qantas include an even split from passengers on the two airlines’ codeshare flights.  *Sources*: BITRE (2012); Haugh and Hazledine (1999); Australian Commission estimates. | | |
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### What issues remain for the single aviation market?

There are two main restrictions on a fully integrated Australia‑New Zealand aviation market: seventh freedom rights for passenger movement have not been granted; and restrictive designation/ownership requirements for carriers in the trans-Tasman market remain. Given the current level of competition in the trans‑Tasman market, and open capacity on existing routes, the removal of these remaining restrictions may not produce large benefits. Nevertheless, there does not appear to be a strong public interest case for retaining the restrictions, and their removal may support continued competitive pressure on the trans-Tasman route, as well as facilitating greater competition on international routes from Australia and New Zealand.

#### Seventh freedom rights for passenger movement

The seventh freedom for passenger movements is the only freedom not yet granted. Seventh freedom rights allow carriers to operate ‘standalone’ services between the bilateral partners and third countries. For example, without seventh freedom passenger rights, Air New Zealand is only able to fly between Australia and Singapore if it incorporates a leg back to New Zealand. In order to operate under seventh freedom rights, agreement is required by each party involved. In the case of the previous example, agreements would be required (either bilaterally or as a group) from the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and Singapore for Air New Zealand to operate this service.

In the 2000 Memorandum of Understanding between Australia and New Zealand, the Ministers undertook ‘to examine further the introduction of seventh freedom traffic rights for passenger services by carriers of both Parties in the light of the ongoing development of a competitive aviation market’ (Anderson and Gosche 2000). There has not, however, been any further progress in this area.

Granting seventh freedom rights could potentially have benefits for the Australian and New Zealand communities by opening up opportunities for airlines to expand the range and quality of services from Australia and New Zealand, enabling greater competition and exerting downward pressure on airfares. The New Zealand Ministry of Transport supported this view:

While the practical impact of exchanging 7th freedom passenger rights may be limited … we agree that the restrictions do not appear to be serving any useful purpose. Seventh freedom rights would provide airlines with greater flexibility and the ability to base aircraft at airports in the other country, which may facilitate the development of new routes to third countries. (sub. DR99, p. 1)

Likewise, Qantas Airways Limited noted it would ‘support further discussion of the possibility of granting seventh freedom rights in the future, against the background of the current aviation market’ (sub. DR117, p. 4).

#### Designation, ownership and control restrictions

The current requirements for airline designation linked to national ownership and other requirements (box B.5) restrict carrier entry to the trans-Tasman market (in contrast, up to 100 percent foreign ownership of Australian and New Zealand domestic airlines is permitted). For example, the New Zealand Ministry of Transport noted that Australian-based airlines, such as Tiger Airways, are excluded from the trans-Tasman market because of designation requirements (sub DR99, p. 2).

The designation requirements are also inconsistent with, and more restrictive than, the recent policy positions that the Australian and New Zealand Governments have both committed to in the negotiation of ASAs (DITRDLG 2009; MoT 2012b).

For example, in the 2009 National Aviation Policy White Paper, the Australian Government committed to include ‘incorporation and principal place of business’ criteria for designating airlines in its bilateral agreements wherever possible. These criteria are focused on where an airline is based and which country has effective regulatory oversight of the airline rather than who owns and controls the company (DITRDLG 2009).

Similarly, the New Zealand Government highlighted in its International Air Transport Policy Review (2012) that it negotiates access on principal place of business, place of incorporation and effective regulatory control. This position is predicated on the view that:

while under the bilateral system, and for safety reasons, it is necessary to retain a nexus between an airline and the designating state, it should be the right of each country to determine the investment environment for its own airlines. (MoT 2012a, p. 19)

In the past, designation restrictions that required national ownership were less of an issue, as airlines were generally state-owned and operated in a less commercially-oriented environment. However, with a growing number of airlines worldwide, tight designation rules potentially limit commercial opportunities for airlines and mean that the community does not enjoy the benefits of open markets and increased competition. This view was supported by a range of stakeholders who argued that the designation criteria under the Open Skies Agreement need to be tested afresh and that they should be revised in line with existing policy to enable more airlines to fly the Tasman (Christchurch International Airport Limited, sub. 21, p. 4; Qantas Airways Limited, sub. DR117, p. 5; Ministry of Transport, sub. DR99, p. 2).

In summary, while some form of designation is required under the bilateral system, local ownership and other restrictions are not. Both Governments should seek to align the designation requirements in the SAM with their broader designation policies.

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| Box B.5 Clarifying ownership and control of airlines |
| There are several issues regarding ownership and control of airlines that are closely related but distinct from each other.  The first ownership and control issue relates to airline designation under air services agreements negotiated between governments. ASAs contain an airline designation clause intended to restrict the benefit of an air services agreement to the signatory countries. For example, many clauses restrict designation to airlines ‘substantially owned and effectively controlled’ by the state of designation and/or its nationals, though more recently there has been a move towards ‘principal place of business’.  The second aspect is the restrictions in domestic policy and legislation, which govern foreign ownership of airlines. In both Australia and New Zealand, there are separate foreign ownership restrictions for Qantas and Air New Zealand as the national flag carriers, as well as other Australian and New Zealand airlines. These domestic legislation requirements interact with the designation requirements in ASAs in the sense that changes to one may require changes to the other in order for there to be any effect.  A related consideration for New Zealand is the Government’s current part‑ownership of around 73 percent of Air New Zealand. It has recently announced that it is considering a partial sale of some of its shares in the context of implementing the mixed (government/private) ownership model (MoT 2012a). |
| *Sources*: Hocking (2011); MoT (2012a). |

### Looking beyond the trans-Tasman market

The complex, restrictive and inefficient regulation that characterises the international air services market means that it is likely there would be greater benefit from both countries pursuing further liberalisation of international air services.

Both countries have made commitments to pursuing more liberal aviation arrangements through the greater exchange of air freedom rights, relaxing designation requirements and offering additional capacity (see the 2009 National Aviation Policy White Paper in Australia and the 2012 International Aviation Policy in New Zealand). Significant progress has been made:

New Zealand has followed an ‘open skies’ policy for several decades, and as a result we now have more than a dozen open skies relationships in place. Many of these agreements include the exchange of 7th freedom and cabotage rights. Our current international air transport policy is arguably the most liberal in the world, and any restrictions included in our more recent agreements have generally been at the request of the other Party. We seek agreements with liberal designation criteria based on the airline having its principal place of business, place of incorporation, and effective regulatory control in the designating State. Where possible, we also refrain from referring to specific New Zealand airports in our agreements, thus ensuring that airlines are able to operate to/from any airport as they see fit, where they see a commercial opportunity. (Ministry of Transport, DR99, p. 2)

There appear to be further opportunities to be pursued. In some cases, the complexity and negotiation required to deliver more open arrangements may hamper progress. However, a continued focus on, and pressure for, bilateral and multilateral reform is likely to deliver benefits to both countries, including benefits for trans-Tasman travellers and domestic travellers in Australia and New Zealand.

#### The objectives for international air services policy

Policy objectives should be clearly defined and explicitly directed at promoting net benefits for the community. At present, Australia’s current policy goal for international air services is cast in terms of balancing the interests of the Australian aviation industry and the interests of the broader community (DITRDLG 2009). New Zealand’s aviation policy objective is to help grow the economy and deliver greater prosperity, security and opportunities for New Zealanders (MoT 2012b). Both Governments should ensure that the objectives of air services policy are to enhance the wellbeing of the whole community, rather than to focus on the interests of particular industries.

#### Pursuing broader liberalisation

As noted above, Australia and New Zealand have made significant progress in negotiating more liberal ASAs and bilateral open skies agreements with other partners. However, progress has not been uniform or complete. For instance, the Australian Government has two open skies agreements in place with New Zealand and the United States (as well as ‘open capacity’ agreements with the United Kingdom, Japan, Switzerland and Singapore). New Zealand has more than a dozen open skies agreements, including with the United Kingdom, United States and Canada, as well as the Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalisation of International Air Transportation, with the United States, Singapore, Chile and Brunei.

Similarly, in July 2012 the Tourism Access Working Group, a joint government‑industry working group, assessed Australia’s aviation market and found that while there were no significant access issues in several ASAs, such as those with India and South Africa, a number of impediments and constraints exist in other agreements (table B.1).

Table B.1 Summary of Australia’s aviation markets

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| Country | Total capacity entitlementsa | Capacity and other issues |
| Canada | 6 000 seats | Adequate capacity in ASA. Restricted intermediate rights (including at Los Angeles) prevents airlines moving to a double daily service. |
| China | 50 000 seats | A range of intermediate and beyond rights available. |
| France | 6 units of capacity (approx. 2 400 seats) | Services to/from metropolitan France restricted to 3 per week, with restrictions also in place for intermediate and beyond rights. ASA is outdated and in need of modernisation. |
| Hong Kong | 140 frequencies | The Hong Kong side has exhausted its available capacity on this route. The arrangements are amongst Australia’s most restrictive, with significant rights restrictions and unnecessarily complex rules on tariff approvals and other ‘doing business issues’. |
| India | 13 000 seats | Ample capacity available. No constraints currently identified. |
| Indonesia | 50 000 seats | Available capacity expected to be fully utilised in coming years. There are restrictions on intermediate and beyond rights for Australian carriers. |
| Ireland | 14 frequencies | Current capacity not utilised by either party. |
| Japan | 158 units Narita; 14 units Haneda. Open capacity other airports | The current ASA offers adequate capacity for each country. Restricted intermediate and beyond rights. |
| Korea | 19 000 seats | Intermediate and beyond rights are very restricted. |
| Malaysia | 52 600 seats | Malaysian carriers are using a significant amount of available capacity. Increase in capacity required for further growth. |
| Singapore | Open capacity | Traffic rights for airlines are restricted, particularly beyond rights. Airlines of Singapore do not have access to Pacific route. |
| South Africa | 42 frequencies | No constraints currently identified. |
| Taiwan | 12 000 seats | Code share frameworks limit marketing carrier activities. |
| Thailand | 90 units (approx. 35 000 seats) | While there appears to be significant capacity for Australian carriers, much of the capacity is used for third country code share services because of the outdated capacity structure in the arrangements. |
| United Kingdom | Open capacity | Traffic rights via China and USA are restricted. |
| United Arab Emirates | 252 services | Regulatory constraints may be an impediment to the growth of Middle Eastern carriers. No current constraints identified. |
| USA | Open capacity | Open skies agreement provides for unlimited capacity. |

a Capacity entitlements per week.

*Sources*: Tourism Access Working Group (2011, 2012).

As a result, Australia and New Zealand should reaffirm their commitment to pursuing the most open air services agreements possible, by negotiating reciprocal open capacity and all air freedoms, including cabotage (8th and 9th freedoms) where appropriate. Governments should also seek to remove any remaining regulatory impediments to accessing regional airports (see for example, Christchurch International Airport Limited sub. 21, p. 9 and sub. DR87, p. 7; and Tourism and Transport Forum sub. 25, p. 8).

This approach has potential benefits for trans-Tasman routes, by enabling greater access by third country carriers; domestic routes in each country (should cabotage rights be agreed); as well as the broader international air services market for both economies. Further liberalisation will reduce constraints on market entry and the controls on the rights of airlines to service particular routes. This should enhance economic efficiency by placing competitive pressure on the cost of air travel; provide consumers with greater choice, particularly in terms of the range of services offered; and encourage innovation and cost minimisation by airlines, including through more efficient operation of their networks (box B.6).

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| Box B.6 Benefits of air service liberalisation |
| Research has found that the liberalisation of air services generates significant opportunities for carriers and consumers and benefits communities more broadly. Even a gradual expansion of rights under ASAs can lead to significant gains (InterVISTAS‑ga 2006).  Liberalisation leads to increased competition, reduced prices and increased traffic by providing incentives for airlines to operate more efficiently and increase service quality; and allowing airlines to better optimise network configuration through use of hubs. Through liberalisation, there are opportunities for economies of scale (owing to a higher passenger base) and scope (derived from the development of hub airports) (Grančay 2010).  A prominent example of liberalisation is the European Union Single Aviation Market. Between 1987 and 1993, the EU introduced three packages of reforms that almost fully deregulated the EU aviation market. Carriers from the EU are now free to operate any route within the EU, without restriction on price or capacity, including cabotage. In addition, all restrictions on airline ownership have been removed for EU citizens (Intervistas-ga 2006; InterVISTAS-EU 2009).  Liberalisation in the EU has greatly increased competition on many routes, with a significant increase in the number of routes served by two or more carriers. Fares have fallen, with a 30 percent decline in discount fares in real terms between 1992 and 2000, with full economy fares also declining. There has also been a strong rise in the number of city pairs served (EU city-pairs served increased by 74 percent), and in the overall capacity provided to the EU market (Fu et al. 2010; EU 2003). |
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#### Designation requirements and ownership restrictions

As discussed above, both countries have committed to adopting designation criteria of ‘incorporation and principal place of business’ into their bilateral agreements wherever possible. There has been considerable progress in achieving this, with for example, ‘principal place of business’ incorporated in 48 of Australia’s 77 ASAs and 28 of New Zealand’s 49 ASAs. Nevertheless, some key agreements continue to retain ‘substantially owned and effective control’ clauses, such as the Australia-US agreement. While it is not always possible to move to more liberal designation requirements because of the negotiating position of the bilateral partner, both countries should continue to adopt it as their default position, consistent with the International Civil Aviation Organization model.

Alongside a continued revision of designation requirements, the appropriateness of current foreign ownership restrictions for national airlines, including for Qantas and Air New Zealand, could be reviewed. Study participants expressed varying views on the current ownership structures. The Australian Council of Trade Unions and the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions (sub. DR118) opposed any relaxation of ownership restrictions arguing that government restrictions were necessary to maintain strong national carriers. Whereas Qantas Airways Limited stated:

Qantas supports the removal of restrictions on foreign ownership, which would bring Australia’s aviation industry in line with other industries and their ability to compete. The removal of these restrictions would also improve opportunities to participate in cross-border industry consolidation and strategic alliances. (sub. DR117, p. 5)

In Australia, total foreign investment in Australian international airlines is limited to 49 percent. Additionally, for Qantas, a single foreign investor is limited to 25 percent ownership and aggregate ownership by foreign airlines is limited to 35 percent. The Australian Government has indicated it will remove the 25 and 35 percent secondary ownership restrictions on Qantas (DITRDLG 2009, p. 7).

In New Zealand, foreign ownership of New Zealand international airlines (including Air New Zealand) is currently limited to 49 percent, with any single foreign airline interest limited to 25 percent and no more than 35 percent in total to be owned by foreign airline interests (MoT 2012a, p. 20). The New Zealand Government has recently announced that for airlines other than Air New Zealand, it will remove the 25 and 35 percent secondary ownership limits. The ownership of Air New Zealand is being considered separately in the context of implementing a mixed government/private ownership model (MoT 2012b, p. 2).

#### Multilateral liberalisation of air services

Although the specific characteristics of the bilateral system mean that it is not necessarily in Australia’s or New Zealand’s interests to liberalise unilaterally (box B.7), the two countries may be able to cooperate and encourage other governments to liberalise as part of a broader multilateral framework, such as through the WTO or International Civil Aviation Organization:

Over the next decade, a gradual move towards a multilateral framework to replace the complex system of bilateral agreements is anticipated. A number of plurilateral and multilateral agreements are already progressing globally, for example within ASEAN and the Open Skies Agreement between the European Union (EU) and the US. These have the potential to replace the patchwork of bilateral agreements — and the piecemeal liberalisation they have produced — in a number of key aviation regions. The EU-US agreement in particular has set a global benchmark for the pace and scope of future liberalisation in other regions. (Qantas Airways Limited, sub. DR117, p. 8)

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| Box B.7 Unilateral liberalisation: an option for air services? |
| As small countries with limited bargaining power, it has generally been in Australia’s and New Zealand’s interests to liberalise goods and services trade unilaterally. In air services, unilateral liberalisation can also be in a nation’s interest, with the Australian Commission (PC 1998a) previously noting that it should be considered where there are likely to be clearly derived benefits. The Commission accordingly recommended the Australian Government unilaterally offer a range of rights in ASA negotiations:   * removal of restrictions on the number of points to be served and designation of all cities in Australia other than Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth * unrestricted rights for foreign airlines to codeshare to all points in Australia on Australian domestic airlines * unrestricted rights for foreign airlines to carry their own stopover traffic.   However, the Commission found that unilateral liberalisation may not always be beneficial because air services have certain characteristics that make them distinct from other goods and services.  Under the entrenched bilateral system, one country alone cannot produce international air services. Inputs are required from both the origin and destination countries in the form of infrastructure and rights to exercise various freedoms of the air. Therefore, unilateral liberalisation would not ensure that competition and the quantity and quality of air services would increase, or that airfares would fall. Other countries could still restrict entry and capacity. The Commission therefore concluded that as long as the rest of the world remains committed to the bilateral system, a universal policy of unilateral open skies could make Australia worse off. |
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Ultimately, a liberal multilateral agreement under the WTO that covers all or most countries would allow international air services to develop in response to market changes and pressures. Efficient carriers would replace inefficient carriers and the removal of regulatory barriers to entry would enhance competition. A multilateral system would also be easier to administer and comply with than the current bilateral system (PC 1998a).

In the first instance, Australia and New Zealand could pursue strategic multilateral arrangements, such as full open skies agreements with the European Union or ASEAN, while encouraging further multilateral reform at the WTO level.

In summary, further removal of barriers to competition in the air services market should facilitate competition, keep downward pressure on airfares and provide opportunities for an expanded range of services. Therefore, the Australian and New Zealand Governments should continue to progress appropriate reform with a particular focus on:

* ensuring that the objective of air services policy is explicitly directed at promoting net benefits for the community
* pursuing the most liberal air services agreements possible by negotiating reciprocal open capacity and all air freedoms, including cabotage where appropriate
* revising designation and ownership requirements
* pursuing plurilateral and multilateral air services agreements
* encouraging multilateral reform of air services, through the WTO or International Civil Aviation Organization.

## B.2 Passenger movement charge

Introduced in July 1995 to replace the Departure Tax, the Australian Passenger Movement Charge (PMC) forms part of the cost of the ticket of a person departing Australia for another country. It was intended to recoup the cost of customs, immigration and quarantine processing of inward and outward passengers and the cost of issuing short-term visitor visas. As of 1 July 2012, the PMC is A$55 per passenger. The PMC is expected to generate A$794 million in 2012‑13 (with around 8 percent from trans-Tasman travel), rising to over A$1 billion in 2015‑16 (AGD 2012).

There has been significant debate over the PMC in the last five years (box B.8). During the course of this study, participants have called for its removal or reduction on the Australia-New Zealand route, arguing that true integration would see trans-Tasman travel akin to a domestic flight, and highlighting the potentially disproportionate impact the charge has on trans-Tasman travel as a short and low price route.

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| Box B.8 Views on Australia’s passenger movement charge |
| In a 2008 inquiry by the Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs into the Passenger Movement Charge Amendment Bill 2008, a range of participants argued there was a lack of transparency in relation to the PMC. In particular, they argued that the PMC is a tax rather than a cost recovery charge, and questioned whether the PMC ‘over-collects’ for its stated purpose (SSC LCA 2008). These concerns were reiterated during the Senate hearings for the 2012 Bill to increase the PMC (SSC LCA 2012).  In a submission to the 2011 Tax Forum in Australia, the Tourism and Transport Forum (TTF) stated that the PMC undermines the competitiveness of Australia’s tourism industry and is inconsistent with the Government’s stated goal of growing international visitation. The TTF also recommended a restructure for short-haul markets where the PMC comprises a large proportion of the total ticket price:  On popular New Zealand routes, the PMC often comprises up to 30 percent of the ticket price and TTF believes a reduction in the departure tax would stimulate growth in visitation, which would offset the reduction in revenue collected. Given the government’s commitment to simplifying trans-Tasman border formalities, TTF believes New Zealand should be used as a test case for PMC reduction, due to its status as the single largest market for inbound visitors. (TTF 2011, p. 4)  The Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism commissioned a study (Forsyth et al. 2011) on the impact of raising the PMC by 20 percent. The study found that although the tourism industry would unambiguously lose from this change, it would provide a net benefit to the Australian economy overall.  In submissions to the Commissions’ study, Christchurch International Airport Limited (sub. 21, p. 13) and the TTF (sub. 25, p. 5) identified the PMC as a disincentive for travel between Australia and New Zealand. Qantas Airways Limited argued:  As the PMC is not differentially applied to passengers departing from Australia, short haul routes, such as to New Zealand, or those routes which are principally composed of leisure traffic which have a higher elasticity of demand, are unfairly impacted. The PMC is now up to one third of the cost of a Jetstar flight from Sydney to Auckland and third party surcharges, fees and taxes now comprise $153.64 on an average return fare on this route. This is a serious concern in a highly competitive and price sensitive industry. (sub. DR117, p. 5)  Additionally, the Australia New Zealand Leadership Forum (sub. 15, p. 3) recommended reducing the PMC to align it with actual costs to encourage more trans‑Tasman travel and tourism. |
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### The impact on air travel

The PMC can comprise a significant part of the price of low-priced international flights from Australia, such as to Asia or New Zealand. For air travel between Australia and New Zealand, the PMC can typically represent around 15–20 percent of the low-cost airfare category and 2 percent of the average business class airfare (though it has been suggested it can make up as much as 30 percent of the cost of a sale fare). This cost is borne by travellers of all nationalities departing Australia.

While it would be expected that removal of the PMC would lower airfares, the extent to which it would impact passenger movement is less certain. In the case of trans-Tasman routes, there are only a few studies on price elasticity, with the evidence suggesting that demand for trans-Tasman travel, and particularly business travel, is relatively price inelastic (BTCE 1995; Gillen et al. 2003; Tourism Research Australia 2011).

Overall, any decrease in airfares will generally increase demand for flights by less than the proportional price decrease. In part, this is because a range of other factors beyond price enter into a traveller’s decision-making when purchasing flights, including their income and exchange rates. That said, the PMC is likely to have more of an impact on the budget leisure segment of the trans-Tasman market and more demand-elastic travel to short and medium haul international destinations in Asia.

### The PMC is a general tax not a user charge

There are a number of issues associated with the PMC that go beyond its impact on the trans-Tasman route. Legally, the PMC is a tax levied under the *Passenger Movement Charge Act 1978* and collected under the *Passenger Movement Charge Collection Act 1978*. Despite its original objective as a cost recovery measure, the revenue raised through the PMC is not hypothecated to border services and forms part of the Government’s consolidated revenue.

The PMC lacks transparency as currently configured. It has been found to have been over-collected and under-collected at different times. Initially, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) estimated that the A$27 charge over-collected the costs of providing border services, as the cost of processing passengers turned out to be lower than expected and the rate of growth in the number of departures was higher than expected (ANAO 1996). However, the Australian Commission (2005a) found that the PMC had under-recovered costs from 2000‑01 to 2002‑03. This shortfall in revenue compared to the cost of service delivery resulted in a benefit to the tourism industry of A$11 million in 2000‑01, A$1 million in 2001-02 and A$3 million in 2002‑03. The revenue raised by the PMC was found to be broadly in line with the costs to Government in 2005 (PC 2005a).

The ANAO audit in 2000‑01 found that with the decision to increase the PMC from A$27 to A$30 per passenger, a policy shift had taken place:

The PMC is levied under Commonwealth taxing powers and is now applied partly as a general revenue raising source. As a consequence, the PMC is no longer solely linked to cost recovery of Customs, Immigration and Quarantine services. (p. 13)

Several inquiry participants to an Australian Commission review of cost recovery in 2001 supported this view, arguing that the PMC had come to be regarded purely as a source of taxation revenue. This was confirmed in the 2009 Henry Review of Australia’s Future Tax System, which concluded that the PMC does not recover all the costs of border services and does not reflect specific costs (Commonwealth of Australia 2009). Submissions to this study have also expressed this view (Qantas Airways Limited, sub. DR117; Tourism and Transport Forum, sub. DR107).

Moreover, at times the Government has committed to using the revenue raised by the PMC for measures other than border services, such as tourism marketing (SSC LCLA 2012). As part of the 2012‑13 PMC increase, revenue will be allocated to a new Asia Marketing Fund to support the promotion of Australia to growing markets in Asia, as well as a new Tourism Industry Regional Development Fund (Swan et al. 2012).

### Reconfiguring the PMC as a user charge

In its current form, the PMC does not fulfil its original objective as a cost recovery mechanism for border services. In particular, it does not provide a transparent indication of the costs of providing border services (Commonwealth of Australia 2009). As a tax levied on a narrow base, it is a higher-cost method of raising revenue than broader-based taxes.

Given the issues associated with the PMC generally, it would be appropriate for the Australian Government to consider reconfiguring it as a genuine cost recovery mechanism for border services as originally intended.

The Tourism and Transport Forum commented:

TTF appreciates that there are costs in processing international passengers — providing a legitimate case for some form of cost recovery to remain in place. However any cost recovery measures should be transparent and hypothecated against the services the PMC is intended to fund — i.e. customs, immigration and quarantine processing of international passengers. (sub. DR107, p.7)

Additionally, the New Zealand Government should review whether the current arrangements for funding passenger clearance services are appropriate (box B.9). In New Zealand, while the cost of border services for passengers is funded by the Government (excluding aviation security services which are funded by airlines), the cost of providing services for cargo clearance have been fully recovered for a number of years.

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| Box B.9 New Zealand funding of passenger clearance services |
| In 1998, the New Zealand Government announced that it would fully recover the cost of clearing passengers, aircraft and sea vessels at the New Zealand border. A user charge would cover the cost of services provided by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry’s Quarantine Service, Customs and Immigration Service, through a charge on each port (MPI 1998b). This decision was made based on the following considerations:   * international passengers arriving in New Zealand expose the community and environment to a range of biosecurity risks, and also some international travellers presented other risks * increasing visitor arrivals were placing greater demands on existing border services * a need to increase the efficiency, effectiveness and equity of border services * service users should pay for border services, rather than New Zealand taxpayers (MPI 1998a).   However, a user charge was never introduced. In 2004, changes to the funding of passenger clearance services were announced: the costs of aviation security services were to be met by the airline industry, and the costs of biosecurity and customs passenger clearance processing services were to be met by the Government at established international airports (Carter 2010). This was expected to result in a 50:50 split of costs between the Government and industry.  Meanwhile, full cost recovery of clearance services for cargo proceeded. The charge for cargo clearance was based on a framework for cost recovery developed by the New Zealand Treasury, and was the subject of consultation with industry. Over time, the charge for cargo clearance has changed to reflect developments in the industry (currently a consultation process is underway on incorporating the costs of implementing the new Joint Border Management System into clearance charges).  A further issue to have arisen is whether passenger clearance services at new airports should be subject to cost recovery. While extending the government funding model would be consistent with the regime for existing airports, it may result in the commencement of international services from some regional airports where the economic costs exceed the benefits. Legislation is currently being debated in Parliament regarding the funding method for new (and re-starting) airports. |
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In response to the draft report, some stakeholders raised concerns about moving to a user charge arrangement, arguing that:

* the whole country benefits from the provision of border services so they should be funded through general revenue (Tourism and Transport Forum, sub. DR107, p. 9; Qantas Airways Limited, sub. DR117, p. 5; New Zealand Ministry of Transport, sub. DR99, p. 3)
* cost recovery of border services may be inconsistent with Article 15 of the Chicago Convention that states ‘no fees, dues or other charges shall be imposed by any Contracting State in respect solely of the right of transit over or entry into or exit from its territory’ (Tourism and Transport Forum, sub. DR107, p. 6; New Zealand Ministry of Transport, sub. DR99, p. 3)
* it may be difficult to design and administer a charge that covers multiple services provided by multiple agencies. Additionally, as noted by the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, the introduction of a cost recovery charge would require new collection and administration arrangements to be established with industry (sub DR127, p. 3).

All these factors will need to be considered in moving to a genuine user charge arrangement. However:

* the benefits flowing to the community from border services result from the costs forgone (that is, from not incurring the cost, say, of foreign pests and disease entering the country). It could therefore be argued on equity grounds that the community should not bear the expense of avoiding being harmed. Those who pose the potential risk should bear the cost
* Article 15 of the Chicago Convention prohibits charges purely on transit, but does not preclude recovering the costs of transit. Moving to a user charge would appear to be more consistent with Australia’s obligations under the Convention compared to retaining the current tax
* the design of a user charge may pose challenges, and governments will need to consider minimising the transaction and administration costs of a user charge. Some trade-off between the efficiency of the charge and minimising the costs of administration may be inevitable.

If designed appropriately, a genuine user charge (box B.10) would have the advantage of:

* providing greater transparency in the cost of border services, through requiring border agencies to articulate clearly their broad objectives and explain how their activities and approach to the user charge contribute to those objectives (DoFA 2005)
* providing a mechanism to signal the underlying cost of the provision of border services
* enhancing equity, by ensuring that those who use the services pay for their provision.

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| Box B.10 Cost recovery and user charges |
| Cost recovery differs from general taxation (which raises revenue to fund a wide range of government activities or products) by recovering some or all of the costs of a particular government activity or product. Examples include the costs of aviation safety regulation through the Civil Aviation Safety Authority in Australia, and road user charges in both Australia and New Zealand.  A user charge is one form of cost recovery, and is a charge for the provision of a specific good or service to an individual user, generally related to the quantity consumed. Less direct forms include special levies or earmarked taxes to fund a specific government activity. The link between the revenue raised and the funding of a specific activity distinguishes taxes imposed for cost recovery from general taxation.  Cost recovery can provide a mechanism for improving the efficiency with which government services are produced and consumed, as well as transparency in the cost of their provision. Charges for goods and services can also provide signals to users or their customers about the costs of the resources involved.  Benefits will be greatest where cost recovery charges can be linked as closely as possible to the costs of activities or products. Where this is not possible, specific taxation measures such as levies may be appropriate, but only where the basis of collection is closely linked to the costs involved.  The Australian and New Zealand Governments have both developed principles and guidelines for cost recovery. |
| *Source*: PC (2001). |
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## B.3 Other potential air services issues

There are several other air services regulatory issues that were raised during the study, including:

* Competition regime issues regarding airline services. The Trans-Tasman Outcomes Implementation Group has been working to progress reforms that will result in firms operating in both markets facing the same consequences for anti-competitive conduct and enhanced cooperation between regulators in Australia and New Zealand (TTOIG 2012).
* A frequent complaint relating to trans-Tasman air travel is not related to the air services themselves, but the relatively high cost of taxi travel to and from airports, as well as the opportunity cost of the time spent at airports because of international security requirements. For instance, taxi fares to and from airports can represent a significant cost for travellers. Unlike New Zealand, taxi services throughout Australia remain highly regulated, through a combination of supply restrictions (licensing) and price setting (box B.11). There would be benefits to the Australian community from the removal of restrictive regulation, as well as benefits to international visitors, including those from New Zealand.
* Occupational licensing. Although pilot licences are covered under the trans‑Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement, a study participant indicated that there are still barriers to the mutual recognition of pilot licensing in the SAM.

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| Box B.11 Taxi regulation in Australia and New Zealand |
| The Australian and New Zealand taxi industries operate under substantially different regulatory regimes. In New Zealand, the industry was deregulated in 1989, removing quantitative entry restrictions and fare controls for taxis (maximum fares are required to be pre-registered and approved). After some initial instability and the introduction of service quality measures, deregulation has produced significant benefits for New Zealand (Taxi Industry Inquiry 2012).  In comparison, the taxi industry in Australia operates within a highly regulated environment governed by each state and territory. The 2012 draft report of the Victorian Taxi Industry Inquiry found:  … the causes of the taxi industry’s poor performance are longstanding and deeply entrenched. Most of the industry’s problems stem from the complex and highly restrictive regulatory framework within which it operates — a framework that constrains competition, stifles innovation and directs much of the revenue generated by the industry away from those providing ‘on the ground’ services. (p. 20)  International studies have reported similar outcomes. A study from the OECD (2007) concluded:   * Restrictions on taxi numbers constitute an unjustified restriction on competition. These restrictions can lead to large transfers from consumers to producers, economic distortions and associated deadweight losses. * Increasing numbers of OECD countries have removed or loosened supply restrictions on taxis. The results of these reforms have been strongly positive, with reduced waiting times, increased consumer satisfaction and, in many cases, falling prices. * Removing entry restrictions does not imply removing quality based regulation. Indeed, appropriate regulation (which might address a range of vehicle and driver standards and seek to ensure passenger safety) is a precondition for fully achieving the potential benefits of adopting an open entry policy. That said, remaining regulatory arrangements must not unduly inhibit the development of innovative service offers and industry models. |
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## B.4 Sea freight

### International container shipping

Currently, operators of liner shipping services have immunity from key parts of Australian and New Zealand competition legislation(box B.12)allowing them to form agreements on prices, capacities and schedules for the supply of liner cargo shipping services to exporters and importers (box B.13).

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| Box B.12 Exemptions for liner shipping from competition law |
| In Australia, Part X of the *Competition and Consumer Act 2010* (CCA) exempts ocean carriers from key parts of the CCA relating to anti-competitive conduct. This allows carriers to make agreements to: fix prices; pool or apportion earnings, losses or traffic; or regulate capacity. To gain an exemption, carriers must register their agreements with the Registrar of Liner Shipping.  In New Zealand, there are automatic exemptions from the *Commerce Act 1986* for all agreements between carriers concerning international shipping, including price-fixing and capacity limiting agreements. New Zealand provides formal exemptions for international shipping in both the *Commerce Act 1986* and the *Shipping Act 1987* from the *Commerce Act*’s competition regime. The two exemptions are subtly different, with inconsistent treatment of importing versus exporting. Compared with other countries, New Zealand’s regulatory regime for international shipping is an outlier in that the exemptions apply widely, and largely without the limiting conditions found elsewhere. |
| *Source*: NZ PC (2012). |
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These exemptions reflect a view that allowing collusive agreements between ocean carriers is necessary because the sector’s characteristics (high fixed costs, and the existence of economies of scale and scope) mean that carriers on a route need an ability to fix prices and/or capacity and pool revenue to ensure reliable freight shipping services. The public benefits of the agreements are presumed to so clearly outweigh any anti-competitive detriments such that there should be no onus on carriers to prove that this is the case.

A number of submissions to this study have supported retaining the exemption (Shipping Australia Limited, sub. DR68; International Container Lines Committee (New Zealand), sub. DR105; Australian Council of Trade Unions and New Zealand Council of Trade Unions, sub. DR118). Past reviews have also supported this view (see for example, PC 1999). Submissions also argued that since many other countries in the region retain exemptions, it would be undesirable for Australia and New Zealand to make changes:

In the Asian Pacific region, this exemption for international liner shipping is common place where there are laws relating to competition policy. More recently, both Japan and Singapore, for example have extended their exemption to 2015 when they will be reviewed. (Shipping Australia Limited, sub. DR68, p. 2)

New Zealand especially and also, to some extent, Australia, are small players in international trade channels … The risks of reduced service to small, distant markets (that are already costly to serve) from policy experimentation are considerable. That is … a simple fact given low international shipping profitability levels, assets that are highly mobile and can be redeployed, and business uncertainty when faced with costly, loss-making routes or jurisdictions with difficult regulatory environments. (International Container Lines Committee (New Zealand), sub. DR105, p. 2)

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| Box B.13 Collaborative agreements in international sea freight |
| Liner shipping operators use various types of collaborative agreements to coordinate rates, capacity, routes, frequency and other matters. Agreements can generally be divided into ‘ratemaking’ agreements and ‘non-ratemaking’ agreements. The defining characteristic of ratemaking agreements is that they set freight rates and/or limit capacity in order to raise rates above what they would be in the absence of the agreement.  Ratemaking agreements   * Conference agreement: an agreement between a group of ocean carriers to set rates and manage capacity on a specific trade route. The carriers might also agree to limit capacity. * Rate discussion agreement: an agreement between a group of ocean carriers to discuss advised rates and capacity management for a specific trade route.   Non-ratemaking agreements   * Alliance agreement: an agreement between a group of ocean carriers to jointly operate a network of vessel services. * Cooperative working agreement: an agreement between two or more carriers regarding joint services. * Equipment interchange agreement: an agreement between a group of ocean carriers to jointly use and manage a pool of equipment. * Non-rate discussion agreement: an agreement between a group of ocean carriers to discuss service-related and capacity-management matters. * Sailing agreement: an agreement between ocean carriers regarding coordinated sailings. * Vessel sharing agreement: an agreement between two or more ocean carriers regarding sharing of vessel space. |
| *Source*: NZ PC (2012). |
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However, market conditions have changed significantly over the last 15 years. International reforms, most notably in the United States and European Union, have seen a marked shift towards contract carriage and individual service contracts, and away from ratemaking agreements, suggesting they are not necessary for the stable and efficient operation of liner shipping (NZ PC 2012). Both the Australian Commission and the New Zealand Commission have reviewed these exemptions and concluded that there is little rationale for maintaining them in their current form.

The Australian Productivity Commission’s most recent review concluded:

… the existence of Part X was based on the judgment that so few agreements would fail a net public benefit test that the added costs of individual authorisation were not warranted. At best, this judgment is now untested. As the analysis of market share indicates, there are a number of agreements currently operating which are unlikely to provide a net public benefit. The Commission finds that, in this sense, Part X as currently structured, no longer meets its primary purpose and that evaluation of agreements is needed to ensure that registration is provided only to agreements that are likely to provide a net public benefit. (PC 2005c, p. XXXVIII)

While the Australian Government accepted some of the Commission’s recommendations following the study’s release, and agreed to remove the exemption for discussion agreements, no further progress has been made to implement the changes.

The New Zealand Commission found:

There now seems to be little evidence that reliable shipping services are so dependent on the ability to have ratemaking agreements that such agreements should be automatically presumed to be in New Zealand’s best interest. (NZ PC 2012, p. 6)

International reviews also indicate that exempting ratemaking agreements from competition legislation does not provide a net benefit to the community. For example, the 2002 OECD review of Competition Policy in Liner Shipping concluded that it ‘had not found convincing evidence that the practice of discussing and/or fixing rates and surcharges among competing carriers offers more benefits than costs to shippers and consumers’ (OECD 2002, p. 5).

The presumption that these agreements provide a net public benefit runs counter to the general provisions in the competition laws of both countries, where those seeking exemptions for anticompetitive behaviour are required to demonstrate a net public benefit before such exemptions are provided. It also runs counter to the usual approach in competition policy where the onus of proof is placed on those seeking the retention of anticompetitive arrangements to make the case and present the supporting evidence.

Useful parallels can be drawn between shipping and other transport industries such as airlines and some road and rail freight. In many countries, these industries were formally accorded special treatment under competition laws or subject to industry-specific regulation. Deregulation of these industries has occurred without evidence of unacceptable market instability. In fact, deregulation, with regulatory approval for operational agreements, has generally been associated with improved service provision and lower prices (PC 2005c).

#### Reforms in both Australia and New Zealand are warranted

For these reasons, it would be appropriate to reform requirements for international liner shipping in both Australia and New Zealand. In the first instance, the exemption for ratemaking agreements under the competition acts in both countries should be removed. Shippers have largely supported this proposal, with the New Zealand Shippers Council Inc. commenting that:

There is no evidence to suggest that continuation of exemptions is necessary now that global trade has developed over the last century when ratemaking agreements first appeared. In fact a more open environment allows greater competition in principle and would clearly be in the interests of importers and exporters and ultimately the general public. (sub. DR83, p. 2)

The Australian Peak Shippers’ Association Inc. (APSA) (sub. DR109) supported the removal of the exemption for discussion (ratemaking) agreements, in line with its position in the 2005 Australian Commission review:

It is the strong view of shippers generally that discussion agreements are formed to limit or even eliminate competition on price and capacity… Discussion agreements have been the chief target of Australian shippers who seek to end such agreements by taking away their right to operate with anti-trust immunity for these agreements. (PC 2005c, p. 78)

Removing the exemptions for ratemaking agreements is consistent with the recent New Zealand Commission recommendation, which the New Zealand Government is currently considering. New Zealand Commerce Minister Foss has requested that the Commerce Select Committee examine competition regimes for international shipping (as well as international civil aviation), and specifically whether a parallel regime is the best way to regulate competition in the sector or whether it should be transitioned to the general regime under the Commerce Act (Foss 2012).

Removing exemptions for ratemaking agreements should increase the level of competition in international liner services, leading to better and lower priced services, which in turn should reduce the costs of international trade (including trans-Tasman trade). That said, the benefits of removing the exemption are unlikely to be large for the Australian and New Zealand economies, given the low reliance on such agreements. Nevertheless, removal will reduce the likelihood of future carrier collusion.

This change would not mean that beneficial agreements could not be made. It would simply place the onus on carriers to demonstrate that an agreement is in the public interest.

As highlighted in the New Zealand Commission’s report (2012), there may be potential benefits from Australia and New Zealand coordinating the proposed change in order to reduce any potential costs from removing the exemptions. The New Zealand Shippers’ Council Inc. (sub. 46, p. 5) supported Australia and New Zealand working together on this issue:

Both countries share characteristics like distance to markets. Each country is a significant trading partner with the other. So it makes logical sense that both have standardised shipping regulation.

For this study, it is suggested that the exemption for non-ratemaking agreements be retained based on the potential risk that authorisation requirements may deter the making of productivity enhancing non-ratemaking agreements. However, it would be appropriate for the Australian and New Zealand Governments to examine the potential costs and benefits of further action ⎯ for example, removing remaining exemptions ⎯ particularly in light of ongoing changes in international practices. This may occur in New Zealand through the Government’s current consultation on the proposed changes identified above, and in Australia through the scheduled review of Part X. Although the latter is due to occur in 2014, the opportunity and potential benefits of trans-Tasman co-ordination are strong reasons to bring forward this review.

### Coastal shipping

Australian cabotage restrictions currently require vessels to obtain a licence and employ crew under Australian conditions and rates of pay while engaging in coastal trade in Australian waters.

Prior to 1 January 2011, however, the responsible Minister could issue single or continuous (lasting up to three months) voyage permits in cases where licensed ships could not meet all coastal shipping demand, allowing foreign vessels to operate without having to satisfy cabotage requirements. Since 1999, the tonnage carried under these permits increased from 7 to 25 percent of the market (DIT 2011b, PC 2005b). During the same period, the number of Australian registered trading vessels fell from 55 to 22 and employment fell from 2400 to 1300 people (DIT 2011b). The growth of permits coincided with a marked reduction in sea freight rates — for example, shipping rates from the east coast to Perth fell by more than a third in real terms (PC 2006).

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| Box B.14 Australia’s and New Zealand’s coastal shipping task |
| Coastal shipping is responsible for around 25 percent of Australia’s domestic freight task on a tonne-kilometre basis (DIT 2011a). In 2009‑10, 104.8 million tonnes of coastal cargo passed through Australian ports. Measured in tonnes per kilometre terms, the total coastal freight task was 114.8 billion tonne-kilometres in 2009‑10 (BITRE 2011a).  Bulk cargo represents the majority of coastal cargo — approximately 85 percent by weight in 2009‑10. Dry bulk cargo makes up the largest proportion of shipped products, with 65 percent of coastal shipping the movement of non-fuel crude materials, such as bauxite and iron ore. Liquid bulk, such as fuels, represents around 20 percent of the shipping task, with container and other non-bulk cargo making up the remainder (BITRE 2011a).  In 2009‑10, Weipa was the largest port in Australia for total loaded coastal cargo (13.2 million tonnes of dry bulk cargo), followed by Port Hedland and Gladstone (both also largely dry bulk cargo). In 2009‑10, Gladstone was the largest port in terms of total unloaded coastal freight (14.3 million tonnes, largely raw material to be processed into aluminium), followed by Port Kembla (raw material to be processed into steel) (BITRE 2011a).  In New Zealand, coastal shipping accounts for 15 percent of all freight movements on a tonne-kilometre basis. Total movements by coastal shipping is estimated at about 4.2 million tonnes annually, of which almost half (47 percent) is the movement of fuel, 28 percent is the movement of cement and 24 percent the movement of general cargo. By weight, over half the coastal shipping task in New Zealand in 2006-07 was loaded at Northland Port, Marsden Point, while Canterbury and Auckland were the largest destinations for coastal freight (RPC 2008). |
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#### Recent restrictive changes in Australia

During the 2010 Federal election campaign the Minister for Infrastructure and Transport announced that a ‘re-elected Gillard Government will introduce measures to strengthen Australia’s shipping industry for our economy and our environment’ (DIT 2011a). As of 1 January 2011, wage rates on foreign-flagged vessels operating coastal trade under permits are no longer set by the International Transport Federation (ITF) market rate. Instead, wage rates on these vessels are now set in accordance with the *Fair Work Act 2009* — under the Seagoing Industry Awards.[[3]](#footnote-3) A further package of changes, which commenced 1 July 2012, abolishes single and continuous voyage permits for foreign-flagged vessels. It also provides a range of tax concessions to Australian registered ships and establishes a new licensing system to protect the domestic shipping industry (box B.15).

The main reasons put forward to support cabotage and industry assistance for the Australian shipping industry are to prevent Australian vessels from ‘unfair’ competition from subsidised foreign-flagged vessels, and support jobs for Australian seafarers, as well as to maintain the industry for other strategic purposes (such as supporting national security and defence):

For both our countries — a continent in which 85 per cent of the population lives within 50 kilometres of the coast and an island nation — it is essential that a viable and attractive coastal shipping capacity is maintained for economic, transport efficiency and environmental reasons … The Australian shipping industry has been operating at a substantial disadvantage compared to international operators who have had for some time, access to beneficial tax arrangements. These reforms will level the playing field for the Australian shipping industry. (ACTU and NZCTU, sub. DR118, pp. 16–17)

And:

There has been a decline in the Australian shipping fleet and industry over recent decades, as regulatory drift has allowed a concurrent increase in the number of foreign registered ships and the proportion of coastal trade they carry has increased. As a consequence investment in Australian registered shipping has fallen substantially and is predicted to lead to a situation where there are very few Australian ships within a few years as the aging fleet is retired from service. The strategic consequences of a decline in the domestic maritime industry could be significant for a trading nation such as Australia, particularly for the viability and longevity of its maritime skills base. (DIT 2011a, p. 78)

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| Box B.15 Support for the Australian shipping industry |
| A new licensing regime: A licence can be issued in one of three categories:   * a general licence allows unrestricted access to the coastal trade for Australian registered vessels for up to five years * a temporary licence allows foreign-flagged vessels to operate in the coastal trade for up to 12 months, subject to time, trade and voyage restrictions. It is expected that temporary licences will cover trade that is less constant or unpredictable * applications will be made available to general licence operators to provide an indication of their ability to carry the trade. The Government will reject an application if it believes an Australian registered operator can carry the trade on reasonable commercial terms * an emergency licence can be granted for cargo or passenger movements in emergency situations such as natural disasters.   Tax concessions: Companies operating qualifying ships on Australia’s primary or international shipping registers[[4]](#footnote-4) will be able to access:   * a tax exemption for operators of Australian registered eligible vessels on qualifying shipping income * accelerated depreciation and rollover relief for owners of Australian registered eligible vessels * a refundable tax offset for employers who employ eligible Australian seafarers * an exemption of Royalty Withholding Tax arrangements, where vessels are leased by an Australian company from foreign owners under a demise or bareboat charter (the chartering of a ship where no crew or provisions are included).   **Productivity compact:** In exchange for strengthening cabotage, maritime unions and the Australian shipping industry have agreed to a compact to deliver productivity gains including: improving work practices; the development of a process to review minimum manning levels; and the introduction of riding gangs on board vessels to undertake additional maintenance at terms and conditions of employment established under the *Fair Work Act 2009.* |
| *Sources*: DIT (2011a, b); Albanese (2011). |
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#### New Zealand has liberalised coastal shipping

The experience in New Zealand suggests that while Australian cabotage can directly benefit local ship owners and maritime workers, it does so at the expense of the wider community.[[5]](#footnote-5)

The New Zealand Government largely removed its cabotage regime in 1994. Coastal trade is not fully open. The *Maritime Transport Act 1994* (s. 198) only allows international operators to compete on coastal routes against domestic operators, as part of an international voyage and if they do not operate in New Zealand for longer than a continuous period of 28 days (NZ PC 2012).

After cabotage was removed, the number of New Zealand flagged freight vessels declined. International ships now carry around 70 percent of coastal cargo in New Zealand, both in full domestic cargo and repositioned empty containers (Rockpoint 2009). However, freight rates have fallen substantially and volumes have risen:

* coastal shipping rates dropped between 25–50 percent, depending on the route
* volumes shipped increased by up to 100 percent on some routes.

The removal of cabotage has since been found to have provided a net benefit to the community (Cavana 2004).

The New Zealand Commission recently reviewed the case for cabotage as part of its International Freight Transport Inquiry:

… the Commission does not support the [reintroduction of cabotage] ... International shipping services carry significant volumes of container cargo around the New Zealand coast, much of it at low marginal cost and low prices. They also reposition tens of thousands of empty containers each year. These services are valuable to New Zealand shippers. Reintroducing cabotage would likely increase prices. (NZ PC 2012, pp. 6–7)

This is consistent with findings of other reviews in Australia and overseas. For example, the Australian Commission has examined cabotage in a number of inquiries (see, for example, IAC 1988; PC 2005b, 2010). In the first of these it said:

The Commission’s assessment of the arguments for cabotage … indicates that, while many have intuitive appeal, they also imply the acceptance of high cost imposts upon the wider community for, at best, uncertain benefits. Hence, from a national perspective, the Commission is unable to identify any worthwhile reasons for retaining cabotage. (IAC 1988, p. 130)

The OECD (2001, p. 41) also questioned the effectiveness of cabotage in preserving employment and national fleets and called for member countries to remove it:

Overall, cabotage laws attract considerable domestic attention, and generally are jealously guarded by domestic shipping lines. However, the reality seems to be that they probably do not protect a country’s shipping “capability”, but may simply act to increase the costs of domestic shippers.

#### The Australian regime should be assessed within a broad cost-benefit framework

On balance, protection of domestic shipping serves to encourage the sale of maritime transport and labour services at the expense of the sale of goods and employment creation elsewhere in the economy. Although the coastal trade is small relative to international trade, the negative impact is likely to be material, particularly for industries (such as those shipping bulk commodities) that rely on coastal shipping:

The CIF [Cement Industry Federation] is concerned that these reforms could have numerous unintended consequences. Heavily protected coastal shipping routes will become even less competitive against international shipping leading to an outcome that negatively impacts on the competitiveness of Australian dry bulk shipping users, including cement and clinker, which will in turn lead to a reduced demand for coastal shipping services. (CIF, sub. DR94, p. 3)

NBCG [National Bulk Commodities Group] has put together its own financial models, which demonstrates … a freight increase of A$16.38 per tonne for a mini bulker and $8.74 for a handysize bulker on known voyages ... The current shipping reform package … [is] unlikely to provide a net public benefit and will eventually result in either import substitution or use of alternative logistic providers. (NBCG sub. DR93, pp. 6–9)

From a trans-Tasman perspective, removing the restrictions may improve the ability for international carriers to combine services both within and between Australia and New Zealand, which may provide better utilisation of container capacity, increased competition and lower prices.

The application of different policy approaches to coastal shipping in Australia and New Zealand provides an opportunity, in due course, for an independent body to undertake a comparative review of the impacts of the two approaches on each economy and on trans-Tasman trade.

## B.5 Ports

### Performance has improved

The performance of Australian and New Zealand container ports has improved significantly since the early 1990s. There has been progress in bridging the productivity gap with overseas counterparts, despite relatively small trade volumes at Australian and New Zealand terminals. Improvements are due to a number of factors, notably more flexible labour arrangements (ACCC 2011; PC 1998b, 2003).

During this time, a range of developments have improved the framework in which ports operate, for example, competitive tendering for stevedoring services has encouraged greater competition. In Australia, there has been a review of port access regulation under the COAG Reform Agenda, and the Government has also released a National Ports Strategy, which aims to drive the development of efficient and sustainable ports that meet the community’s needs (IA 2010).

### Scope for further gains

That said, further improvements can be made. While Australia and New Zealand now compare favourably with most overseas ports with respect to crane rates (figure B.1), they are still below world’s best practice and the last year has seen a deterioration in labour productivity at Australian ports due to industrial disputes (ACCC 2012). Across both Australia and New Zealand there is also notable variation between ports (figure B.2). In many cases, productivity at New Zealand ports, as measured by crane rates, is similar to that at Australian ports despite significantly lower container volumes. For example, the Port of Tauranga in New Zealand has been able to deliver higher productivity and lower charges than its Australian counterparts, despite lower volumes (PC 2003; NZ PC 2012). This difference is particularly pertinent given the potential to capture benefits from economies of scale that come from the operation of port services at larger ports (ACCC 2011).

Figure B.1 Crane rates at selected international ports, 2007–2011**a**

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a Data does not reflect difference in port scale. For example, the size of vessels that are serviced at a port, as well as the type of crane used will affect a port’s crane rate. Crane rates measure the number of containers a crane lifts on and off in an hour. Original data is from a range of sources, and as a result there may be inconsistencies in calculations.

*Sources*: MoT (2011); NZ PC (2012).

Figure B.2 Container productivity at ports in Australia and New Zealand, 2010**a**

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a Crane rates are typically used to measure port productivity, though other measures, such as ship and vessel rates can also be used. Crane rates measure the number of containers a crane lifts on and off in an hour. Total containers are the total number of containers lifted on/off fully cellular ships in a given period (as distinct from the measure of ‘twenty foot equivalent’ containers) (BITRE 2011b).

*Sources*: BITRE (2011b); NZ PC (2012).

### Providing an appropriate framework

While competition is possible between ports, particularly in New Zealand, evidence suggests that competition between the major Australian capital city ports is insufficient to provide a significant constraint on prices for container port services (ESC 2009). The main opportunities for governments to influence port efficiency come from promoting competition for port services, particularly stevedoring; improving labour productivity and the interface with the land transport system; and improving governance, planning and investment.

#### Competition for port services, particularly stevedoring

The limited number of competitors in stevedoring services at ports in Australia and New Zealand would appear not to provide sufficient discipline to deliver competitive outcomes. In Australia, the ACCC monitoring program indicates that while performance has improved substantially since 1998-99, sustained high profits and declining productivity suggest that it is an industry that would benefit from further reform (ACCC 2012, p. v).

Stevedoring services in Australia have traditionally been held by a duopoly of providers. Actions by state governments in Queensland and New South Wales to reduce artificial barriers to entry — through the tendering out of new terminal leases and restructuring long-term terminal leases to improve the incentives of the stevedores to undertake certain investments — have had some success (ACCC 2011). A third operator, Hutchison Port Holdings is set to commence operations in Brisbane and Sydney from 2013. A new entrant would be expected to increase the pressure on the existing stevedores to improve productivity in order to retain current customers and attract new ones, though these benefits are only likely to be fully realised once additional container terminals are established across all of Australia’s largest container ports (ACCC 2012).

In New Zealand, there is greater choice of stevedoring and marshalling services for bulk and break-bulk cargos (which are handled largely by third parties) than there is for container cargo (which is handled largely by port companies or their subsidiaries). The Port of Tauranga, the largest port in New Zealand in terms of gross volume of freight, has competing stevedoring service providers. Other ports have fewer service providers operating, though changes have been proposed. For example, the Port of Auckland has announced an intention to introduce competitive stevedoring at its Fergusson and Bledisloe Container Terminals in order to enhance port performance (Quay Shipping 2012).

#### Workplace relations

Workplace relations have been a longstanding issue at both Australian and New Zealand ports, with considerable implications for port productivity through determining the extent to which ports are able to respond to fluctuations in activity.

The New Zealand Commission found in its recent inquiry that there appear to be work practices and behaviours in some ports that are impeding productivity and innovation, which may also be jeopardising progress towards improved health and safety standards and increased workforce diversity. These practices include limited work hours, inflexible scheduling of rostered days off, work extending practices and restrictions on output (NZ PC 2012). Likewise Australian ports have also faced constraints, such as inefficient work practices and industrial action that have led to reduced port operations (ACCC 2011; ACCC 2012; PC 1998b).

#### Improving governance, planning and investment

Poor governance, planning and investment can hamper the efficient operation of ports. For example: a number of Australia’s and New Zealand’s major ports are unable to accept fully laden ships of the highest tonnage; constraints on ship loading facilities have resulted in long queues of ships at some bulk ports in Australia; and several reports have highlighted quay-side and land-side congestion at some container ports in Australia (ACCC 2011; EIT 2005).

Planning and investment issues can arise for a number of reasons.

* The characteristics of the market may hinder investment. Investment at ports tends to be large and lumpy, demand is uncertain and there are multiple interdependent decision makers through the supply chain.
* Economic regulation of access and port charges may not be efficient.
* Stevedores may lack the right incentives to invest in capacity.
* Port governance arrangements may not facilitate efficient investment in infrastructure.
* There may be environmental constraints on port development.

Having effective frameworks and processes in place should assist in enhancing port performance. For instance, the New Zealand Commission (2012) found that governments can improve planning and investment decision-making by facilitating better coordination between different levels of government.

The New Zealand Commission (2012) also found the strengthening of governance and/or ownership arrangements to be an important factor in improving port performance. It found that difficulties in resolving multiple objectives in publicly owned firms can contribute to problems in areas such as operational efficiency, labour relations and investment planning. To avoid such problems, port companies need a clearly defined purpose, and governance and ownership models that best suit that purpose (box B.16).

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| Box B.16 **The New Zealand Commission’s findings on governance** |
| The New Zealand Commission (2012) found three areas where the governance framework applying to council-controlled port companies is not currently optimal: lack of clarity of purpose of the companies; failure to properly manage conflicts of interest; and insufficient monitoring and transparency of performance information (p. 274). The Commission concluded that:   * the principal objective of council-controlled port companies should be: ‘to be a successful business as profitable and efficient as comparable businesses that are privately owned’ (p. 187) * to manage conflicts of interest, elected representatives and council staff should be precluded from being a director of port companies (increasing separation between commercial and wider council objectives) * port companies should regularly publish economic value-added figures in order to improve reporting, transparency and efficiency * councils should consider landlord port models in which land ownership is separated from terminal operations, enabling control to be maintained over port land use while improving efficiency from increased private involvement in port operations. |
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### What next?

Port reform is an ongoing and complex task. Both Governments should continue to focus on providing an appropriate framework for ports to improve productivity. This should include providing the right governance and regulation of ports and opportunities for competition, as well as ensuring the broader workplace relations framework is effective.

An initial step that governments can make to help identify best practice performance is through better data collection and monitoring. Both countries currently collect data and monitor ports. In Australia, for example, data about port performance is collected through the Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics *Waterline* series and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s stevedoring monitoring program. In New Zealand, port information is collected by the Ministry of Transport, which is expanding data collection, including measures of port productivity and the Freight Information Gathering System (sub. DR99, p. 4).

There is merit in building on these existing initiatives by establishing a formal dialogue between Australia and New Zealand to compare productivity across the full set of container and bulk ports. As part of this, it may be possible to extend data collection to a broader range of information from a larger number of Australian and New Zealand ports. This could occur through existing initiatives, such as Australia inviting New Zealand to be part of the monitoring and evaluation program under the National Ports Strategy; or through cooperation from the ACCC, BITRE and New Zealand Ministry of Transport. Enhanced information will be of benefit for preparing for and responding to future market changes and for policymakers in designing and evaluating policies and regulations.

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1. Control refers to the operational oversight of a carrier, with the notion of ‘effective control’ designed to test whether decision-making within an airline is vested with nationals of the designating country (Duval 2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. An airline must satisfy a range of requirements to be designated a SAM airline. These include being majority owned and effectively controlled by Australian and/or New Zealand nationals; having at least a two-thirds majority of Australian and/or New Zealand nationals as Board members; having an Australian or New Zealand national as the chairperson of its Board; and having the head office and operational base in Australia or New Zealand. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Wages on Australian licensed vessels are now determined by the Seagoing Industry Award (SIA) Part A or enterprise bargaining agreements. Wages for foreign vessels operating in Australian waters are now determined under SIA Part B. Part B provides more generous wages rates compared to the ITF market rates and improved conditions relating to working weekends and leave entitlements (total cost estimated to be almost double the ITF market rate). Part A has similar daily wage rates to part B but more generous conditions, including approximately one day leave for every day worked and allowances for handling, disturbed sleep, meal and study (total cost is estimated to be more than 60 percent higher than Part B rates) (ELC 2012, pp. 30-31). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The Australian International Shipping Register will register Australian owned or operated vessels provided they: employ a minimum of two Australian citizens (preferably the Master and Chief Engineer); meet training obligations (a requirement to access tax concessions); and be covered by the *Fair Work Act 2009* and associated laws when in Australian coastal waters (exempted when in international waters). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Under the recent package of changes, the Australian Government has proposed that the costs of cabotage will be offset by productivity improvements agreed between industry and unions under the productivity compact. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)