

Wattle Park Partners Pty Ltd

Prof. R J Snape Commissioner Productivity Commission LB2 Collins Street East MELBOURNE VIC 8003

Dear Professor Snape



BROADCASTING INQUIRY

As undertaken, attached is a further submission to the Commission's Inquiry into Broadcasting regarding the concept of the multimedia- communications market. It includes the charts that seek to plot the breadth of commercial interests across this market that are held by Telstra, News Ltd and PBL.

The research is being undertaken in the context of seeking to define the rapidly aggregating market in which television and radio, pay TV, newspapers, magazines, production houses, telecommunications, Internet and other services now operate. My argument is that while an operator in any particular market segment may not, under current Australian competition law, be regarded as dominant in that segment, the accretion of power and influence bestowed by operating in a number of these market segments may deliver such power as to deliver a dominant market position. The network and tipping effects that can result will act to severely limit competition.

This is still a work in progress but is provided now to hopefully assist in your final deliberations. Please let me know if you require any further information or clarification.

My thoughts are with you as you finalise your report. I appreciate only too well from my own work heading the Government's review of broadcasting in 1988-92 the minefield in which you tread.

Kind regards

Chris North

PO Box 20

HAWKER ACT 2614

AUSTRALIA

Tel: +61.2.62544796

Fax : +61.2.62541107 Mobile : 0419 901050

Submission to the Productivity Commission Hearing into Broadcasting

Market Definition in Broadcasting

Markets are not defined as an end in themselves, but as a tool for analysing the state of competition in particular sectors of the economy. They assist in the identification the area of real concern under the Trade Practices Act - the presence and use of market power.

From the Trade Practices Act point of view, market definition is an "essential first step ... but a first step" in the assessment of the state of competition. Competition itself is a flexible concept - valued for many reasons as serving economic, social and political goals. Further:

Competition is a process rather than a situation.²

Players are included or excluded from the market definition by reference to whether they significantly constrain another's power to "give less and charge more".

The process of market definition is useful only in so far as it helps identify competitive concerns. In the broadcasting area there are a number of features of the market which impact upon this analysis. As the draft Productivity Commission Report identifies, what we are essentially talking about in the broadcasting area is information and images - the market for ideas (page 179). The difficulties of identifying the boundaries of the market in this area point to an arbitrariness in market definition. Instead of drawing tightly defined markets whose boundaries pre-determine the analysis of competitive forces in the industry it is better to focus on the aspects of the marketplace which impact upon competitive behaviour of the players in it.

The importance of not being too prescriptive in tightly drawn market boundaries is especially important at a time when there is convergence of the different elements of the value chain. Not only is there convergence of technology, there is increasing "crossfertilisation between sectors, telecommunications and broadcasting for example" leading to "convergent services". The phenomenon of convergence raises challenges for competition analysis and market definition. These include issues arising from conglomerate joint ventures and mergers, rapidly changing markets, standards, and standardisation and the redefinition of relevant markets. These challenges can be met by a return to the fundamental features of the industry which drive competitive behaviour.

Queensland Co-operative Milling Association (1974) ATPR 40-012 at page 17,246

² *QCMA* at page 17,246.

³ OECD, Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology Sectors, and the Implications for Regulation (3 December 1997), 2.

Lang, *Media, Multimedia and European Antitrust Law*, found on the European Commission Competition Division website, http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/index_en.htm. As Lang notes, this also can be accompanied by increased specialisation and does not necessarily mean narrower market definitions.

Features of markets in broadcasting

- Information demonstrates **network externalities**. The value of the information depends on how many users exist. Externalities arise not just due to technological changes but in the very nature of the product being broadcast. For example:
 - Television programming, but sport in particular, is an experience good, that is you cannot assess its quality until it has been consumed. Further, the experience of seeing a match in an otherwise empty stadium and the experience of seeing one in which the stadium is full are very different. The value of television programs and the experience of watching them at home is also enhanced by the knowledge that others are watching the program, enabling social interaction with respect to that programming at a later time.
 - Theatre and movies likewise gain from being consumed jointly by many consumers at the one time.
 - E-commerce depends upon the inter-relationship of supply and demand.
- There are strong **economies of** *scale* **and** *scope*.
 - The size of an organisation impacts significantly on the cost level which it faces.
 - The larger the number of different segments in which it operates the larger the cost savings which can be made.
- Tipping effects occur. In a network market, as a firm expands, the product of that firm should progressively become more attractive. Tipping occurs when a product subject to increasing returns generates sufficient momentum to dominate the market. Consumers will value one particular good, and avoid substitutes. Tipping effects have several advantages to a large player in the market:
 - When a product has a small market share, network effects will work against an increase in market share.
 - In order to displace a dominant product, the whole market must be displaced, making it more difficult to do so.
- There are **first mover advantages**, for example in establishing the standards to which market players must conform. If you establish and control the standard the rest of the market must follow you. These advantages arise partly because of the presence of tipping effects. The dynamics of the industry require that players in the market obtain a critical mass (at least minimum efficient scale but this might be below the tipping point needed to establish yourself as the industry leader) as soon as possible. The timing of strategic moves is therefore critical, as is the prospect of customers locking in or being locked in to a particular standard.
- There are **high sunk costs**. For example, the capital cost of broadcasting equipment is high. If there is a need to enter into long-term contracts to ensure supply of inputs or a secure customer base to justify the capital expenditure, this also might constitute a sunk cost for it amounts to a precommitment to legal liabilities in an uncertain environment. The presence of high sunk costs is a strong indication of the presence of entry barriers and hence the ability to earn monopoly rents if the critical mass is reached.

- 6 **Vertical integration** delivers significant competitive advantages:
 - it delivers control over the content shown on the various media;
 - a corporation has the ability to cross-sell and cross-market between the various vertical lines;
 - the competitors of the vertically integrated entity may have to rely upon that entity for content at one end or output distribution at the other end of the value chain.
- The industry is characterised by significant **partial ownership**. The network created in the industry is created without full ownership. This is significant because, without the cost of full ownership of companies in related industries, and without a legal control threshold being passed, the market players can:⁵
 - assist in the foreclosure of opportunities for rivals who will be unwilling to either invest in or patronise a company which is owned partially by a rival in another market segment;
 - assist in the acquisition of key strategic information about developments in other segments of the industry - positioning for a move into that segment in a more committed manner if strategic reasons dictate that this should occur;
 - deter the companies in which the acquisition is made from pursuing competitive rivalry with a major but not controlling shareholder;
 - form the basis of willing co-operation between the two companies.

Implications for market definition

If an unnecessarily narrow definition of a market is adopted the inter-relationship between the various segments giving rise to these effects can be overlooked. If an overly broad definition is used, a simplistic analysis of the level of competition based solely on market shares can understate dramatically the level of market power able to be exercised.

There is another way of viewing markets and competitive forces in them. This is to explicitly recognise the network nature of the marketplace. It identifies clusters⁶ of products and locations which are naturally grouped together.

The attached charts identify:

- the many interests that each of PBL, News and Telstra have in the broader communications market;
- the fact that their interests in the various entities operating within the sphere of this industry are not always wholly owned;
- identifies the network effects which are able to be exerted by the creation of the web of interests in each of the elements of the broader communications market.

Some of these effects are explored in the United States' antitrust literature, for example: Areeda and Turner, Antitrust Law, ¶1200ff; Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its Practice (1994), 812 9

Michael Porter, "Clusters and Competition" in On Competition (Harvard Business School Press, 1998), 197-298 explores the concept of a cluster from the perspective of geographic space. The same concepts are applicable in product space.

These charts are not intended to represent the complete corporate structures and diverse interests of any of News Corporation, Publishing and Broadcasting Limited or Telstra. Their purpose is to highlight the ways in which the interests of these companies in publishing, broadcasting, filmed entertainment, pay television, telecommunications, internet and e-commerce are converging and blurring traditional market boundaries. Every attempt has been made to ensure that the information contained within them is correct at the date of printing, however much of the information has been taken from a range of sources including media reports and no warranty is given as to their ultimate accuracy. Where interests have not been represented as a percentage, the exact nature and extent of the interest held has not been able to be identified.

In industries with which this submission is concerned, viewing the competitive dynamics through the use of clusters rather than through more traditional groupings of companies, industries or sectors is more in-line with the true nature of competition and the sources of competitive advantage. "Clusters, broader than industries, capture important linkages, complementarities and spill-overs of technology, skills, information, marketing, and customer needs that cut across firms and industries. [S]uch connections are fundamental to competition, to productivity and, especially, to the pace of new business formation and innovation."

⁷ ibid at p 205

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