
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# Abbreviations and explanations

Abbreviations

ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics

ACCC Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

ACT Australian Competition Tribunal

AEMC Australian Energy Market Commission

AEMO Australian Energy Market Operator

AER Australian Energy Regulator

AEMA Australian Energy Market Agreement

CAIDI Customer average interruption duration index

CAPEX Capital expenditure

CBA cost-benefit analysis

CDF Customer Damage Functions

COAG Council of Australian Governments

CPI-x Consumer Price Index minus a benchmark productivity rate (x)

CPP Critical Peak Price

CSIRO Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation

DANCE Dynamic Avoidable Network Cost Evaluation model

DG Distributed generation

DLC Direct load control

DM Demand management

DMEGCIS Demand Management and Embedded Generation Connection Incentive Scheme

DNSP Distribution Network Service Provider

DRED Demand Response Enabling Device

DSP Demand side participation

ESCOSA Essential Services Commission of South Australia

ETC Electricity Transmission Code

EU European Union

GDP Gross Domestic Product

HV High voltage (nominally 5–22kV)

IPART Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (NSW)

IRSR inter-regional settlement residue

kVA kilovolt ampere

kW kilowatt

kWh kilowatt hour

LRMC Long Run Marginal Cost

LV Low voltage

MAIFI Momentary average interruption frequency index

PSCR Project Specification Consultation Report

MAR maximum annual revenue

MCE Ministerial Council on Energy

MDMS meter data management system

MED Major event days

MW megawatt

MVA megavolt amperes

MWh megawatt hour

NECF National Electricity Customer Framework

NEM National Electricity Market

NEMMCO National Electricity Market Management Company Limited

NEO National Electricity Objective

NEL National Electricity Law

NER National Electricity Rules

NGL National Gas Law

NMS network management systems

NTNDP National Transmission Network Development Plan

NTP National Transmission Planner

N-x

Ofgem Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (UK)

Ofwat Office of Water Services (UK) (On 1 April 2006, the functions of Ofwat were replaced by the Water Services Regulation Authority)

OPEX Operating expenditure

PC Productivity Commission

PV Photovoltaic

RIT-D Regulatory Investment Test for Distribution

RIT-T Regulatory Investment Test for Transmission

SAIDI System average interruption duration index

SAIFI System average interruption frequency index

SCER Standing Council on Energy and Resources

STPIS Service Target Performance Incentive Scheme

SOC State-owned corporation

TNSP Transmission network service provider

TOU time of use (electricity tariffs)

VCEC Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission

VCR Value of Customer Reliability

WACC Weighted average cost of capital

WAPC weighted average price caps

Explanations

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Billion | The convention used for a billion is a thousand million (109). |
| Findings | *Findings in the body of the report are paragraphs high­lighted using italics, as this is.* |
| Recommendations | ***Recommendations in the body of the report are high­lighted using bold italics, as this is.*** |
| Requests for further information | *Information requests are paragraphs highlighted using italics, as this is.* |