
September 2022



Container port productivity

Technical paper

Technical paper for *Lifting productivity at Australia’s container ports: between water, wharf and warehouse*, Inquiry Draft Report

|  |
| --- |
| The Productivity Commission acknowledges the Traditional Owners of  Country throughout Australia and their continuing connection to land,  waters and community. We pay our respects to their Cultures, Country and Elders past and present.  The Productivity Commission  The Productivity Commission is the Australian Government’s independent research and advisory body on a range of economic, social and environmental issues affecting the welfare of Australians. Its role, expressed most simply, is to help governments make better policies, in the long term interest of the Australian community.  The Commission’s independence is underpinned by an Act of Parliament. Its processes and outputs are open to public scrutiny and are driven by concern for the wellbeing of the community as a whole.  Further information on the Productivity Commission can be obtained from the Commission’s website (www.pc.gov.au).  © Commonwealth of Australia 2022  CC By logo  With the exception of the Commonwealth Coat of Arms and content supplied by third parties, this copyright work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence. In essence, you are free to copy, communicate and adapt the work, as long as you attribute the work to the Productivity Commission (but not in any way that suggests the Commission endorses you or your use) and abide by the other licence terms. The licence can be viewed at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0.  The terms under which the Coat of Arms can be used are detailed at: www.pmc.gov.au/government/commonwealth-coat-arms.  Wherever a third party holds copyright in this material the copyright remains with that party. Their permission may be required to use the material, please contact them directly.  An appropriate reference for this publication is: Productivity Commission 2022, *Container port productivity*, Technical paper for *Lifting productivity at Australia’s container ports: between water, wharf and warehouse,* Inquiry Draft Report, Canberra, September  Publication enquiries:  Media, Publications and Web | phone 03 9653 2244 | email publications@pc.gov.au |

Contents

Container port productivity 4

1. What the Commission has been asked to do 4

2. Motivating concerns about port performance 5

3. Why port performance matters 8

4. Measuring port performance 11

5. A framework for assessing port performance 14

6. How productive are Australian container ports? 27

7. The productivity of Australian container ports internationally 44

8. Summary 68

Appendices

A. Data sources 71

B. Supplementary figures and tables 75

C. Review of international container port productivity literature 86

D. The World Bank’s Container Port Performance Index 96

References 107

Container port productivity

This technical paper assesses the performance of Australia’s major container ports, with a focus on benchmarking their productivity against each other and against similar international ports. The analysis also takes a long‑term productivity focus where the data permits.

This paper supports and extends the discussion presented in chapter 3 of the inquiry report *Lifting productivity at Australia's container ports: between water, wharf and warehouse* (the inquiry report). It is intended to be a standalone piece and therefore contains some repetition of that chapter’s content.

The paper:

* describes what the Commission has been asked to do (section 1)
* highlights some of the motivations for the analysis (section )
* describes why port performance matters (section 3)
* describes how to measure port performance, including what constitutes a container port and the inputs and outputs used to assess productivity (section 4)
* develops a conceptual framework for assessing port productivity and examines how the existing framework could be extended (section 5)
* assesses the performance of Australian container ports, presenting long‑term trends where possible (section 6)
* assesses how Australia’s major container ports compare to ports overseas, unpacking the World Bank’s study results and benchmarking the performance of Australia’s container ports internationally in the process (section 7)
* summarises the key takeaway messages from the analysis (section 8).

Annexes to the paper provide further information on data sources, supplementary figures and tables, literature reviewed and a detailed summary of the World Bank’s Container Port Performance Index (CPPI).

## What the Commission has been asked to do

The terms of reference direct the Commission to:

Examine the long‑term trends, structural changes, and impediments that impact the efficiency and dependability of the maritime logistics system, including developing a framework of performance measures to determine port performance and benchmarking Australian ports internationally.

Port performance encompasses the efficiency and dependability of ports. Efficiency is interpreted here as being the technical efficiency with which ports undertake their operations, while dependability refers to how reliable the ports are in handling containers and ensuring goods reach their destination.[[1]](#footnote-2) The paper focuses on the technical efficiency (productivity) of Australian ports, noting other dimensions of performance where relevant or where data permits.

As per the primary scope of this inquiry (chapter 1, inquiry report), this paper focuses on the performance of container ports. Moreover, reflecting where the majority of containers are un/loaded and data availability, the paper focuses on the five main Australian container ports: Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and Fremantle.[[2]](#footnote-3)

All of these container ports also handle other types of cargo. For example, the port of Melbourne also handles: motor vehicles; bulk liquids from petrochemicals to crude oil and molasses; dry cargo including cement, sugar, grain, and gypsum; breakbulk commodities such as timber, paper, iron and steel; and a variety of non‑containerised pack types including farm equipment and machinery. These non‑containerised activities are not included in the subsequent analysis.

Measurement of long‑term trends in container ports requires extensive time‑series data. It also requires the ability to identify and exclude the effects of short‑term influences from the data and analysis. The COVID‑19 pandemic led to many disruptions in the maritime logistics system, including shipping delays, quarantine of supply chain workers, surges in demand and price spikes.[[3]](#footnote-4) Long‑term trends are presented where data permits, allowing for the impact of the pandemic between 2020 and 2021 to be noted.

## Motivating concerns about port performance

A motivating factor for this inquiry was the poor performance of Australian container ports in a recent international study undertaken by the World Bank in conjunction with IHS Markit (2021).[[4]](#footnote-5) This study developed a Container Port Performance Index (CPPI) to enable comparisons of quayside performance, and assessed performance across 351 container ports in 2019‑20. The CPPI was the first attempt at a comprehensive cross‑sectional international comparison of container port performance using a consistent dataset. Earlier international studies focused on benchmarking far fewer ports, and each used data compiled from numerous and different sources. Subsequent iterations of the CPPI are intended to be released annually.

For the CPPI, port performance was measured with reference to port hours (that is, the time from when a ship reaches the port limit to the time it departs from the berth; this covers anchorage, steam in and cargo handling operations). The rationale is that more efficient ports handle a given ship‑call‑size combination more quickly than less efficient ports (where call size represents the number of containers un/loaded on a ship’s visit).

Nearly all Australian container ports ranked in the bottom 20 per cent of the ports assessed in the inaugural report (table 1). The exception was Brisbane, which ranked in the bottom 30 per cent. These results suggest that Australian ports took longer than most international ports to turn over ships. The port of Yokohama in Japan was found to be the most efficient container port globally, followed by the port of King Abdullah in Saudi Arabia.

The performance of Australian ports was similarly poor in the second edition of the CPPI (for 2021), released in late May 2022 (The World Bank 2022). The 2021 index clearly reflected the impacts of the COVID‑19 pandemic on performance. For example, Los Angeles and Long Beach ranked last which is unsurprising given the backlog of ships waiting to dock at those ports at times during 2021.

Table 1 – Australian container ports rank poorly in the World Bank’s Container Port Performance Index (CPPI)a,b

Sample of 351 container ports, 2019‑20

|  | Statistical approach | | Administrative approach | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Port | Rank | Total score | Rank | Total score |
| Brisbane (QLD) | 246 | +0.569 | 234 | ‑8 |
| Sydney (NSW) | 337 | +3.907 | 327 | ‑63 |
| Melbourne (VIC) | 302 | +1.676 | 313 | -40 |
| Adelaide (SA) | 339 | +4.546 | 333 | -78 |
| Fremantle (WA) | 326 | +2.716 | 319 | -49 |
| Highest ranked | Rank | Total score | Rank | Total score |
| Yokohama (Japan) | 1 | -5.995 | 1 | 130 |
| King Abdullah (Saudi Arabia) | 2 | -5.684 | 2 | 114 |

**a.** The statistical approach used factor analysis to identify the relevant factor weights for each input. Total scores can be negative (more efficient) and positive (less efficient). **b.** The administrative approach calculated an index that arbitrarily weights each input. The higher the index, the more efficient a port is found to be. The index can be positive (more efficient) or negative (less efficient). Both approaches are discussed in more detail in the accompanying technical paper.

Source: The World Bank (2021).

The COVID‑19 pandemic may also have affected the results from the first edition of the CPPI. The study period (July 2019 to June 2020), covered the onset of the pandemic and ports that faced disproportionately more disruptions (such as ships arriving off schedule or COVID‑19 outbreaks among dock workers) likely ranked lower due to increased port hours.

Given the widespread media coverage of supply chain issues during COVID‑19, the World Bank’s ranking of container port performance attracted considerable attention, and criticisms of the CPPI have been raised in submissions to this inquiry (box 1).

Overall, submissions questioned the validity of the results and cautioned drawing conclusions about Australian port productivity based on the CPPI. In particular, DP World (sub. 49, p. 7) highlighted that the study ‘cannot precisely identify the cause of delays — including the extent to which these are caused by poor productivity or other (exogenous) factors’, which limits the usefulness of the CPPI.

| Box 1 – Some inquiry participants criticised the World Bank study |
| --- |
| Many submissions to this inquiry raised concerns that the World Bank study had not compared like‑for‑like ports (ACL, sub. 57, p. 9; Deakin University, sub. 39, p. 7; FPH, sub. 55, pp. 10–11; MUA, sub. 59, p. 70; NSW Ports, sub. 66, p. 17; Ports Australia, sub. 45, p. 4). Particular concerns included that it did not differentiate ports by:   * the amount and type of trade * the ship sizes serviced * the function of the ports (transhipment versus destination/origin ports).   The Maritime Union of Australia (sub. 59, p. 71) also noted that few of the top ranked ports had similar labour and human rights standards to Australia. Inquiry participants suggested that these factors likely contributed to the poor rankings of Australian ports.  Inquiry participants also noted other criticisms relating to the focus of the study on:   * port hours as the key measure of performance, which misses other important indicators of port performance, such as container dwell times and landside performance (Deakin University, sub. 39, pp. 7–8; DP World, sub. 49, pp. 6–7) * the interests of one key stakeholder (the shipping lines) (MUA, sub. 59, p. 83) * port‑wide performance rather than terminal‑level performance. Some participants advocated for performance to be measured at the terminal level because the productivity of individual terminals differs (NSW Ports, sub. 66, p. 17; Ports Australia, sub. 45, p. 4). |
|  |

However, in its submission, Shipping Australia Limited (sub. 11, p. 102) advocated for the CPPI to be included as part of the port performance monitoring framework. They acknowledged that, while the CPPI would always attract criticisms, ‘if two separate methodologies, devised and implemented by world‑leading transport economists, both rank the performance of Australian container ports badly, then … it is not the methodologies that are at fault’.

Two of the main criticisms focused on the failure of the study to:

1. ensure like‑for‑like comparisons given perceived differences across container ports, particularly in terms of throughput, differences in the size of ships that visit each port, and whether the ports were transhipment or origin/destinations ports[[5]](#footnote-6)
2. take into account the efficiency of landside operations of each port.

There is some validity to each of these criticisms. While it did not receive much prominence, the published indexes did take ship and call size into account to facilitate greater comparability across ports. The analysis did not, however, differentiate between transhipment and origin/destination ports. Moreover, collecting landside data is difficult given the heterogeneity of landside operations and numerous firms involved. Therefore, the absence of a consistent, comparable global dataset precludes the inclusion of landside operations across the 351 ports analysed.[[6]](#footnote-7) The World Bank recognised and acknowledged many limitations in their report, and they intend to enhance the methodology, scope and data in subsequent reports.

Despite these criticisms, it is worth noting that the number one ranked port, Yokohama, is similar in size (that is, it handles a similar number of containers annually) to Melbourne and Sydney and could therefore be considered ‘broadly comparable’.

The findings of the World Bank study are similar to many previous empirical studies on the performance of Australian container ports relative to international ports (annex C). For example, one somewhat dated OECD study, Merk and Dang (2012, p. 35) also found that Australian container ports were relatively inefficient in an international context. (In contrast, the study found that Australian bulk ports were among the most efficient in the world (p. 19, 22), particularly Port Walcott (iron ore) and Gladstone, Newcastle and Hay Point (coal). There has been limited national or international performance benchmarking of bulk ports; presumably a reflection of their diversity.)

Unfortunately, the World Bank study did not identify *why* Australian container ports ranked so poorly nor *what* they could do improve their performance and world ranking, especially given that many of the drivers of performance may be outside the control of individual port operators (such as the demand for imports in Australia and world demand for Australian exports, the size of ships operated by international shipping lines and service frequency). These issues are explored in section 7 of this paper.

## Why port performance matters

### Efficient ports are vital to the functioning of the Australian economy

Ports play a critical role in the maritime logistics system and hence, in the global economy. As the World Bank (2021) explained:

Maritime transport carries more than 80 percent of global merchandise trade by volume, and any impediment or friction at the port will have tangible repercussions for their respective hinterlands and populations. In the short term, this is likely to take the form of shortages of essential goods and higher prices, as we saw early in the pandemic. But over the medium to longer term, an inefficient port will result in slower economic growth, lower employment, and higher costs for importers and exporters. (p. 8)

Most goods that enter Australia pass through container ports (aside from crude oil, motor vehicles and petroleum), as do most manufactured and processed exports.

While details on the number of containers handled exist, it is hard to be definitive about the share of Australian imports and exports that pass through Australian container ports, or even ports more generally (that is, including containerised and non‑containerised trade) using data from public sources.

In its submission to this inquiry, Shipping Australia Limited (sub. 11, p. 6) attempted to identify the share of trade passing through Australian ports by combining data from different official sources. They noted some material differences in the value of goods trade that passes through airports and seaports across sources. They estimated that seaports handled 99.93 per cent of all trade (imports and exports) by volume, and 83.6 per cent by value in 2018‑19. These estimates were not broken down between imports and exports and between container and non‑container trade. The ABS publishes the volume and value of maritime trade by port, but likewise does not differentiate between containerised and non‑containerised trade. The lack of distinction in the type of trade is particularly an issue for ports that handle multiple types of cargo because the value of containerised trade cannot be distinguished.

The efficiency, effectiveness and dependability of Australian ports affect the cost of importing and exporting goods, and, consequently, play a role in determining the international competitiveness of many Australian businesses in global markets and the cost of goods purchased by Australian households. The performance of Australian ports ultimately affects the living standards of all Australians.

Strong growth in containerised trade is forecast for Australia (chapter 1, inquiry report). Moreover, ships are getting bigger and, with this, so are their call sizes (chapter 7, inquiry report). These trends are expected to continue. Ports will need to be efficient to be able to deal with the projected growth in the number of containers handled annually and per ship (that is, the throughput and call size).

### Productivity is integral to the efficient functioning of ports

Productivity is the ‘technical efficiency’ (sometimes called ‘engineering efficiency’) of how a current mix of outputs is produced from existing inputs (either individually or collectively) (box 2).[[7]](#footnote-8)

A port that is *technically efficient* uses the fewest inputs possible to produce a given level of output. In other words, given the prevailing technology, it is not possible to reduce the use of any input (such as cranes or labour) at this port without reducing the level of output (such as the number of containers passing through the port).

Ports may also be technically efficient in the use of one, but not all, inputs. In this case, they could produce the same level of output using less of some, but not all, inputs. An example of this might be a port that used its cranes efficiently but had an excess of labour inputs for the level of throughput handled.

Being technically efficient, however, does not necessarily mean that the existing level of throughput is being achieved in the most cost‑effective way. For example, it may be that a port is fully efficient in the use of manually operated cranes and labour, but these manual cranes may cost more in the long run than fully automated cranes (chapter 11, inquiry report). So, even if fully automated cranes are unable to move more containers or move them more quickly than manual cranes, investing in fully automated cranes would reduce a port’s overall costs in the long run (by reducing labour costs). Such an investment would alter the mix of inputs used (in this case, using more capital and less labour) with resultant benefits to profitability (and, potentially, overall productivity).

| Box 2 – Different measures of productivity |
| --- |
| Different types of productivity measures exist, with many relating to the choice of inputs.  Partial productivity measures relate to the use of a single input (such as capital or labour). Examples relevant to ports include lifts per crane (capital), containers moved per hour worked (labour) and containers moved per berth metre (capital). Partial productivity measures may also differ in the measure of output used (such as container movements or the number of ship calls).  Productivity measures can also relate to the use of groups of inputs (such as the use of capital and labour, often called value adding factors, or all inputs, referred to as total factor productivity). Such measures of productivity are uncommon for ports. Value added and total factor productivity measures are frequently used in studies that cover broader ranges of economic activity and are used by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in the Australian National Accounts. |
|  |

Technical efficiency is one of a number of measures of economicefficiency (box 3). Technical efficiency is a prerequisite for productive efficiency — which occurs when a given quantity of output is produced at the lowest possible cost.

Measuring technical efficiency (in the form of productivity levels) is useful in benchmarking the same activity in one port against another. This benchmarking can provide useful insights into how port productivity and practices can be improved and to identify which ports to learn from. Care is still needed in analyses of this type as any undue focus on an individual performance measure may miss wider issues (including the trade‑offs between different activities, as one port may not be good at everything). For example, a port may be the fastest at unloading containers but the slowest at getting those containers out the gate and to customers, and as a result has a congested container yard.

Growth in productivity is often more informative than point‑in‑time measures when assessing an individual port because it details how productivity has changed over time (such as whether improvements are occurring and whether this is coming from using inputs more efficiently or from output growth with a comparatively small increase in inputs).

| Box 3 – Requirements for economic efficiency |
| --- |
| The concept of efficiency has a number of dimensions. Overall economic efficiency requires satisfaction of productive, allocative and dynamic efficiency.   * Productive efficiency — goods or services are produced at the least possible cost for a given quantity or quality. This concept goes beyond technical efficiency, which is the lowest volume of inputs per unit output for each possible combination of inputs, as it takes into account the prices of the inputs. An inefficient firm reduces productive efficiency, for example, by not maximising its output given its mix of inputs, or by choosing a more expensive mix of inputs than required. (An increase in productive efficiency can be represented by moving to a production bundle closer to the production possibility frontier. However, only one point on that frontier will be cost minimising and, hence, meet productive efficiency.)   + Technical efficiency is the conversion of physical inputs such as labour services and raw materials or semi‑finished goods into outputs. It is determined by the difference between the observed ratio of combined quantities of an entity’s output to input and the ratio achieved by best practice. It can be expressed as the potential to increase quantities of outputs from given quantities of inputs, or the potential to reduce the quantities of inputs used in producing given quantities of outputs. * Allocative efficiency — the type and mix of different goods and services produced are of the highest value for consumers compared with any alternative use of the given resources. A lack of effective competition can mean that firms have an incentive to maximise profits by reducing supply and raising prices. This reduces allocative efficiency as it results in an underproduction of particular goods or services. (An increase in allocative efficiency can be represented by a movement along the production possibility frontier that places the community on a higher utility curve.) * Dynamic efficiency — productive and allocative efficiency are achieved over time. This can mean finding better products and better ways of producing goods and services. (An increase in dynamic efficiency can be represented by a shift outwards of the production possibility frontier.)   The 3 figures in box 3 show the production possibility frontier. This concave curve shows the combinations of two goods X and Y that can be produced for the total amount of resources available. In the first figure productivity growth is observed when there is a move from a point A inside the production frontier to any point on the frontier. For example, moving from A to B more of good Y is produced, moving from A to C more of both X and Y are produced. The second figure shows an improvement in allocative efficiency. In this figure a move from point B which is on the frontier to point C (which is also on the frontier) raises utility because the C is on a higher indifference curve — it gives the highest utility given the production possibility frontier. The third figure shows an improvement in productivity through dynamic efficiency. This is represented by a shift out in the production possibility frontier. This shift allows a higher indifference curve and hence level of utility to be achieved at point E, which has a higher production of both goods X and Y than at the previous point C.  Sources: PC (2013, p. 3, 2019, p. 69). |
|  |

## Measuring port performance

The exercise of measuring container port productivity raises two key questions:

1. what constitutes a ‘container port’?
2. what physical outputs and inputs should be used to assess port productivity?

### What constitutes a ‘container port’?

Container ports consist of a range of separate, but inter‑related, activities. These include:

* a port authority: the agency or company than has overall responsibility for the port
* container terminal operators (referred to as stevedores in Australia): the companies that employ the labour used to un/load ships and that frequently invest in the cranes, land and other infrastructure needed to move containers from ships to other forms of transport such as road, rail or ship (and vice versa)
* pilots: who are responsible for navigating ships safely into harbour
* tug operators: who assist pilots to manoeuvre ships safely through the port to and from assigned berths
* container park operators: which manage the flow and stock of empty containers
* road (trucks) and rail (trains) transport within the perimeter fence that surrounds the port
* ancillary services such as customs and quarantine, which affect the speed at which goods flow through ports.

The maritime logistics system also includes other activities such as transport outside the port fence and freight forwarders (chapter 2, inquiry report).

The disparate nature of these activities means that productivity analyses do not, in practice, assess an entire container port. Instead, ports are usually assessed on activities connected with:

* *marine* *operations* — the on‑water activities involved in bringing ships into and out of port
* *quayside* *operations* — the activities that occur at the interface of the ship with the land when it is berthed, including the loading and unloading of containers
* *landside* *operations* — the movement and temporary storage of containers in the container yard and the loading or unloading of containers on to land‑based transport (typically trucks or trains) and the passage of that transport into and out of the port.[[8]](#footnote-9)

The most common metrics of port performance published in Australia relate to their quayside and landside operations (discussed below).

Notwithstanding that their results are presented in terms of ports, most international port benchmarking studies, including the World Bank study mentioned above, focus on quayside operations.

### What outputs and inputs should be used to assess productivity?

The most common measure of container‑port output is throughput — denoted as either the number of containers handled, or the number of 20‑foot equivalent (TEU) containers handled.[[9]](#footnote-10) A less common measure is the number of ship calls, but this measure fails to account for the number of containers that pass through the port — the main function of a container port.

The main inputs of container ports are berths, quay cranes, labour, container yard area and land‑based cranes. These can be broadly grouped into capital, labour and land. Container ports also use a wide range of standard business inputs such as offices, information technology, vehicles, fuel, legal and accounting services, telecommunications, electricity and water. Some empirical studies also include the number of container terminal operators as an input.[[10]](#footnote-11)

Inputs and outputs may be expressed in terms of physical units such as the number of cranes or the number of employees, or as time‑based measures such the number of hours that a crane or employees worked or were available for use.

Productivity analysis focuses on input use and outputs produced over specified periods of time (such as a quarter or year).

#### Not all inputs and outputs are within the control of ports

The demand for container port inputs and outputs that drive their productivity may result from factors that are not within the control of the port or container terminal operators (table 2).

Table 2 – Some factors affecting port productivity

Factors within and outside the control of port or terminal operators

| Controllable factors | Uncontrollable factors |
| --- | --- |
| Service and waiting time | Tidal and weather restrictions |
| Terminal layout and configuration | Other physical and technical constraints |
| Capacity development and expansion | Trade pattern, traffic type and mix |
| Terminal procedures | Container status, type, and dimensions |
| Working hours, shift/labour arrangements | Ship size and type |
| Type, size, and maintenance of equipment | Pattern/frequency of shipping services |
| Routing and stacking of containers | Arrival pattern of ships, trucks**a**, and trains |
| Equipment allocation and deployment | Stowage plan |
| Berth and yard management systems | Landside and intermodal connections |
| ICT and Terminal Operating System modules | Customs and trade related procedures |
| Reliability and level of customer service | Health and safety requirements |
|  | Other regulatory requirements |

**a.** The arrival of trucks is not within the control of ports because truck operators use their own discretion to book slots to pick up containers. Further, the terminal operators have no control over which operators handle the containers nor the order in which the containers are picked up or delivered at the terminal — activity undertaken by transport companies at the direction of the cargo owners.

Source: Adapted from Bichou (2013, p. 31).

Whether these factors are controllable or not at the port or container terminal level is particularly important in providing context in any performance benchmarking analysis. For example, sometimes inefficiencies may be unavoidable for ports if they are caused by factors outside of their control (such as tidal and weather restrictions). Interpreting benchmarking results therefore requires an understanding of the specific factors affecting each port.

The most obvious external factor outside the control of ports is container throughput. The number of containers that pass through a port reflects the demand for imports by the local community and world demand for local exports. As such, port throughput is a ‘derived’ demand. Competition between container terminal operators is ostensibly about the division of port‑level throughput and the cost of handling those containers (chapter 5, inquiry report).

Shipping lines also control some of the factors that drive input use by container terminal operators. The length and draught of a ship affects which berths it can dock at and affects the type and number of cranes needed to service it, as well as the height and distance that the cranes need to travel to access containers. External factors such as bridge heights, channel depth and tidal ranges also affect vessel choice. These factors may also affect port and terminal productivity, albeit indirectly.

While these ‘external’ factors may affect the nature of the physical inputs and outputs of a port and the use of physical inputs, terminal operators often have discretion in how they respond to these factors. Terminal operators control the number and type of cranes allocated and workforce deployed to service vessels, even if they are unable to control the size of the vessel being serviced or its call size. Thus, how container terminal operators respond to ‘external factors’ means that these operators’ actions may still influence their productivity.

## A framework for assessing port performance

The terms of reference direct the Commission to develop:

… a framework of performance measures to determine port performance and benchmarking Australian ports internationally.

Australia was at the forefront of early efforts to measure and benchmark container port performance:

Australia was a pioneer in efforts to [develop] efficiency metrics, as the Australian government sought to assess its waterfront reform initiatives in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Bureau of Industry Economics, 1993). The government wished to understand port performance in terms of operational efficiency and the customer requirements of timeliness and reliability. (Mary R. Brooks Transportation Consulting 2015, p. 22)

The key publication that benchmarks the performance of Australian container ports is *Waterline*, published by the Australian Government’s Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics (BITRE). *Waterline* was first published in July 1994, initially on a quarterly basis, and is now released on an irregular basis. The *Waterline* data also underpins the annual Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s (ACCC) *Container Stevedoring Monitoring Report*.

*Waterline* was introduced to monitor and publish the impact of waterfront reforms on port performance. ‘The Waterfront Industry Reform Authority (WIRA) monitored the progress of waterfront reform from June 1989 to September 1992, producing performance indicators at quarterly intervals’ (BTCE 1994, p. 1).Self‑initiated by the Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics (BTCE) in 1994, *Waterline* was designed to continue to monitor and disseminate the impacts of waterfront reform.[[11]](#footnote-12) Since then the *Waterline* report has evolved and changed in response to feedback, but monitoring has continued.

The latest *Waterline* report consists of four sections:

* measures of container terminal throughput
* measures of container terminal productivity
* vehicle booking system and empty container park operations
* a port interface cost index (used by the ACCC in its *Container Stevedoring Monitoring Report*).

*Waterline* also contains some commentary on the statistics and on recent developments. Earlier editions included some discussion of other related matters, such as some employment and labour market issues.

### Understanding how container ports operate

An understanding of the basic anatomy of container ports is helpful to understanding the rationale for the existing approach for assessing port performance and as background to the discussion below about its strengths and weaknesses (chapter 2, inquiry report).

The role of container ports is to move containers into and out of the country. This requires linking the waterside operations of a port (referred to here as marine operations) with its landside activities (landside operations). The interface between these two areas of operation, where containers are loaded and unloaded from ships, is referred to the quayside (quayside operations). The ship’s crew, employees of the port and employees of other port‑related business (such as, pilots and tugs) undertake the bulk of marine operations. Container terminal operators and their employees link the waterside and landside activities.

An efficient port, given its inputs and external constraints, minimises the collective time that it takes for containers to pass through the port (both inwards and outwards). Such ports also minimise the time that ships and land transport spend within the port. Ports that move containers more quickly, reliably and in a cost‑effective manner are better performers than those that do not.

The multi‑dimensionality of the processes involved in moving containers gives rise to a variety of performance metrics. Some relate to different parts of the process (such as port, quayside and landside operations) and others relate to different measures of performance (such as crane productivity and time‑based metrics).

Ports may perform well against certain metrics, while simultaneously performing less well against others.

Thus, there is no one overall measure of port performance. Instead, port performance needs to be assessed using a range of different metrics.

#### Container movements

Container movements are central to determining how effectively container ports operate. Focusing on imports for brevity, each container that passes through a port undergoes a series of separate, but related, broad steps:

* it enters a port onboard a ship
* it is unloaded from a ship
* it clears customs and quarantine
* it sits in the container yard awaiting collection
* it is loaded onto land‑based transport
* it exits the port on that transport (table 3).

Empty containers may also sit in container parks within ports awaiting collection. Exported containers follow similar steps, but in reverse.

Hiccups in any one of these steps add to the time taken for the container to pass through the port. At best, this adds unnecessarily to the cost of importing/exporting goods and, at worst, may lead to perishable goods spoiling, making them worthless.

Table 3 – The movement of an imported container through a port

| Step | Timing required | Derived time measure |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Container arrives at the port limit | Time when the ship arrives at port limit/anchorage point |  |
| Container sits at anchorage |  | Time spent at anchorage |
| Container starts to move to berth | Time when the ship starts sailing to the berth |  |
| Container moves to berth |  | Sailing time |
| Container arrives at berth | Time when the ship arrives at berth |  |
|  |  | Line fastening time |
|  | Time when the ship lines are fully secured |  |
|  |  | Preparation time |
|  | Time when labour first boards the ship |  |
|  |  | Unlashing time |
|  | Time when container unloading commences |  |
|  |  | Container ship waiting time |
| Container unloaded from the ship | Time when the container is unloaded |  |
|  |  | Customs clearance time |
| Container clears customs and quarantine | Time when container clears customs and quarantine and is available for collection |  |
|  |  | Container dwell time |
| Container moves to the yard | Time when the container is moved to the yard |  |
|  |  | Container movement time |
| Container moves from the yard to the truck loading bay (intermodal terminal for rail) | Time when the container is moved to the truck loading bay (intermodal terminal) |  |
|  |  | Truck/train loading time |
| Container loaded onto truck/train | Time when the container is loaded onto truck/train |  |
| Container moves to port exit |  | Truck/train exit time |
| Container leaves port | Time when the truck/train exits the port |  |

#### Ship visits

Ship visits are frequently expressed in terms of the size of the vessel that visits a port, its call size and its turnaround time.

The turnaround time is the total time that a ship spends in port (also known as ‘port hours’). This can be broken down into stages (figure 1).

Most container ships operate to schedules that set out their expected arrival and departure times. The shipping lines provide this information to ports. The ports then determine arrival ‘windows’ during which the ship is expected to arrive. These enable the port and terminal operators to plan the delivery of services to the ship and the un/loading of containers around these windows (such as allocating berths and providing pilots, tugs, line boats, mooring gangs, cranes, workers and fuel).

If ships miss their window or if their berths are otherwise unavailable, ships may have to anchor at the port limits and wait until a suitable berth is available (referred to as anchorage time).

Ships missing their windows also affects the reliability of the maritime logistics system. When ships miss their windows, it can disrupt operations of the port and container terminals and therefore delivery of goods to customers.

Figure 1 – The anatomy of a port call

Figure 1.1 – This figure details the steps involved in a port call. This includes port hours components, the different points of activity that define these components and the operational processes that occur within each time component. 

Source: Adapted from The World Bank (2021, p. 45).

Anchorage time is wasted time. It may reflect port or channel congestion, the designated berth already being occupied, the terminal operator not being otherwise ready to receive the ship, or ships missing their window. And it may be a consequence of the actions of port authorities, terminal operators or the ships themselves (for example, choosing to miss their designated window for berthing to save fuel).

Ships then enter the port under the direction of the Harbourmaster and vessel pilot. The time taken to sail to the berth will reflect, among other things, the distance from the port limit to the berth (which varies greatly by port) and vessel type. This steam‑in time is largely outside the control of port operators and container terminal operators. Ships leave the port (‘steam‑out’) in a similar fashion.

The remaining time is the time that ships spend at berth. This is the time between when all the lines that secure the ship to the berth are secured (referred to as all lines fast) to when all those lines are released so that the ship can depart (referred to as all lines released).

Time spent at berth is composed of three components: start, finish and operating time. Start and finish involves the time taken for the crew to ready the ship for boarding and for land‑based workers to board the ship to unlash and unpin the containers so that they are ready to be moved. (The time when labour first boards the ship is referred to as first labour.) Likewise, finish time involves the opposite as the workers secure the containers and the crew readies the ship for sailing. (The time when labour last leaves the ship is referred to as last labour.) Operating time relates to the time during which containers are ready to be unloaded and loaded. Gross operating time is the total time during which containers can be lifted; net operating time excludes any operational and non‑operational delays. The duration of operating time will be correlated with call size, the number of cranes used and crane productivity — ships with larger call sizes will generally be in port for longer.

#### Land transport

Land transport takes full and empty containers to and from port. Trucks carry most containers across all Australian container ports (chapter 7, inquiry report).

As noted above, a more efficient port will minimise the total time that land transport spends in the port. That is, the time between when it enters and exits the port. The time that trucks spend waiting at the port gate also should be minimised (even though this occurs outside of the port perimeter), otherwise ports could artificially deflate truck turnaround times by forcing trucks to wait outside the gate. All other things equal, lower turnaround times are indicative of higher landside productivity. Further, a more efficient port will backload trucks such that trucks haul containers on both the in‑bound and out‑bound legs of a single trip.

### The existing approach to assessing port performance

The metrics published in *Waterline* anchor to many of these concepts.

A range of the published throughput and productivity measures relate to port performance (table 4). These measures are published for the five main container ports (Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and Fremantle) and a ‘five ports’ total. Numerous metrics are expressed on both a container and TEU basis. Each productivity indicator is informative about a different aspect of port productivity. For example, containers per truck reflects the productivity of trucks that visit the port.

The focus of the quayside productivity measures in *Waterline* is crane usage. The report does not provide information on the workforce. Three key quayside productivity measures are presented: *the* *crane rate*, *the* *elapsed labour rate* and *the ship rate*.

The three measures reported in *Waterline* are ‘net’ measures in that they *exclude* any operational or non‑operational delays (such as award breaks or public holidays). In contrast, ‘gross’ measures would include these delays.

As the net time will always be the same or lower than the gross time, the resulting net productivity measure will always be the same or higher than the corresponding gross productivity measure. If the net and gross measures are computed on a consistent basis, then a comparison of them will indicate the extent of delays (that is, the relationship between net and gross times indicates the duration for which cranes and/or labour were unavailable to work a ship).

One *Waterline* measure in particular merits further comment. Contrary to how it is often interpreted, the elapsed labour rate reveals nothing about labour productivity. The measure is defined as the number of containers handled per elapsed labour hour — the time between when labour first boards the ship to when it leaves the ship. Labour productivity is defined as output per worker or per hour worked. The elapsed labour rate does not reflect the number of workers involved nor the average number of hours they worked the ship. The crane rate, on the other hand, measures capital productivity because it reflects the number of hours that cranes worked.[[12]](#footnote-13)

For this reason, the elapsed labour rate is not presented in the assessment of port performance below.

*Waterline* does not publish measures of labour productivity or total factor productivity.

### Gaps in the existing approach

The existing approach for assessing port performance in Australia could be improved.[[13]](#footnote-14) The metrics collected in *Waterline* focus on separate areas of port performance. As such, the fragmented nature of the approach means that there are some areas of port performance for which data is missing. Taking a more holistic view of a port and of the time it takes to move containers through helps to identify the gaps in the existing approach. These gaps relate to:

* missing metrics
* missing information on underlying distributions
* lack of more disaggregated data.

And the gaps represent areas in which the existing approach could be extended.

Table 4 – Selected indicators presented in *Waterline*

| Throughput measures | Definition |
| --- | --- |
| Number of ship visits | The number of ships handled by terminal operators. |
| Number of containers handled | The total number of containers un/loaded on/off ships at container berths. |
| Number of containers transported by road/rail | The total number of containers transported in all modes on the landside, either by trucks or by rail. |
| Number of full container imports and exports | The number of full containers imported (unloaded) and exported (loaded). |
| Number of empty container imports and exports | The number of empty containers imported (unloaded) and exported (loaded). |
| Productivity measures |  |
| *Marine operations* |  |
| Ship turnaround time (median, 95th percentile) | The hours from when a ship enters a port to the time a ship leaves the port. |
| Anchorage time (average/median) | The hours ships waited at anchorage, if a ship waited more than 2 hours. |
| Time spent at berth | The total hours spent at berth by container ships at that port. |
| Time available to stevedores (terminal operators) | The total hours that ships can be loaded or unloaded. |
| *Quayside operations* |  |
| (Net) crane rate | The number of containers handled per hour that the crane worked. |
| (Net) elapsed labour rate | The number of containers handled per elapsed labour hour, which is defined as the time between when labour first boards the ship to when it leaves the ship. |
| (Net) ship rate | The average number of containers moved on or off a ship in an hour. It is calculated as the (net) crane rate multiplied by the average number of cranes used. |
| Average lifts per berth visit | The total number of containers handled divided by the number of berth visits of container ships. |
| Average lifts per berth hour | The total containers un/loaded on/off container ships divided by the total time ships spent at berth. |
| *Landside operations* |  |
| Containers per truck | The number of containers processed through the VBS/TASa systems divided by the total number of VBS/TAS trucks used. |
| Per cent of backloaded trucks | The number of backloaded trucks as a proportion of the total VBS/TAS trucks. |
| Average truck turnaround time (average) | The time elapsed from when the truck enters the gate of a container terminal to the time when the last container is loaded |
| Average container turnaround time (average) | Calculated as the ‘average truck turnaround time’ divided by ‘average containers per truck’. |

**a.** VBS = vehicle booking system. TAS = truck appointments system.

Source: BITRE (2021).

#### Missing metrics

##### Labour

Labour is a vital input in the operation of ports, playing an important role in almost all activities and therefore in the productivity of ports.[[14]](#footnote-15) Workers, for example, unlash and unpin containers so that cranes can lift them from the ship and are, thus, central to the un/loading of containers. Most cranes have a driver, whether seated in the cabin or operating from a remote location. A team of workers usually accompanies each crane, and they operate together. Workers are also essential for many port activities. Pilots and tugboat crews, for example, guide ships into and out of port and their moorings, and harbourmasters are responsible for the safe and efficient operation of ports.

Unfortunately, no detailed data is published on the use of labour inputs — the number and type of workers, the hours that they work and their remuneration — in Australian container ports.[[15]](#footnote-16) To measure labour productivity, the data would need to be collected and linked to outputs, such as the number of containers handled. This would enable measures like the average number of TEUs handled per person‑shift to be constructed. This data is not currently published and as such labour productivity measures are not presented here or elsewhere. As noted above, the elapsed labour rate, which is referred to as measuring labour productivity, is not a *true* measure of labour productivity. The lack of labour information is a major limitation with the Australian container port data and with freight data more generally (iMove Australia 2019, pp. 4–5).

Being able to assess labour productivity could provide insights into opportunities for productivity improvements in the short term. Labour is one of the few inputs over which terminal operators have some degree of control, notwithstanding terms in enterprise agreements that may restrict or otherwise constrain recruitment, the amount and type of labour used and how it is used (chapter 9, inquiry report). Labour is also relatively more flexible than capital. Thus, understanding labour productivity is critical to improving productivity in the short term.

##### Time-based metrics

**Missing ship call metrics**

The published time‑based metrics for ships cover many of the important parts of a ship visit, but do not cover all the stages (figure 1). For example, cargo operation times, start and finish times, operational and non‑operational delays, and elapsed labour hours are not reported.

The inability to unpack and understand what is driving the aggregate time‑based metrics in the *Waterline* collection precludes identification of activities in which performance appears relatively slow. For example, longer ship turnaround times may be a reflection of slow start times and inefficiencies in the activities that occur within this time (such as authority clearance, labour available and positioning cranes). Providing a more detailed breakdown of time‑based metrics would allow for a more precise identification of inefficiencies.

There is also an absence of ship arrival and window data. Ports may appear inefficient if many ships miss their windows and are forced to spend time at anchor. But this may be an inaccurate reflection of the port’s performance. Instead, this could reflect inefficiencies on the part of shipping lines (or external factors that cause ships to miss their windows) or another port (given multiport calls are a feature of Australian ports, delays at one port can cascade through the system). Information on ships missing windows and arrival schedules could help to correctly attribute inefficiencies, especially in relation to anchorage times.[[16]](#footnote-17)

Information published online by each port on individual ship movements indicate the raw data needed to identify ships missing windows are available. The collection and distribution of this ship‑level data could provide additional information on the servicing provided by Australian ports (such as how many ships visit multiple ports and which ports they visit) and enable a closer assessment of the reliability of the shipping lines, and consequently Australian ports.[[17]](#footnote-18)

**Missing container dwell times**

Container dwell time refers to the time a container spends in port after being discharged from a ship until it leaves the port for delivery to clients, in the case of imports; and the time containers spend in port after being delivered to the port until they are loaded onto ships, in the case of exports. Longer dwell times may reflect inefficiencies in the logistics system and result in slower delivery of goods to end customers.[[18]](#footnote-19)

The published data do not cover the time that containers spend in the container yard. This data is also not linked with the time that it takes containers to enter or exit the port and for it to be un/loaded quayside. Information regarding dwell times would enable a deeper understanding of where a container spends most of its time in port and may reveal areas for improvements. For example, the port of Halifax collects information on container dwell times and presents them on their website to help set and monitor performance standards and reduce yard congestion (Morley 2018).

**Missing gross productivity measures**

*Waterline* presents ‘net’ time measures of productivity (that is, for the crane, elapsed labour and ship rates). Ideally, both net and gross measures would be made available. This would provide users with a sense of operational and non‑operational delays, and the degree to which productivity could be improved by reducing those delays. For example, the net crane rate shows the maximum productivity of a crane; reducing delays could help bring the gross measure in line with the net measure.

Alternatively, providing information on the extent of operational and non‑operational delays, in terms of the number of minutes lost, for example, and the relative distribution of operational versus non‑operational delays, could help to identify whether these delays are a problem for a port.

**Missing rail turnaround times**

No rail turnaround times — that is, the time it takes for containers to enter or exit the port by rail — are published in *Waterline*. To provide a complete picture of how containers move through ports this metric would also need to be collected and reported.

##### Measurement issues

There are some measurement issues with the time‑based metrics presented in *Waterline*.

* Truck turnaround times do not include the time taken for the truck to exit the port after a container is loaded or any time that the truck spends waiting outside the port. As noted above, ports can appear relatively efficient if trucks are forced to wait outside the gate rather than inside the port.
* Presenting anchorage times for *all* ships that anchor rather than only those that anchor for more than two hours would more accurately shed light on how much time ‘wastage’ occurs at anchor (or how long ships are waiting for tugs and pilots).

#### Missing information on underlying distributions

The existing framework takes a high‑level view of port operations and consequently, the metrics published tend to be aggregate summary statistics, such as totals, averages and medians, which summarise underlying distributions. For example, *Waterline* publishes the average and median anchorage times and the median and 95th percentile ship turnaround times. These published aggregates tell us little about the underlying distribution and may not provide an accurate representation of the underlying data. Average time‑based metrics in particular can be sensitive to outliers in the data (such as ships that stay at anchor for days at a time in the case of anchorage times), which tend to increase the average measure reported and render cross‑port comparisons misleading.

Understanding the underlying distributions is important for assessing port performance. Information on the distributions (such as via reporting of percentiles or standard deviations) would provide insights into the reliability of the port system. A wider spread of ship turnaround times, for example, would indicate lower reliability because the port is less consistent in the time it takes to handle ships and containers. In contrast, if there is less spread in the distribution there is more certainty in ship turnaround times and in the reliability of the port system. A wider distribution also provokes questions as to why port performance is so variable within a port. Only more disaggregated data can address these types of questions.

#### Lack of more disaggregated data

While *Waterline* reports metrics for each of the main Australian container ports, more disaggregated data would be useful for assessing port performance.

More data is needed on ship sizes and call sizes. For example, data on the average size of ships calling at each port or the average call sizes for those ships is missing from *Waterline*. Without understanding these important factors, it is difficult to make performance comparisons across ports. For example, comparing the average ship turnaround time across each port can be misleading for assessing performance without taking into account ship size and, in particular, call size. Ports with larger call sizes would have longer turnaround times and thus appear relatively inefficient compared with those with smaller call sizes. Comparing turnaround times within ship and call size categories (as done by the World Bank (2021)) would allow for a fairer approach in evaluating performance.

Data on performance by terminal operator are also needed. Performance may differ between terminal operators in a port. Metrics published reflect the average performance. These measures do little to help identify best practice among terminal operators. Providing performance metrics (confidentiality permitting) for each terminal operator may help to identify underlying trends and patterns in performance and help shipping lines make an informed decision when selecting which terminal operator to use. (International datasets, such as the one used by the World Bank (2021), do provide data at the terminal level.)

The lack of raw underlying data released is also observed as a significant gap in freight data more generally (iMove Australia 2019, p. 4).

### Filling the gaps in the existing approach

Filling gaps in the existing framework would require tracking the movement of containers, ships, trucks and trains throughout the duration of their time spent in port and at the various stages of port operations. Some time‑based metrics are collected and published in *Waterline* but others (such as container dwell times) are notably absent (figure 2). The reporting of labour productivity measures is also an important gap to fill.

The suggested extension of the existing framework would place greater emphasis on time‑based metrics, greater cohesion of time‑based metrics across port operations, and more disaggregation of the data. This is similar to the approach used for ship calls by the World Bank (2021) and is similar to a port‑wide approach proposed for Canadian ports (Mary R. Brooks Transportation Consulting 2015), which both place a greater emphasis on time‑based metrics.

The benefits of extending the existing framework to include more time‑based metrics include, but are not limited to:

* allowing for a comprehensive assessment of productivity across the maritime logistics system and what actions can improve the system and inter‑port coordination
* helping the many participants of the logistics chain understand the ‘pinch points’ in the system and where they can improve their operations
* assisting government policy and improving strategic planning. Full data is needed to make sure that our ports develop in the best way going forward (recognising that a poor decision today can have significant long‑term consequences).

Much of the time‑based data is already collected elsewhere but is currently not linked. A time‑based recording system already occurs for ships. The automatic identification system (AIS) records when ships arrive at the port limits, how long they spend at anchorage, the time taken to sail to berth, when the ship is berthed, when it leaves the berth, and when it leaves the port limit. Terminal operators also collect time‑related data for their landside operations for their own use. The existing framework could be improved by linking these existing data collections and, potentially, augmenting them.[[19]](#footnote-20)

Not all data would need to be published in *Waterline.* Some could be released in the electronic data tables that accompany the publication. For example, information on underlying distributions could be aggregated for publication (for example, via mean, median and standard deviation statistics). This would also help to maintain presentability and confidentiality. More detailed data could be released in electronic data tables or made available on request.

That said, linking, cleaning and maintaining data is not costless. While much of the data needed to fill the gaps in the framework appear to be collected by participants in the supply chain, there are costs associated with gathering and reporting this data. These costs potentially include, but are not limited to:

* the administrative burden for the participants involved in providing the data (for example, the burden of providing more data for firms with outdated data systems may be too high)
* ensuring confidentiality is maintained and that publishing more data does not facilitate anticompetitive behaviours among firms
* additional governmental resources required (such as setting up contracts to collect data, cleaning and linking the data and reporting and maintaining the data)
* potentially undermining third‑party businesses who currently track individual container movements (although, the extended framework focuses on reporting more aggregated statistics rather than container‑level data).

While richer data would support deeper insights into port performance, it is unclear if the associated benefits would outweigh the potential costs inherent in extending the existing framework. But as the Commission has previously noted:

… the substantive argument for making data more available is that opportunities to use it are largely unknown until the data sources themselves are better known, and until data users have been able to undertake discovery of data. (PC 2017, p. 2)

Further, some of the gaps identified are relatively easier to fill. For example, labour productivity measures or container dwell times could be sourced from container terminal operators, who already provide other related information for publication in *Waterline*. This suggests there is ‘low‑hanging fruit’ to be picked that could fill the gaps in the existing framework in a valuable way. More detailed data on time‑based metrics, especially data disaggregated by ship and call size, may be more costly to gather and report.

Figure 2 – Grey areas represents gaps in existing time based metricsa,b

1. Marine operations and quayside time-based framework

Figure 1.2 – This figure details the time components of port operations and quayside operations for three different levels of aggregation. The first is simply port hours. The second level disaggregates port hours into the arrival process, berth hours and departure process. The third level disaggregates this further into anchor time, steam in, start, cargo operations, finish and steam out. Points of activity that define these time components are also displayed. 

1. Landside time-based framework

Figure 3.2b – This figure details the time components of landside operations. Including container dwell times, truck waiting time, truck turnaround time and truck exit time. Points of activity that define these components are also displayed.

**a.** The blue boxes indicate that the time‑based metric (or some form of it) is available in BITRE’s *Waterline* publication. A grey box indicates that data is currently unavailable. **b.** Containers can also be transported via trains. This is not depicted in the figure.

### Other data issues in the existing approach

#### Lack of recent information

*Waterline* has a long publication lag. For example, *Waterline 67* was released in December 2021 and contained quarterly data up to December 2020. This means that any productivity analysis uses data that is at least a year old. The significant delay in releasing government data is an issue identified for most freight datasets (iMove Australia 2019, p. 4).

Releasing electronic data tables online, perhaps prior to releasing the *Waterline* publication, could improve the timeliness of data. The New Zealand port performance data is published online enabling access to more recent data for users (Ministry of Transport 2021).

#### Limited time‑series data

Despite having been published since July 1994, *Waterline* contains limited time‑series data. This is because the range of reported metrics has expanded over time (which limits time‑series data for newer measures) and because some metrics have been renamed and refined (so are no longer consistent over time).

The duration of time series data varies by metric. The crane rate, elapsed labour rate and ship rate span the longest period (1989–2020), enabling a longer‑term assessment of quayside productivity. Other measures have much shorter time series which limit their usefulness for examining long‑term trends. For example, metrics such as truck turnaround time, anchorage time and ship turnaround time only span 2011–2020.

The limited time‑series data makes it difficult to analyse long‑term trends in port performance as directed by the terms of reference.

### The proposed way forward for assessing port performance

The range of time‑based metrics (in figure 2) could be collected, assessed and potentially combined into an index of port performance. The index could build upon the work done by the World Bank (2021), and could be used to compare ports on the basis of container movement times (that is, from arrival on ship to departure on transport for imports and vice versa for exports).[[20]](#footnote-21) This index should incorporate time‑based metrics from marine, quayside and landside operations and, importantly, these time components should be able to be disaggregated into subcomponents (such as anchorage, operating time and container dwell time).

Comparing performance in different time metrics across ports should reveal operations in a port that are relatively inefficient compared with other ports. Other metrics of performance could be used to help to understand *why* these relative inefficiencies are present. For example, analysing crane rates can shed light on cargo operation times: more productive cranes should result in faster times. Unpacking any index and understanding *which* components are inefficient and *why* there are differences in performance can provide more value than the index itself. This is because the process sheds light on specific inefficient areas and potential ways to improve performance.

Such an index should be feasible for Australian ports *if* gaps in the existing data can be filled.

Developing such an index to use in international comparisons would be more challenging. Collecting data on the landside would be more difficult than collecting data for the quayside because landside operations are more fragmented (more operators and different transport types). Given this, the World Bank and IHS Markit’s CPPI have made an impressive first pass at collecting time‑based metrics for marine and quayside operations and at constructing a performance index based on these metrics.

This type of performance benchmarking and detailed unpacking of the index could shed new light on port inefficiencies. The analysis, however, may not reveal any role for government intervention. For example, inefficiencies in loading and unloading containers would be an issue for terminal operators to directly address. That said, there may be a role for regulators or governments in setting performance benchmarks.

Given BITRE are the main data collectors and have already undertaken benchmarking exercises in the past (BITRE 2009), they would be well placed to perform a benchmarking analysis. Consultation with industry following the analysis could help to unpack the findings of the benchmarking exercise and help identify ways to improve performance.

## How productive are Australian container ports?

In order to assess the performance of Australian ports, the Commission has combined metrics from *Waterline* and IHS Markit’s Port Performance Program.

The Port Performance Program data help to fill some of the gaps in the existing framework and provide a wider range of metrics. In particular, the advantages of these data are that they:

* provide comprehensive information on ship‑visit times
* provide terminal operator data
* contain gross measures of productivity
* enable greater consistency with the international comparisons of container port productivity (section 7).

Combining data sources allows for more in‑depth analysis of the performance of Australian ports than would otherwise be possible. Still, gaps in the data mean that a performance benchmarking index of the time it takes to move a container through a port (as described above) cannot be constructed. Missing data, for example, on container dwell times, mean that a significant part of the time that a container spends in port would be missing, potentially biasing the index. Instead, the Commission has sought to benchmark components of time for which data is available and unpack the reasons for relative performance where possible.

COVID‑19 pandemic‑related supply disruptions have caused major disruptions to international and Australian container shipping markets and introduced significant volatility into the data. This is evident in the Port Performance Program data for 2020 and 2021 and *Waterline* data for 2020, and it means that those years are unlikely to be representative of productivity in international container ports, including those in Australia. Given this, the Commission’s benchmarking of port performance focuses on the 2019 calendar year as it preceded the COVID‑19 pandemic and is, therefore, more representative of a ‘typical’ year.

That said, while in many ways the data for 2019 can be considered representative of earlier years and consistent with longer‑run trends, this may not be the case for every port. For example, the nature, type and duration of industrial action undertaken to support negotiations over enterprise agreements means that individual terminal operators may have been affected by stoppages and other actions that reduced their throughput and impeded efficient port operations (chapter 9, inquiry report). The ongoing rolling nature of these industrial actions mean that their effects will be present in the data for many years. While less severe than industrial action in 2020 and 2021, rolling industrial action occurred in 2019 across the main Australian container terminal operators (DP World, Hutchison, Patrick, and the Victorian International Container Terminal) and most container ports (other than Adelaide). The effects of industrial action were particularly evident at Port Botany in Sydney and the subsequent ship diversions affected operations at Brisbane. Events of this type will affect how Australian ports compare, both with each other and international ports.

The following sections assess:

* the reliability of ships arriving at Australian ports on schedule (and thus containers arriving on schedule)
* the productivity of ports (including marine, quayside and landside operations) in moving those containers through the port.

### Service reliability has declined markedly over the past three years

Ships missing windows has clearly become a significant problem worldwide following the onset of the COVID‑19 pandemic. The trend appears to have started in mid‑2019 in Australia and was exacerbated by COVID‑19 (figure 3). The Maritime Union of Australia (sub. 72, p. 1) stated that ‘over the 18 months from August 2020 to January 2022, 83 per cent of all the international container vessels arriving in Australia’s five major container ports arrived late for their allocated slot’. Ships were between 5–8 days late in calling at Australian ports in January 2022 (p. 2).

Detailed data on shipping schedules and windows are not publicly available. Neither *Waterline* nor the Port Performance Program contain data on the extent to which ships meet their designated windows. The Maritime Union of Australia relied on data from Sea‑Intelligence which is not publicly available. Public access to data on shipping schedules and movements would enable an assessment of short‑ or long‑term trends in the reliability of ships servicing Australian ports.

Figure 3 – Reliability of ships arriving on schedule has declined markedly

Per cent of container ships arriving on time, 2019–2022

Figure 1.3 – This chart is a line chart that shows the percent of container ships that arrived on time for each Australian port between 2019 and early 2022. In the first half of 2019 around 90 percent of ships arrived on time. From min 2019 the share of ships arriving on time started to decrease. By late 2020, under 30 percent of ships arrived on time and this trend has persisted.

Source: MUA Supplementary Submission (sub. 72, p. 1).

### Marine operations

The productivity of marine operations is reflected in the time it takes for ships to get into and out of port — ship turnaround time (or port hours). Because container handling is a large part of the time a ship spends in port, quayside operations time is also included in this discussion (and detail about quayside performance is presented in the following section).

On average, each visiting container ship spent 35 hours in Australia’s major container ports in 2019 (figure 4). Over three‑quarters of this time was spent at berth (27 hours) and two‑thirds was taken up with container handling (24 hours). But there is substantial variation in average ship visit times between ports.

Figure 4 – The average container ship spent 35 hours in porta

Total port hours by component, 2019

Figure 1.4 – This is a stacked bar chart that shows the time components of total port hours for each Australian port in 2019. This includes anchorage, steam in, start, operating, finish and steam out times. Sydney has the longest port hours on average, while Brisbane and Adelaide had the shortest hours. Average anchorage times are highest in Brisbane and Sydney. Average steam in times are highest in Sydney and Adelaide. Cargo operations are longer in Sydney and Melbourne on average because they receive larger call sizes. Start, finish and steam out times are similar across ports.

**a.** Observations with arrival hours greater than 72 hours are removed from sample data cleaning advice provided by IHS Markit. Observations with data on all time‑based metrics are included in the sample, 85 per cent of full sample.

Source: IHS Markit’s Port Performance Program data.

The remainder of the section unpacks port performance in each component of port hours.

When interpreting the following results, it is important to bear in mind that there is sometimes a trade‑off between the speed of operations and safety. For example, increasing the speed of using cranes may result in higher productivity but also increase the risk of straddle cranes tipping over. Similarly, increasing the speed of entering a port may compromise the safety of tug operators.

Australian ports are relatively safe. The Maritime Union of Australia (sub. 59, pp. 104–5) stated that there has not been a stevedoring fatality on Australian ports since May 2014, nor have inquiry participants raised concerns about serious injuries or accidents in Australian ports. This contrasts with the experience of New Zealand where the port of Auckland had two fatalities in two years (2018–2020) (Maritime Union of New Zealand, sub. 30, pp. 3–5).

The guidelines and regulations that ensure the safety of Australian workers should not be compromised for speed. The Maritime Union of New Zealand (sub. 30, p. 2) cautioned that when long‑standing work practices that ensured the safety of employees were removed, ‘productivity of the port may have improved, [but] anticipated direct safety consequences followed’.

Notwithstanding this, the analysis below sheds light on components of port operations that are slowing ship turnaround times and points to areas that could be investigated to determine whether times could be improved without compromising worker safety.

#### Arrival and departure processes

Arrival and departure processes accounted for about 20 per cent of port hours on average. Reducing anchorage time would be a key way to improve performance, whereas steam‑in and steam‑out times are likely more difficult to reduce because they should only reflect the sailing of ships within a port.

##### Anchorage time

As noted above, the time that ships spend at anchorage is wasted time.

Ships spent an average of 1.3 hours at anchorage in 2019, with Brisbane and Sydney having the highest average anchorage times (2.6 hours and 2.1 hours, respectively) (figure 4). These times are averages across all vessels and, as such, may be skewed both by ships that steam straight in and by outliers that have to wait much longer than other ships. Consistent with this point, average wait times are higher when ships that did not anchor are excluded, and median anchorage times are considerably lower than average times for vessels that did anchor.[[21]](#footnote-22)

These averages mask variations across terminal operators and over time (figure 5). For example, anchorage times increased for ships using all three Sydney terminal operators from September quarter 2018 through to the end of 2020. A number of factors could have contributed to this increase, including:

* intense storms — October 2018 included seven days where waves were above 3 meters in Sydney, including three consecutive days. Significant wave events were further experienced in June 2019 (Manly Hydraulics Institution 2020, fig. 5.15). This can create unsafe conditions for pilotage forcing ships to anchor rather than enter port
* industrial action — there were industrial disputes at DP World and Hutchison (ACCC 2019, p. 24).

The average anchorage time returned to below September quarter 2017 levels by June quarter 2020, only to then rise sharply again due to the COVID‑19 pandemic and subsequent industrial action (NSW Ports 2020).

##### Steam‑in and stream‑out times

Steam‑in time should reflect the movement of a ship from either the port limits or anchorage to the berth. Similarly, steam‑out time reflects movement from the berth to port limits. Some anchorages are located further away from the berth and therefore steam‑in and out times are expected to be larger for these ports, but factors such as sailing speed will also affect these times.

Steam‑out times were similar across ports, but steam‑in times differed (figure 4). Steam out times averaged 3 hours, with the longest average time recorded in Adelaide (3.6 hours) and the shortest in Melbourne (2.8 hours). Steam‑in times were highest in Adelaide (5.6 hours) and Sydney (4.3 hours) compared with other ports (2.1 hours on average). Higher steam‑in times for these ports appear to be due to how the data were collected.

* For Adelaide, the Port Performance Program data suggest that no ships anchored but the *Waterline* data indicate that they did. Because anchorage could not be discerned from steam‑in time in the 2019 Port Performance Program data, steam‑in time was inflated. Indeed, data for 2021 contain both anchorage and steam‑in time and revealed that average anchorage time in Adelaide was 4 hours and steam‑in time was 2.6 hours.
* For Sydney, some ships crossed an anchorage zone assigned to Sydney and then left the zone to wait somewhere outside before finally berthing after an extended wait. The additional waiting time was captured in steam‑in time rather than anchorage time (Turloch Mooney, IHS Markit, pers. comm., 11 May 2022). Therefore, steam‑in time is inflated and anchorage time is deflated for Sydney.

Notwithstanding this, the arrival process in Sydney (6.4 hours), Adelaide (5.7 hours) and Brisbane (4.8 hours) is more than double the time taken in Melbourne and Fremantle (2.5 hours each), suggesting that improvements could be made by reducing anchorage time since steam‑in time should only reflect sailing from anchorage to port.

Figure 5 – Average anchorage hours in Sydneya,b

Average anchorage hours in Sydney by terminal operator, 2017–2022

Figure 1.5 – This is a line chart that shows average quarterly anchorage hours by terminal operator in Port Botany between 2017 and 2022. Average anchorage hours increased for Patrick and DP World in the second half of 2018. Anchorage hours also increased for all operators during 2021. 

Source: IHS Markit’s Port Performance Program data.

#### Berth hours

Berth hours account for almost 80 per cent of port hours on average and encompass start and finish times, and cargo operating time. Improving performance in these time components could help to turn ships around faster. This is especially true for cargo operations which account for the bulk of a ship’s time spent in port.

Importantly, giving terminal operators access to a ship once it has berthed allows them to start container handling operations as soon as possible. Terminal operators may not, for example, be able to unload containers until the ship or its cargo have undergone a clearance procedure or before containers are unlashed by dock workers. If ships are sitting idle with no work being carried out, then this idle time is wasted and reduces port productivity. On average, ships were available to terminal operators (stevedores) for 86 per cent of the time that they were berthed in 2019 (figure 6). Cranes operated for three‑quarters of that time, or 65 per cent of total berth hours.

##### Start and finish times

The average time taken between when a ship arrived at berth (all lines fast) and when cargo operations started (first lift) varied across ports (figure 4). Adelaide had the longest start time on average (2.7 hours), while Melbourne had the fastest (1.3 hours on average).

Finish time, that is, the time taken from when cargo operations finished (last lift) to when the ship was ready to leave (last line released), was more similar across ports. Sydney had the slowest finish time on average (2.4 hours), while Melbourne had the fastest (1.8 hours).

When start and finish times are combined, Adelaide has the slowest time on average (5 hours), followed by Sydney (4.3 hours) and Fremantle (4 hours). Melbourne and Brisbane were the fastest (3.1 and 3.5 hours respectively). This suggests that Adelaide, Sydney and Fremantle have scope to improve start and finish times and lower their berth hours.

Figure 6 – Terminal operators had greater access to ships in Melbournea

Share of total berth hours where ships were available to terminal operators and cranes were operating, 2019

Figure 1.6 – This is a bar chart that shows the share of total berth hours that ships were available to terminal operators and crane operating time. This is shown for each Australian port and the Australian average. Ships were available to terminal operators for the highest share of berth hours in Melbourne and the lowest in Adelaide. Cranes operated for the largest share of berth hours in Fremantle and Melbourne and lowest in Brisbane.  

**a.** Available to terminal operators: total time ship available to stevedores divided by total berth hours. Crane operating time: total operating hours divided by total berth hours.

Source: BITRE (2021).

##### Cargo operating time

Cargo operating time is the largest single component of port hours (figure 4). On average, operating time accounts for almost 68 per cent of port hours. Adelaide had the shortest average operating time at 16 hours and Sydney and Melbourne had the longest (about 28 hours each) (table 5).

Operating time is influenced by a range of factors; the key ones include:

* call size (recapping, the number of containers un/loaded on each ship visit)
* the number of quay cranes used to handle containers and the productivity of those cranes (discussed in more detail below).

Larger call sizes will typically require longer cargo operating hours because there are more containers to be handled. Differences in average operating times between the Australian ports largely reflect differences in average call sizes. The ports with higher average call sizes — Melbourne and Sydney — had the longest average operating time per ship (table 5). The performance differential is less pronounced once call size is taken into consideration — that is, differences in operating minutes per move are considerably smaller than those in average operating times.

Table 5 – Average operating time related to call sizea

Operating time, 2019

| **Port** | Total calls | Total moves | Average call size | Total  operating time | Average operating time | Operating minutes per move |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | no. | no. | no. | hours | hours/ship | min |
| Brisbane | 620 | 541 797 | 874 | 11 225 | 18.1 | 1.24 |
| Sydney | 719 | 1 060 157 | 1 474 | 20 260 | 28.2 | 1.15 |
| Melbourne | 652 | 1 125 798 | 1 727 | 18 223 | 27.9 | 0.97 |
| Adelaide | 309 | 225 565 | 730 | 4 974 | 16.1 | 1.32 |
| Fremantle | 341 | 371 826 | 1 090 | 7 595 | 22.3 | 1.23 |
| Australia | 2 641 | 3 325 143 | 1 259 | 62 276 | 23.6 | 1.12 |

**a.** Observations with data on all time‑based metrics are included in the sample, 85 per cent of full sample.

Source: IHS Markit’s Port Performance Program data.

The number of cranes allocated to ships also influences cargo operation times. More cranes (within the physical restrictions of the ship and berth) will enable more containers to be moved simultaneously. The number of cranes deployed will typically be higher for larger call sizes. Melbourne and Sydney deploy more cranes per ship (discussed below). As a result, these ports recorded faster average container moves. Adelaide, with the smallest average call size, had the longest average handling time at 1.3 operating minutes per container move (table 5).

Moreover, larger ships typically involve larger call sizes, and larger ships therefore generally result in lower minutes per container moved (port hours per move). Sydney and Brisbane handle more smaller ships and call sizes than Melbourne, helping to explain why their average time taken to handle a container is higher than Melbourne’s (figure 7). Melbourne’s lower anchorage times also contributes to this outcome.

Figure 7 – Ships in Melbourne spend less time in port per container

Total port hours per container move, 2019

Figure 1.7 – This is a bar chart that shows the average minutes per container move in each Australian port in 2019. Melbourne had the fastest minutes per container move: moving a container in an average of 1.3 minutes. Whereas, Adelaide had the longest time: moving a container in an average of 2.5 minutes. 

Source: IHS Markit’s Port Performance Program data.

### Quayside operations

Quayside productivity captures the efficiency of moving containers from or onto ships using quay cranes. It also includes any incidental container movements, such as re‑stowing cargo for unloading at later ports.

A more productive quayside results in fewer minutes per container move and faster cargo operation times for a given call size. This can help to turn ships around faster, especially given cargo operations account for the bulk of a ship’s time in port.

The time taken to un/load a ship depends, among other things, on:

* the number of quay cranes working the ship
* the gross productivity of each crane.[[22]](#footnote-23)

This section focuses on two measures of quayside productivity — the crane rate and ship rate. Box 4 presents a numerical example of these measures.

| Box 4 – Understanding quayside productivity measures |
| --- |
| A simplified numerical example illustrates commonly used quayside productivity measures.  Assume that a typical ship call involves:   * Containers handled = 1000 containers (also known as call size) * Total number of cranes allocated = 3 * Operating hours = 17 hours * Gross crane time = 30 hours (assumes that each crane is allocated to work 10 hoursa) * Crane intensity (average number of cranes working the ship per operating hour) = 1.8 (gross crane time / operating hoursb) * Operational and non‑operational delays = 3 hours * Net crane time = 27 hours (gross crane time less operational and non‑operational delays)   The following measures are reported in Waterline:   * *Net crane rate* = Containers handled / Net crane time = 37 moves per crane hour * *Net ship rate* = Net crane rate x Crane intensity = 67 moves per hour.   Measures not published in Waterline but are commonly used internationally (JOC Group 2014; The World Bank 2021) and that can be calculated using the Port Performance Program data are:   * *Gross crane rate* = Containers handled / Gross crane time = 33 moves per crane hour * *Gross ship rate* = Gross crane rate x Crane intensity = 60 moves per hour.   **a.** The data reflect that not all cranes will typically operate for the full operating time. **b.** *Waterline* calculates crane intensity by replacing operating hours with elapsed labour time. |
|  |

Average crane rates are similar across ports but average ship rates differ (figure 8). Gross crane rates were similar across ports in 2019, with each crane handling an average of 25 container movements per hour. Melbourne had the highest gross ship rate at 60 moves per hour and Adelaide had the lowest gross ship rate at 44 moves per hour.

Figure 8 – Fremantle and Adelaide have the highest crane rates; Melbourne and Sydney have the highest ship rates

Quayside productivity, 2019

1. Gross measures

Figure 1.8a – This is a bar chart that shows the gross crane rate and gross ship rate for each Australian port in 2019. Adelaide, Melbourne and Fremantle had the most productive cranes, with an average of 25 moves hour. Sydney had the lowest at 23 moves per hour. The gross ship rate was highest in Melbourne at 60 moves per hour, while it was lowest in Adelaide at 44 moves per hour. 

1. Net measures

Figure 1.8b – This is a bar chart that shows the net crane rate and net ship rate for each Australian port in 2019. Adelaide and Fremantle had the most productive cranes, with an average of 35 moves hour. Brisbane had the lowest at 29 moves per hour. The net ship rate was highest in Melbourne at 75 moves per hour, while it was lowest in Adelaide at 52 moves per hour. 

Sources: BITRE (2021) and IHS Markit’s Port Performance Program data.

Differences in gross ship rates is explained by the number of quay cranes deployed. The gross ship rate depends on the number of cranes deployed to that task (or crane intensity). For a given level of crane productivity, a port can move more containers in a ship hour if they allocate more cranes to ships. Melbourne and Sydney had higher gross ship rates than the other Australian container ports because they used more cranes per ship on average. Melbourne used 2.5 cranes per ship in 2019 compared to 1.8 in Adelaide and 1.8 in Fremantle (figure 9). This higher average crane intensity meant that Melbourne moved 13 to 16 more containers per hour than did Adelaide and Fremantle despite having similar crane productivity.

Assuming comparability between the Port Performance Program (gross rates) and *Waterline* (net rates) data, differences between the gross (figure 8a) and net rates sheds (figure 8b) light on the extent of operational and non‑operational delays. For each port, differences in the two crane rates suggests that delays are reducing crane productivity. For the ship rate, differences are larger. For example, in Melbourne, the gross ship rate is 60 containers, but the net ship rate is 75 containers, suggesting that operational and non‑operational delays reduce the number of containers that can be moved in an hour by 15 containers on average.

Figure 9 – Melbourne uses more quay cranes than other portsa

Crane intensity, 2019

Figure 1.9 – This is a bar chart that shows the crane intensity (or the average number of cranes used to service a ship) for each Australian port in 2019. Melbourne has the highest crane intensity, using 2.5 cranes on average. Adelaide and Fremantle had the lowest at 1.8 cranes. 

**a.** Defined as gross crane hours divided by operating hours.

Source: IHS Markit’s Port Performance Program data.

#### Terminal operator quayside productivity

Port‑wide averages do not reveal much about each terminal operator’s productivity within a port. The Port Performance Program data enable the assessment of productivity by terminal operator. Adelaide is excluded from the analysis because there is only one terminal operator (Flinders) present, which means that port performance is equivalent to the terminal operator’s performance.

Gross crane productivity varies across terminals within a port (figure 10). Patrick tended to have higher average gross crane rates across all ports between 2017 and 2019, followed by DP World. Newer entrants to the market (such as Hutchison and VICT) tended to have lower or more variable average gross crane rates. The exception was Sydney, where gross crane rates converged across the terminal operators in 2019.

Crane rates also vary markedly over time for terminal operators within a given port (figure 10). For example, the average monthly gross crane rate for Patrick in Melbourne between 2017 and 2019 ranged from 27 to 38 container moves per hour, while rates for Hutchison in Sydney ranged from 17 to 32 container moves per hour.

Figure 10 – Productivity varied between terminal operators within portsa,b

Average monthly gross crane rate, 2017–2019

Figure 1.10 – This figure contains four line charts. Each chart shows the average monthly gross crane rate between 2017 and 2019 for each container terminal operator within each Australian port that has more than one operator. In Brisbane, Patrick consistently has the highest gross crane rate, followed by DP World and Hutchison. There is month to month fluctuations in each operators performance. In Sydney, all operators have similar crane rates, no one operator dominated performance. In Melbourne, Patrick had the highest crane rates, followed by DP World, while VICT’s crane rates were more volatile. In Fremantle, Patrick had higher crane rates than DP World. Each terminal operators performance differed across ports too.

**a.** The Port of Adelaide was excluded because there is a single terminal operator (Flinders) and so the port average is equivalent to the terminal average. **b.** The first observation for VICT in Melbourne was in November 2018. The observation for VICT in February 2019 was excluded because it was an extreme outlier in the series.

Source: IHS Markit’s Port Performance Program data.

Evidence of considerable variations in gross crane rates for each terminal operator over time, and between terminal operators requires further consideration. The data suggest that Australian terminal operators have significant scope to improve ship turnaround times without making any changes to crane intensity.

Regardless of the technology used, terminal operators have an incentive to utilise their cranes as efficiently as possible to reduce their per unit costs. Higher rates of crane productivity imply higher rates of asset utilisation. Given the substantial fixed costs involved in purchasing quay cranes, the cost per container moved declines as the number of containers handled by a crane increases (referred to as ‘economies of scale’). The irregular nature of ship arrivals and variations in call sizes that are outside the control of terminal operators mean that achieving high rates of crane utilisation may not always be possible. This observation also applies to other assets such as berths and, on the landside, container yard area. And one downside to high capital utilisation is that there may be limited capacity to handle any future growth in throughput without further investment.

#### Long-term quayside productivity trends

The number of ships handled at Australian ports has increased over the long term as has the volume of cargo handled (figure 11). The number of container ships visiting Australia annually has been relatively stable since about 2011. However, the number of containers handled has continued to grow. This has meant that the average call size — the average number of containers handled per ship visit — has increased. Australian ports are not only handling bigger ships (chapter 7, inquiry report) but they have relatively more cargo to un/load on each visit.

Figure 11 – Australian ports are handling larger call sizesa

Annual, 1990–2020

| 1. Container ship visits | 1. Throughput |
| --- | --- |
| Figure 1.11a – This is a bar chart that shows the number of container ships visiting Australian ports between 1990 and 2020. The number of ships handled at Australian ports has increased over the long term but stabilised since about 2011. | Figure 1.11b – This is a bar chart that shows the number of containers handled at Australian ports between 1990 and 2020. The number of containers handled has increased steadily over the long term. |

**a.** Data for 1992 and 1993 are incomplete and therefore not presented.

Source: BITRE *Waterline* (various editions).

The productivity of Australian container ports has risen since the late 1980s (figure 12).[[23]](#footnote-24) For example, the net crane rate rose from 16 containers per hour in 1995 to 30 containers per hour in 2020 (figure 12b), or at an average annual rate of 2.5 per cent. The net ship rate across all Australian ports similarly grew from 21 containers per hour in 1995 to 65 containers per hour in 2020, or at an average annual rate of 4.6 per cent, implying that the number of cranes used grew at an average annual rate of about 2 per cent over the period.

Figure 12 – Long‑term productivity has risen in Australian portsa

Net crane and ship rates, five-port average, 1989Q4–2020Q4

1. TEUs per hour

Figure 1.12a – This is a line chart that shows the Australian 5-port average quarterly net crane rate and net ship rate in terms of TEUs per hour between 1989 to 2020. There is a break in the series between 1992 and 1993. The net crane rate grew steadily between 1989 and 1998. There was a large increase in the crane rate between 1999 and 2000 due to the 1998 Waterfront reforms. Between 2001 and 2010 the crane rate continued to increase, but has mostly flatlined between 2010 to 2020. The ship rate depicts a similar trend to the crane rate, but has continued to increase between 2010 and 2020.

1. Containers per hour

Figure 1.12b – This is a line chart that shows the Australian 5-port average quarterly net crane rate and net ship rate in terms of containers per hour between 1995 to 2020. This series starts in the December quarter in 1995. The net crane rate grew steadily between 1995 and 1998. There was a large increase in the crane rate between 1999 and 2000 due to the 1998 Waterfront reforms. Between 2001 and 2020 the crane rate has mostly flatlined. The ship rate depicts a similar trend to the crane rate, but has continued to increase between 2001 and 2020.

**a.** Data for both crane and ship rates in terms of TEUs was not published between 1992Q4 and 1993Q2. Data for both crane and ship rate in terms of containers per hour was not published prior to 1995Q4.

Source: BITRE *Waterline* (various editions).

In part, net crane rates measured in TEUs per hour have improved because cranes are handling larger containers — the number of *TEUs* moved per hour has grown more than the number of *containers* moved per hour since the early 2000s. Movement of one 40‑foot container is equivalent to the movement of two TEUs (20‑foot equivalent containers), and the share of 40‑foot equivalent unit containers has been increasing (for example, from 24 to over 55 per cent between 1997 and 2020). The fact that this increase has not reduced the rate at which quay cranes move containers suggests that these (or newer) cranes have handled the shift to larger containers well. It is also a good indication that ports are handling more goods per container movement than previously — a productivity improvement.

Productivity growth was strongest in the 1990s (table 6). Growth in the net crane rate (containers) averaged 4.1 per cent in the four years to the June quarter 1998. This may have reflected continuing improvements in efficiency related to the 1989–1992 waterfront reforms.[[24]](#footnote-25) Annual growth in the crane rate increased to 20 per cent between June 1998 and June 2001. The increase was due to the 1998 reform package which aimed to improve the efficiency of the waterfront (PC 2003, p. 9). One key objective was a five‑port average net crane rate of 25 container movements per hour — a rate achieved for the first time in the December quarter 2000 (PC 2003, p. 12).

Productivity growth has slowed over the last two decades (table 6). But without longer time‑series data (of periods that do not reflect the effects of waterfront reforms) one cannot rule out that the more recent growth rates reflect a return to a long‑term trend.

Reflecting maritime supply chain issues arising from the effects of the COVID‑19 pandemic and industrial action, quarterly productivity growth rates over the last two years have become quite volatile with exaggerated quarterly growth rates (both positive and negative), particularly for net ship rates.

The trends presented here hold for all Australian container ports individually (see annex B).

Table 6 – Australian port productivity growth has slowed

Five‑port average growth rates in per cent, selected periods

|  | Net crane rate | | Net ship rate | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | TEUs (%) | Containers (%) | TEUs (%) | Containers (%) |
| 1995–1998 | 5.3 | 4.1 | 5.5 | 4.2 |
| 1998–2001 | 23.3 | 19.7 | 30.5 | 28.1 |
| 2001–2010 | 1.7 | 0.8 | 3.6 | 2.5 |
| 2010–2020 | 1.3 | 0.7 | 3.2 | 2.5 |

Source: BITRE *Waterline* (various editions).

### Landside operations within ports

Landside operations within ports cover the movement of containers between the base of quay cranes and the port gate (or perimeter). This covers movement through the container yard, temporary storage by terminal operators prior to collection, un/loading onto land‑based transport (trucks and trains) and the customs and quarantine clearance process.

The efficiency of some of these processes cannot be analysed due to a lack of data. For example, there is little information published on container dwell times (as noted above, the time a container spends in port after being discharged from a ship until it leaves the port for delivery to clients), nor is there readily available data on the time it takes for containers to clear customs or quarantine (section 5). (DP World, pers. comm., 27 May 2022) noted that the container dwell times in their Australian terminals are among the best in the world. In 2021, their Australian container dwell times were recorded at two or fewer days, lower than the international median of approximately five days.)

This section analyses the efficiency of Australia’s major container ports in handling the trucks that drop‑off and/or pick‑up containers within the port perimeter. Trucks handled the bulk of all landside freight movements to and from Australian container ports in 2019, accounting for 84 per cent of the just over 5.3 million TEUs handled landside, trains handled the rest (chapter 7, inquiry report). Because data on rail are relatively scarce, this section focuses on trucks.

There are some important differences across ports that impact landside productivity, including that:

* land transport (both trucks and trains) is utilised most effectively when it carries containers into and out of a port (referred to as ‘backloading’), as this reduces the number of empty movements
* trains can carry significantly more containers per trip than individual trucks
* trucks are far more flexible than trains, both in terms of their potential turnaround times and where they can go
* trucks are more cost‑effective than trains for smaller loads and over shorter distances
* differences in the mix of container movements across ports will affect their landside productivity.

These factors will be discussed where relevant.

Available data do not permit an assessment of long‑term trends in landside productivity. Collection of most landside productivity measures in *Waterline* commenced in 2011. This provides roughly nine years of data for analysis when data affected by the COVID‑19 pandemic are excluded. While recent trends can be identified, the data do not support long‑term productivity analysis. Annex B presents some time‑series charts for a number of landside measures but these are not analysed in detail.

#### Differences in the landside freight task

There is an important difference in the freight task across Australian container ports that will have important implications for published landside productivity measures. For example, a port with a large trade imbalance (that is, more imports than exports) may struggle to fully utilise and backload trucks.

It is not obvious in the aggregate statistics, but Australian ports handle more full container imports than they do exports — unloading roughly three full containers for every two full containers that they loaded in 2019 (table 7). This imbalance between imports and exports of full containers means that shipping lines need to export empty containers.[[25]](#footnote-26)

This imbalance between full import and export containers, and the subsequent handling of empty containers, is a bigger issue for Sydney than it is for any other Australian port (table 7). Virtually all containers that came into Sydney in 2019 were full (99 per cent), but their share of full exports was lowest at 39 per cent. This means that three in five containers exported from Sydney were empty.

Table 7 – Australian ports import more full containers than they exporta,b

Landside throughput (‘000 TEUs), 2019

| Measure | Brisbane | Sydney | Melbourne | Adelaide | Fremantle | Australia |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Imports (TEU) | 666 | 1 293 | 1 491 | 215 | 406 | 4 072 |
| Exports (TEU) | 644 | 1 279 | 1 471 | 200 | 380 | 3 974 |
| Total (TEU) | 1 310 | 2 572 | 2 963 | 415 | 786 | 8 046 |
| Net (TEU) | 22 | 13 | 20 | 15 | 26 | 98 |
| Import share (%) | 50.8 | 50.3 | 50.3 | 51.8 | 51.7 | 50.6 |
| Full imports (TEU) | 591 | 1 278 | 1 354 | 161 | 362 | 3 746 |
| Full import share (%) | 88.6 | 98.9 | 90.8 | 74.8 | 89.1 | 92.0 |
| Full exports (TEU) | 361 | 498 | 894 | 164 | 261 | 2 177 |
| Full export share (%) | 56.0 | 38.9 | 60.8 | 82.1 | 68.6 | 54.8 |

**a.** TEU: twenty foot equivalent containers. **b.** Rounding errors may be present in the table.

Source: BITRE (2021).

#### Truck turnaround times

Lower truck turnaround times are indicative of higher landside productivity. In 2019, Fremantle and Melbourne had the shortest turnaround times, while Sydney and Brisbane had the longest (figure 13). These times are likely influenced by a number of factors such as, the degree of port congestion, how many containers were dropped‑off or loaded per visit and the speed of terminal operations in loading containers onto/off trucks.

As noted above, truck turnaround times may appear artificially low if trucks wait outside the port gate until their containers are ready for collection. Given the absence of data on at‑gate waiting times, it is not possible to ascertain if, and by how much, this practice affects measured turnaround times.

#### Truck utilisation

Truck utilisation measures the average number of TEUs handled per truck trip. All other things equal, higher utilisation rates are indicative of higher landside productivity because the port is moving more containers per truck trip. Higher productivity vehicles (bigger trucks) (chapter 7, inquiry report) and increased backloading would tend to increase the truck utilisation measure.

Most ports averaged around 2.5 TEUs per truck (equivalent to 1.7 containers per truck). Adelaide recorded the highest rate at 2.7 (figure 14). And the one exception was Sydney, which averaged 2 TEUs per truck. Truck utilisation in Sydney is much lower than the other ports because, as noted above, Sydney has the highest trade imbalance (table 7). A low proportion of *full* export containers reduces the opportunity for backloading (because empty containers are stored and handled by empty container parks rather than transport companies) such that each truck transports fewer containers per trip (see below).

Figure 13 – Landside turnaround times vary by Australian container porta

Average truck turnaround time, 2019

Figure 1.13 – This is a bar chart that shows the average truck turnaround time for each Australian port in 2019. Fremantle had the fastest time at 23 minutes per truck, Brisbane had the longest at 35 minutes per truck. The Australian average was 30 minutes. 

**a.** The average time from when trucks enter the port to when the last container is loaded, and the truck is ready for departure.

Source: BITRE (2021).

Figure 14 – Sydney has the lowest rate of truck utilisationa

Average truck utilisation rate, 2019

Figure 1.14 – This is a bar chart that shows the average truck utilisation rate for each Australian port in 2019. This is the average number of twenty foot equivalent containers handled per truck. Adelaide had the highest utilisation at 2.7 TEUs per truck, Sydney had the lowest at 2 TEUs per truck. The Australian average was 2.3 TEUs per truck. 

**a.** Average number of TEUs handled per truck. Calculated as the count of TEUs through the VBS/TAS systems divided by the total number of VBS/TAS trucks used.

Source: BITRE (2021).

##### Backloading of trucks

As noted above, backloading makes more effective use of trucks and landside infrastructure.

The share of backloaded trucks varied widely across Australian ports (figure 15). Adelaide had the highest share, and close to twice the rate of Melbourne which was the next best port. The higher degree of backloading in Adelaide corresponds with the higher truck utilisation rates in figure 14. That is, each truck transported more containers because 28 per cent of trucks both dropped off and picked up containers. Similarly, the lower backloading rates in Sydney shed light on why truck utilisation rates were so low in Sydney.

Figure 15 – Sydney also had the lowest share of backloaded trucks

Per cent of trucks backloaded, 2019

Figure 1.15 – This is a bar chart that shows the percent of backloaded trucks for each Australian port in 2019. Adelaide had the highest backloading share at 28 percent of trucks, Sydney had the lowest at 7.2 percent of trucks. The Australian average was 12.1 percent of trucks. 

Source: BITRE (2021).

## The productivity of Australian container ports internationally

This section addresses the terms of reference directive to benchmark Australian ports internationally. An explanation of benchmarking is presented in box 5.

The existing benchmarking evidence suggests that Australian container ports lag behind international ports (see annex C for a detailed review). As noted above, the World Bank (2021) found that most of Australia’s container ports were ranked in the bottom 25 per cent of the 351 ports benchmarked, which suggested that Australia’s ship turnaround times are slower than many other ports (see section 2). The ACCC (2021) recently noted that Australian ports lagged behind their New Zealand counterparts in terms of crane rates, elapsed labour rates and ship rates. Further, the ACCC noted that median time in port for container ships visiting Australia was 1.4 days in 2020 — ‘more than four times as long as Japan, more than double compared to China and 67 per cent greater than time that ships spent in Singapore or New Zealand’ (p. 62). Meanwhile, a recent academic study found that Australian container ports were ranked in the 2nd highest quartile for their size (from a sample of 213 ports), in a study of technical efficiency (Ghiara and Tei 2021). Taken as a whole, this evidence suggests that Australian ports could use their physical inputs more efficiently when compared to similar sized ports.

This section contributes to this literature in by:

* investigating *why* the Australian ports ranked poorly in the World Bank’s CPPI study
* presenting an alternative approach to the World Bank for benchmarking Australian container ports internationally.

| Box 5 – What is benchmarking? |
| --- |
| Benchmarking is the process of comparing the performance of an individual organisation against a benchmark, or ideal, level of performance. Benchmarks can be set on the basis of performance over time or across a sample of similar organisations, or against some externally set standard.  The core reason for benchmarking is to identify performance gaps and areas of potential improvement. Benchmarking is also used to encompass the process of identifying ‘best practices’ — that is, finding ways of doing better.  Benchmarking primarily addresses technical efficiency, or how ports compare in terms of the volume of output produced given the inputs used in production. The best practice identified is not necessarily economically efficient — that is, the best possible use of resources from a community perspective.  Performance benchmarking can be undertaken to determine how well some parts of the Australian waterfront service industries compare in relation to their counterparts in other countries. In the Commissions *International Benchmarking of the Australian Waterfront* (1998) study, the main focus for performance comparisons were charges and service outcomes for importers and exporters; and selected indicators of labour and capital productivity.  A range of factors impact on the usefulness of benchmarking. The three main ones include:   * the accuracy and integrity of the data used in the analysis * the difficulty in ensuring that comparisons are being made between like‑with‑like situations * that lower observed performance may not equate with inefficiency. For example, it may be optimal to operate at 60–70 per cent of full capacity utilisation to prevent congestion in a port and retain spare capacity to cope with peaks in trade.   Source: PC (1998, pp. 1–3) and SCRCSSP (1997, p. 13). |
|  |

### Unpacking the World Bank’s Container Port Performance Index

The World Bank, in conjunction with IHS Markit, developed the Container Port Performance Index (CPPI) to enable comparisons of quayside performance.

As noted above (table 1), the results suggested that Australia ports took longer than most international ports to turnaround ships.

The World Bank received criticism for not comparing like‑for‑like ports (section 2), but importantly their method compared port hours for a given ship and call size to improve comparability. For example, port hours for a ship sized between 5000 and 8500 TEU capacity and a call size between 2001 and 2500 containers are compared across ports. Performance in each of these ship‑call size categories are aggregated to create a single performance measure for each port. (Annex D provides more details of the methodology.) Regardless, there are a number of methodological and data‑related issues that could affect the rankings of Australian ports in the CPPI (box 6).

The Commission obtained the data that underpinned the World Bank study (that is, IHS Markit’s Port Performance Program data) to understand *why* Australian ports ranked so poorly in the CPPI.

| Box 6 – Could aspects of the CPPI method affect the ranking of Australian ports? |
| --- |
| A number of methodological choices and data issues may have affected the CPPI rankings of Australian ports, particularly in relation to the handling of larger ships. As two methodologies were used to construct the index, the approach the issue relates to is presented in parentheses.   * Small sample size issues. There are 43 unique ship call size categories. This means that performance will be based on a small sample of vessels for ports with few ship calls and the measures may, therefore, not be overly reliable. For example, Australia received under 230 visits from large ships in 2019‑20 (8501‑13 500 TEUs). (Both approaches.) * Outliers in the data can inflate average port hours. For example, a port that had one ship at anchor for a few days could substantially increase average anchorage hours and, therefore, port hours, making the port seem inefficient. (Both approaches.) * The imputation method for missing data might bias the performance of a port. Relative performance in call sizes for which there was sufficient data was used to approximate performance for call sizes with missing data. As such, good or bad performance can cascade across missing call sizes. For example, Brisbane’s relatively good performance for the call size range 2001–2500 containers would also be attributed to larger call sizes (figure 18). (Both approaches.) * For a given a ship size, global frequencies of call sizes are used as weights to construct the index. The Australian call size frequencies differ from the global frequencies, which might distort the scores for Australian ports because higher weights are placed on call sizes that are not as common in Australia. (Administrative approach.)   It is not possible to replicate the CPPI and, therefore, it is difficult to assess whether these issues cause material differences in the rankings.  However, the Commission can rule out a few aspects of the methodology that do not materially affect the rankings of Australian ports:   * the use of the fuel consumption index, which applies progressively higher weights to larger ships to aggregate ship level performance to a port score. The use of this index did not materially affect the rankings for Australian ports. That is, even if all ship sizes received equal weighting, the rankings of Australian ports remained relatively unchanged. This is not to say that ports that handled large ships well did not get a boost to their ranking from this weighting approach (both approaches) * excluding some ports from the different ship size categories and attributing a score of zero to these ports essentially gave them the average score and, therefore, should not bias the rankings. For example, all Australian ports received a zero score for ships larger than 13 500 TEUs, since no Australian ports handle ships this large (both approaches.) |
|  |

#### Why did Australian ports rank poorly?

Before diving into the results it is helpful to understand the types of ships calling at Australia’s major container ports and call sizes, since the World Bank takes this information into account to increase the comparability of ports.

The global and Australian distribution of ship and call sizes is presented in figure 16. First, a clear difference is that Australian ports did not receive ships larger than 13 500 TEU capacity in 2019‑20. In fact, Australia received under 230 calls from ships between 8501 and 13 500 TEU capacity. The majority of ships calling at Australian ports are between 1501 and 8500 TEU capacity. Second, for a given ship size, Australian ports receive a higher proportion of larger call sizes than the global average. Thus Australian ports typically service small to mid‑sized ships, typically with larger call sizes than the global average.

Figure 16 – Ship and call size frequencies, 2019‑20a,b

Each row presents the per cent of visits in each call size group

1. All ports

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Ship size group (TEU) | Call size group (number of moves) | | | | | | | | | |
| <250 | 251-500 | 501- 1,000 | 1,001- 1,500 | 1,501- 2,000 | 2,001- 2,500 | 2,501- 3,000 | 3,001- 4,000 | 4,001- 6,000 | >6000 |
| <1,500 | 27.0% | 39.6% | 28.5% | 4.9% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| 1,501-5,000 | 9.8% | 24.8% | 36.1% | 17.1% | 7.7% | 2.7% | 1.0% | 0.7% | 0.2% | 0.0% |
| 5,001-8,500 | 2.6% | 9.7% | 27.4% | 23.2% | 15.6% | 9.5% | 5.2% | 4.5% | 1.9% | 0.3% |
| 8,501-13,500 | 1.3% | 6.7% | 19.1% | 18.2% | 16.3% | 11.9% | 9.0% | 10.0% | 5.2% | 2.1% |
| >13,500 | 0.2% | 1.3% | 5.5% | 7.9% | 10.5% | 11.6% | 11.2% | 22.1% | 22.4% | 7.5% |

1. Australian ports**c**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Ship size group (TEU) | Call size group (number of moves) | | | | | | | | | |
| <250 | 251-500 | 501- 1,000 | 1,001- 1,500 | 1,501- 2,000 | 2,001- 2,500 | 2,501- 3,000 | 3,001- 4,000 | 4,001- 6,000 | Total |
| <1,500 | 23.1% | 54.9% | 19.8% | 0.0% | 2.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 91 |
| 1,501-5,000 | 1.4% | 12.2% | 36.0% | 29.2% | 18.1% | 2.9% | 0.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1391 |
| 5,001-8,500 | 0.1% | 1.5% | 22.0% | 22.0% | 21.3% | 18.7% | 8.1% | 6.2% | 0.2% | 1217 |
| 8,501-13,500 | 0.0% | 1.3% | 10.6% | 25.2% | 25.2% | 15.0% | 11.5% | 11.1% | 0.0% | 226 |
| Total | 40 | 570 | 241 | 811 | 731 | 301 | 128 | 100 | 3 |  |

**a.** Each row sums to 100%. **b.** The shading shows, for a given ship size group, which call size group is most frequent. Darker blue shades indicate a higher percentage, grey indicates a lower percentage, and white indicates no observations for a given row. **c.** The column for call sizes greater than 6000 containers and the row for ship sizes greater than 13 500 are excluded because Australia did not receive ships or call sizes in these groups.

Source: IHS Markit Port Performance Program and the World Bank (2021).

The appendix of the World Bank study pointed to issues in the relatively long times that it takes Australian ports to turn ships around (table 8). The performance of Australian ports — in terms of their percentile rank — deteriorated as ship sizes increased. While the Australian ports did not rank particularly well for the feeder and small ships, their performance was particularly poor for medium and large ships. The exceptions were Brisbane, which received a higher ranking than other Australian ports for large ships, thanks to them having generally faster turnaround times, and Sydney which handled even the feeder ships slowly.

Table 8 – The performance of Australian ports deteriorated as ship sizes increaseda,b

CPPI percentile rank by ship size, 2019‑20

|  | Feeder  <1500 TEUs  (219 ports) | Small  1501‑5000 TEUs  (331 ports) | Medium  5001‑8500 TEUs  (213 ports) | Large  8501‑13 500 TEUs (162 ports) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Brisbane | 64% | 54% | 73% | 69% |
| Sydney | 84% | 71% | 89% | 91% |
| Melbourne | ‑ | 72% | 75% | 88% |
| Adelaide | ‑ | 73% | 96% | 93% |
| Fremantle | ‑ | 63% | 80% | 90% |

**a.** Not all 351 ports are included in each ship size category because not every port handles each ship size. **b.** The percentile rankings for ship sizes greater than 13 500 twenty‑foot equivalent (TEU) container capacity are excluded from the table since Australian ports were not visited by these ultra large ships.

Source: The World Bank (2021).

And the data reveal how slow Australia’s major container ports are at turning ships around relative to global averages (figure 17). The average turnaround time for medium and large ships was above the international average at all Australian ports and Sydney, Fremantle and Melbourne had slower turnaround for feeder and small ships. Given underperformance is relatively pronounced for medium and large ships, the following analysis focuses on these ship sizes.

Australian ports were substantially slower than the top three international ports at turning around *medium*‑sized ships of all call sizes, and were typically slower than the average global port (figure 18). They also took up to three times longer to turn around *large* ships than the best international ports and longer (often considerably so) than the average international port (figure 19). Yokohama (Japan), Qingdao (China) and King Abdullah (Saudi Arabia) consistently had the fastest turnaround times for larger ships (box 7). Across the call sizes presented, Yokohama performed the best, with little change in port hours even as the call size increased.

Figure 17 – Turnaround times at Australian ports are above international averagesa,b,c

Port hours by ship size and component, selected ports and global average, 2019‑20

Figure 1.17 - This is figure is a series of bar charts. Each bar chart shows the average port hours for a given ship size for the Australian ports, the international average and the top performing international ports. The chart also shows the components that make up port hours. The chart shows that Australian ports took longer than the average international port (and top performing ports) at turning over medium and large ships. This was primarily because of longer operating hours.

**a.** Port hours in the CPPI exclude steam out time. To aggregate the data to ship‑size level, the influence of call size is neutralised. This is done by using global ship‑call‑size frequencies, rather than port‑specific frequencies, to weight data and aggregate performance to ship‑size level. **b.** Gaps in figure indicate that the port did not receive ten visits in the period. **c.**Top performers in the CPPI are included for comparison.

Source: IHS Markit’s Port Performance Program data.

Figure 18 – Australian ports take longer than international ports to turnaround *medium* sized ships for a given call sizea,b

Average port hours by selected call sizes, medium ships (5001‑8500 TEUs), 2019‑20

Figure 1.18 – This figure is a series of bar charts. Each bar chart shows the average port hours for given call sizes for medium sized ships for the Australian ports, the international average and the top performing international ports. The chart shows that Australian ports took longer than the average international port (and top performing ports) at turning over medium sized ships.

**a.** Gaps in figure indicate that the port did not receive ten visits in a six‑month period. **b.** The three top international ports and the global average are presented for comparison.

Source: IHS Markit’s Port Performance Program data.

Figure 19 – Australian ports take longer than international ports to turnaround *large* ships for a given call sizea,b

Average port hours by selected call sizes, large ships (8501‑13 500 TEUs), 2019‑20

Figure 1.19 – This figure is a series of bar charts. Each bar chart shows the average port hours for a given call size for large ships for the Australian ports, the international average and the top performing international ports. The chart shows that Australian ports took longer than the average international port (and top performing ports) at turning over large ships. 

**a.** Gaps in figure indicate that the port did not receive ten visits in a six‑month period. **b.** The three top international ports and the global average are presented for comparison.

Source: IHS Markit’s Port Performance Program data.

| Box 7 – What features contribute to making these ports the best in the world? |
| --- |
| The World Bank study does not discuss why ports rank the way they do. The Commission investigated the top performing ports of Yokohama, King Abdullah and Qingdao to identify characteristics that could contribute to fast turnaround times or efficiency more generally. The following is not an exhaustive list.  All three are relatively new ports or have new terminals within an older port. For example, King Abdullah port first opened and serviced a ship in 2013, while Qingdao’s newest terminal opened in 2017. Because these ports are new, they were built and designed to accommodate growth in ship sizes and containerised trade and can therefore accommodate the largest ships (some up to 24 000 TEU capacity).  To achieve their goals, these ports have:   * strategic locations at the entrances of deep water bays or harbours (sometimes man made) which helps to reduce steam‑in times and minimise weather disruptions * numerous long and deep berths, high numbers of large quay cranes (some with an outreach of 25 TEUs or twin lift capabilities) and large container yards. They also have room to expand by adding additional terminals or extending yards. This gives ports the ability to intensely work a ship which helps to reduce operating times * good connections to the landside (all with direct access to highways, Qingdao with rail to dock) which may help to reduce container dwell times and truck turnaround times (but not necessarily ship turnaround times).   There are also port specific characteristics that could affect current and future performance.  Yokohama   * Unionised industrial action might happen once a year. When it does all Japanese ports are affected. Typically, it is scheduled for 24 hours on a Sunday in order to minimise disruption to operations (APM Terminals Yokohama, pers. comm., 23 June 2022). * At the APM Terminal:   + they handle more containers per berth hour than any other terminal (APM Terminals 2015)   + some stevedoring companies (who handle the containers at this terminal) are owned by the shipping lines, helping to align the incentives to turn ships around fast (APM Terminals Yokohama, pers. comm., 23 June 2022)   + an online vehicle booking system (CONPAS) has been introduced but so far there has been limited take up. The paper based (fax) system remains preferred (APM Terminals Yokohama, pers. comm., 23 June 2022).   King Abdullah   * Constructed on a greenfield site, the port therefore does not face many of the constraints present at historical ports (such as urban encroachment). There are also plans to expand the port to handle 20 million TEUs per year, through construction of additional terminals and a dedicated rail terminal adjacent to the port (King Abdullah Port 2022b). * Investments in port technology include a Port Community System (a single online platform for document sharing that increases supply chain visibility) and Smart Gate System (which automates security functions, authenticating the identity of the driver, vehicle and cargo, which improves truck turnaround times) (King Abdullah Port 2022a).   Qingdao   * This is a fully automated terminal, which claimed to have reduce labour costs by 70 per cent and increase efficiency by 30 per cent compared with traditional terminals (CRI Online 2018).   Sources: APM Terminals (2022a, 2022b); IHS Markit’s Port Characteristics data; King Abdullah Port (2022a, 2022b, 2022c); Yokohama Port Corporation (2022). |
|  |

##### Arrival process

Slower arrival processes (that is, anchorage plus steam‑in time), are one potential contributor to Australia’s major container ports recording longer turnaround times for large ships. In 2019‑20, most Australian ports had average arrival times that were in line with or faster than the average international port (figure 17). The outlier is Sydney, where arrival times were longer than the average international port and other Australian ports (as discussed above).

##### Cargo operating times

Australian ports had longer cargo operating times than the international average and top performing ports for a given call size for both medium and large sized ships (figure 20). For example, for large ships and for a call size of 2001–2500 containers, cargo handling at Sydney and Fremantle took over 44 hours, Melbourne and Brisbane performed slightly better (above 36 hours), but Yokohama, Qingdao and King Abdullah took under 20 hours and the global average was 29 hours.

Two factors help to unpack why Australian ports had longer operating times for a given ship and call size:

* the number of cranes deployed (crane intensity)
* the productivity of those cranes (gross crane rates).

For a given ship and call size, Australian ports used fewer cranes to service ships than the average international port and the top performing ports (figure 21). For example, Melbourne deployed about 3 cranes — the most cranes out of the Australian ports — to service large ships with a call size of 2001–2500, while Qingdao deployed about 5.6 cranes and Yokohama deployed 4.8 cranes. The international average was 3.8 cranes.

The productivity of the Australian cranes was similar to the international average (figure 22). Top ranked Yokohama had the highest gross crane rates, likely aided by some of their twin lift cranes (that is, a crane that can handle two forty‑foot containers at once).

The use of fewer cranes in Australian ports meant that it took longer to load and unload containers for a given ship call. This contributed to longer turnaround times and therefore poorer rankings of Australian ports.

The World Bank did not provide an analyses of how ports could improve their performance. Because the index is based on port hours (or turnaround times) anything that reduces this time would improve a port’s ranking. The Commissions analysis suggests that Australian ports could improve their ranking by reducing the proportion of ships anchoring and the waiting time when anchored. Australian ports could also work towards deploying more cranes (where feasible) to load and unload ships, especially for the larger call sizes. These issues seem particularly prevalent for medium and large sized ships. Given ships are getting larger, Australian ports could focus efforts on handling these ships more efficiently, which would also improve their ranking in the CPPI.

That said, Australian ports should be aiming for improved efficiency, which depends on not just the level of outputs produced by ports (such as ship turnaround times) but also the efficient deployment of inputs (such as cranes) to achieve those outputs. The CPPI is only a partial measure of performance and, by itself, cannot be used to evaluate the efficiency of Australian ports. For example, even if deploying more cranes would lower turnaround times, this is only efficient if the cost of the additional cranes is more than offset by the benefits of the reduced turnaround times. The CPPI ranking does not evaluate such a trade‑off.

Figure 20 – Operating times are above the international averagea,b

Average operating hours by selected call sizes, 2019‑20

1. Medium ships

Figure 1.20a – This figure is a series of bar charts. Each bar chart shows the average operating hours for given call sizes for medium sized ships for the Australian ports, the international average and the top performing international ports. The chart shows that Australian ports’ operating hours were longer than the average international port (and top performing ports), especially as call size increased.  

1. Large ships

Figure 1.20b – This figure is a series of bar charts. Each bar chart shows the average operating hours for given call sizes for large ships for the Australian ports, the international average and the top performing international ports. The chart shows that Australian ports’ operating hours were longer than the average international port (and top performing ports), especially as call size increased. 

**a.** Gaps in figure indicate that the port did not receive ten visits in a six‑month period. **b.** The three top international ports and the global average are presented for comparison.

Source: IHS Markit’s Port Performance Program data.

Figure 21 – Australian ports used fewer cranesa,b,c

Average crane intensity by selected call sizes, 2019‑20

1. Medium ships

Figure 1.21a – This figure is a series of bar charts. Each bar chart shows the average number of cranes allocated to a medium sized ship for given call sizes for the Australian ports, the international average and the top performing international ports. The chart shows that Australian ports’ used fewer cranes than the average international port (and top performing ports). 

1. Large ships

Figure 1.21b – This figure is a series of bar charts. Each bar chart shows the average number of cranes allocated to a large ship for given call sizes for the Australian ports, the international average and the top performing international ports. The chart shows that Australian ports’ used fewer cranes than the average international port (and top performing ports), especially for larger call sizes. 

**a.** Calculated as gross crane hours divided by operating hours. **b.** Gaps in figure indicate that the port did not receive ten visits in a six‑month period. **c.** The three top international ports and the global average are presented for comparison.

Source: IHS Markit’s Port Performance Program data.

Figure 22 – Gross crane rates are similar to an average international porta,b

Average gross crane rate by selected call sizes, 2019‑20

1. Medium ships

Figure 1.22a – This figure is a series of bar charts. Each bar chart shows the average gross crane rate for medium sized ships for given call sizes in Australian ports, the international average and in top performing international ports. The chart shows that Australian ports’ gross crane rate was similar to the average international port. Yokohama had the highest crane rates. 

1. Large ships

Figure 1.22b – This figure is a series of bar charts. Each bar chart shows the average gross crane rate for large ships for given call sizes in Australian ports, the international average and in top performing international ports. The chart shows that Australian ports’ gross crane rate was similar to the average international port. Yokohama had the highest crane rates.

**a.** Gaps in figure indicate that the port did not receive ten visits in a six‑month period. **b.** The three top international ports and the global average are presented for comparison.

Source: IHS Markit’s Port Performance Program data.

### An alternative way to benchmark container ports

The World Bank study is closely related to the benchmarking framework described in section 5, in that it focuses on the turnaround times of ships. But given the newness and criticisms of the World Bank’s study and the fact their methodology is being developed and improved, the Commission sought to use a more conventional approach to benchmark the technical efficiency of international container ports — estimating a production possibility frontier using data envelopment analysis (DEA, box 8) and assessing where Australia’s ports sit relative to that frontier.

Two main issues in the benchmarking exercise are:

* the accuracy and integrity of the data used in the analysis
* ensuring comparisons are made between like‑with‑like ports.

#### Port characteristics data

A key challenge for an international benchmarking exercise is obtaining data that are accurate and comparable across ports. As noted by the World Bank there is a:

… lack of a reliable, consistent, and comparable basis on which to compare operational performance across different ports. While modern ports collect data for performance purposes, the quality, consistency, and availability of data, the definitions employed, and the capacity and willingness of the organizations to collect and transmit data to a collating body, have all precluded the development of a comparable measure (or measures) to assess performance across ports, and time. (The World Bank 2021, p. 8)

Typically, data used for benchmarking ports using a production possibility frontier approach are collected manually for a sample of ports in specific regions or countries (annex C). Data are usually collected from port authorities, terminal operators, industry reports, or the Containerization International Yearbooks (now discontinued) for a sample of ports. As a result, sample sizes are typically small, ranging from 5 to 70 ports.

For the DEA, the Commission has drawn on IHS Markit data on port, terminal and berth characteristics that cover almost 1500 ports that receive containers (annex A). The data contain details of port inputs and outputs which are crucial for the DEA. For example, information about the number of cranes, berth lengths and throughput are collected. The data allow the Commission to benchmark a large sample of ports compared with the existing literature.

However, these data are not without issues. Investigations into the data suggested that there are some inconsistencies with data found on port authority websites. For example, for some ports the data understated the number of berths. To improve accuracy, the data for a significant number of ports have been cross‑checked with port authority websites and other online sources. However, not all port data has been verified. Further checks would allow for more robust analysis.

| Box 8 – What is Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)? |
| --- |
| Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is an analytical tool that can assist in the identification of technical efficiency among a group of firms. Such identification can highlight the potential for efficiency improvements.  DEA is a linear programming technique (non‑parametric) used to estimate the production function of ports (figure below). The DEA estimates the maximum potential output for a given set of inputs assuming either constant (CRS), variable (VRS) or non‑increasing returns to scale (NIRS). The model identifies the apparent best ports as those on the frontier (points A, C and E for the VRS frontier depicted in the figure below) — these ports receive a technical efficiency score of one. Ports that operate within the frontier (point B and D for the VRS model represented in the figure below) receive a technical efficiency score of less than one, which is determined by their performance relative to that of the best performers (calculated as ). The input orientated model implies that these ports could reduce the level of inputs and achieve the same level of output.  Estimating a DEA requires data on inputs and outputs for a sample of ports. These should reflect the actual objectives and process of container port production as accurately as possible.  The main advantages of DEA are the ability to:   * incorporate multiple inputs and outputs and that price data are not required (only quantity data) * identify the ‘peers’ for inefficient ports such that the peers provide a set of potential role models that a port can look to for ways of improving its efficiency.   The main disadvantages are that:   * the model is sensitive to data measurement error, data outliers, input and output variable specification and sample size. This means that inefficiency can be confused with poor model specification * it assumes that only those inputs specified in the model are used to produce the output.   An example of a production function estimated using DEA  Figure – This is figure shows two production functions – a constant returns to scale model and variable returns to scale model. It depicts different firm’s positions on the functions to illustrate technical efficient firms (that lie on the frontier) and those that are not technically efficient (that lie withing the frontier).  Source: Ji and Lee (2010) and SCRCSSP (1997). |
|  |

#### Identifying comparable ports

The value in benchmarking arises from comparing like‑for‑like ports. That is, comparing Australian ports to ports overseas (or other Australian ports) that possess comparable characteristics allows for an assessment of what improvements may be possible and the extent to which they are possible. For example, Australian ports may never be able to achieve the same levels of efficiency as transhipment ports such as Shanghai, Singapore or Busan, which handle large volumes of containers from very large ships and move significant numbers of containers from ship‑to‑ship. Nor might Australia achieve the economies of scale present at larger ports (for example, the throughput of the port of Shanghai is five times larger than all Australian ports combined).

But identifying similar ports is a challenging exercise (box 9). There are many factors that make Australian ports different to each other (such as the level of throughput, frequency of ship visits, port infrastructure and operations and restrictions on vessel height and size) and different in an international context. DP World Australia (sub. 49, p. 36) noted that Australian container ports are ‘different in many ways to their overseas counterparts’, for example they:

* are small by international standards (because each port serves one major city rather than multiple)
* operate as a small‑volume destination at the end of a long global trade route
* are predominantly an importer of containerised goods
* major demand centres are located on the coast, and mostly co‑located with the international container ports, therefore ports are located on constrained land.

The Maritime Union of Australia (sub. 59) noted further differences in terms of labour and human rights standards (p. 71) and Australia’s ‘notoriously challenging yard layouts which also impacts on yard logistics’ (p. 31).

Finding data for and accounting for these characteristics in any modelling exercise is difficult, therefore few studies try to identify comparable ports. Most instead compare ports within a country or a region or group ports with similar throughput levels. In previous work, the Commission relied on the advice of consultants to select benchmarking ports (PC 1998, 2003). These ports had direct liner services to Australia, such as Singapore, Los Angeles, Hamburg and Auckland. Some of these no longer seem like good benchmarking partners. For example, Singapore is predominantly a transhipment port, while Los Angeles is at least 3 times bigger than the largest Australian port.

For the DEA, the Commission selected ‘broadly comparable’ ports by selecting origin‑destination ports (rather than transhipment ports) and ports with similar throughput levels to the five major Australian container ports whose levels range between 0.4 and 3 million TEUs annually.

Specifically, the Commission initially selected all 351 port ports included in the World Bank study. From these:

* 30 ports were excluded as they had a transhipment incidence higher than 50 per cent. That is, the share of the total port throughput that is ‘ship to ship’ is greater than or equal to 50 per cent as this suggests these ports are high to pure transhipment ports (Notteboom, Pallis and Rodrigue 2022). These ports tend to be located along the main circum‑equatorial maritime route through the Panama and Suez Canal and the Straits of Malacca and Gibraltar and provide connectivity between north‑south and east‑west shipping lanes. Examples include Singapore, Port Said, Jebel Ali, Columbo, Rotterdam and Hong Kong
* 17 ports were excluded as their throughput was larger than 7 million TEUs and 107 ports were excluded as their throughput was smaller than 0.25 million TEUs. While the DEA method accounts for differences in throughput, the throughput levels of the ports differ markedly and removing the ‘tails’ improves the DEA modelling by removing outliers (figure 23). Similar restrictions have been performed in the literature (Ghiara and Tei 2021)
* 31 ports were excluded because of missing data on key variables (described below).

| Box 9 – Finding comparable ports is important but challenging |
| --- |
| Identifying comparable ports is a challenging task but it is important for benchmarking.  While the achievement of best international practice must be sought within a port, there is, however, a danger of making unfair international comparisons if there is no similarity between contexts. It is necessary to place the efficiency of a port in perspective with ports of similar characteristics with regard to trade volume, infrastructure and port operations. (Tongzon 1995, p. 171)  Many submissions to the inquiry also noted the importance of comparing like‑for‑like ports, but few suggested methodologies to do so.  Shipping Australia Limited (sub. 11, pp. 103–106) provided a method for and identified comparable ports:   * start with the top 100 ports by throughput (Lloyd’s List) and including NZ ports * select ports in nations that were most comparable to Australia using the socio cultural characteristics in the index created by Hofstede Insights (these were Canada, NZ, South Africa, the UK and US) * add a selection of ports that had a similar throughput to Fremantle and Adelaide (because these were much smaller than ports in the top 100 list). This included Halifax, Lyttelton, Auckland and Tauranga * ensure that selected ports had comparable functions (that is, select destination ports rather than origin and transhipment ports) * review satellite imagery to determine if ports have similar physical characteristics.   Their method resulted in 15 international ports being identified as highly comparable to Australian ports. The ports in this small sample are still different. For example, some are restricted by bridges and others are not (p. 105).  The Maritime Union of Australia (sub. 59, p. 85) suggested at a minimum that, the comparable ports:   * are origin-destination (or gateway) ports and not predominantly transhipment or hub ports * handle a similar number of containers/TEUs annually * handles a similar full to empty ratio and 20 foot to 40‑foot ratio * yard area and configurations are similar * the ship size ranges (TEU, load on arrival and beam) serviced by the port are similar * have a similar level of terminal operators.   The Commission sought to take on board this advice, however, finding data for and accounting for all these characteristics to identify comparable ports is difficult in practice. |
|  |

This process goes some way to identifying ports that are more comparable to Australian ports in terms of their predominant activity (transhipment verse origin‑destination) and size (level of throughput) (figure 23). Overall, 166 ports are identified as broadly comparable. including ports in North America (for example, Montreal, Vancouver, Halifax, Charleston, Houston), South America (Callao, San Antonio, Santos), New Zealand (Tauranga, Auckland), Europe (Felixstowe, London, Valencia, La Spezia, Le Havre), Asia (Shantou, Yokohama, Tokyo) and Africa (Durban, Lomé). The list includes those ports identified by Shipping Australia as highly comparable (box 9).

Figure 23 – Identifying comparable ports

Throughput of the ports used in the CPPI, 2019

Figure 1.23 – This figure is a bar chart that shows the throughput (TEUs) of each port in the sample, from largest to smallest. The figure graphically describes which ports are in the final DEA sample. It shows which ports are too large and too small to be comparable to Australian ports. It also highlights which ports are transhipment ports and also not comparable. 

Source: IHS Markit’s Port Characteristics data.

The ports in the sample that are most similar in *size* to the Australian ports are presented in table 9.

Table 9 – Sample ports closest in size to Australian ports

|  | First | Second | Third | Fourth |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Brisbane | Yarimca (Turkey) | Da Chan Bay Terminal One (China) | Mawan (China) | Hamad (Qatar) |
| Sydney | Oakland (US) | Southampton (US) | Yokohama (Japan) | Yeosu (South Korea) |
| Melbourne | Houston (US) | Virginia (US) | Qinzhou (China) | Nagoya (Japan) |
| Adelaide | Lyttelton (NZ) | Itapoa (Brazil) | Tin Can Island (Nigeria) | Salerno (Italy) |
| Fremantle | Trieste (Italy) | Aqaba (Jordan) | Dublin (Ireland) | Algiers (Algeria) |

Source: IHS Markit’s Port Characteristics data.

#### Data envelopment analysis

As noted in box 8, the input and output variables used in the DEA should reflect the actual objectives and process of container port production as accurately as possible. The selection used here largely follows the precedent set by the literature (annex C).

For the output variable:

… container throughput is unquestionably the most important and widely accepted indicator of container port or terminal output. Almost all previous studies treat it as an output variable, because it closely relates to the need for cargo‑related facilities and services and is the primary basis upon which container ports are compared, especially in assessing their relative size, investment magnitude or activity levels. Most importantly, it also forms the basis for the revenue generation of a container port or terminal. Another final, but extremely pragmatic, consideration is that container throughput is the most appropriate and analytically tractable indicator of the effectiveness of the production of a port. (Wang and Cullinane 2015, pp. 259–260)

As such, container throughput (TEUs) for 2019 is the output variable in the model.

Container port production depends crucially on the efficient use of labour, land and capital. Input variables should reflect each of these dimensions.

While labour is a critical input, it is rarely included in port studies because data are unavailable. Operations managers, crane operators and work gangs are just some examples of the types of labour that are critical to port production. Few studies include a labour input and when they do it is usually a poor proxy. For example, the number of port authority employees has previously been used as a proxy but this misses other types of labour that are necessary for port production and may simply introduce bias into models. While excluding labour is a major limitation of the Commission’s model it is criticism of the wider literature on port performance.

Land inputs are typically included in port studies, however, data are unavailable for the Commission’s analysis. Yard size can dictate capacity and flexibility to manage container traffic flows and store containers. While the IHS Markit Ports Characteristics data appeared promising for container yard area, the data were patchy and did not cover all terminals within ports, therefore aggregating terminal‑level to port‑level data would result in a misleading land input that could bias the model. Not including a land input is another limitation of the study.

Apart from labour and land inputs, other important inputs may be missing from the DEA model including:

… berth occupancy, berth accessibility, proximity to major trade lanes, terminal/port connectivity (as proxied by the number and frequency of liner services that service the terminal or port), crane operating hours, different handling speeds of yard and quay cranes, equipment age and maintenance, the total capital invested in a terminal and associated equipment, average container interchange per ship and quayside water depth. However, the practical problem of obtaining data on each of these variables across the whole sample is likely to prove virtually insurmountable.(Wang and Cullinane 2015, p. 260)

Given data constraints, the model mainly includes capital inputs, including:

* number of terminals — a proxy for terminal‑level competition within the port
* number of berths — a proxy for the number of ships a port can service
* total length of berths — a proxy for the size of ships a port can handle
* maximum draft — a proxy for the weight and depth of ships that a port can service
* the number of container cranes (separated into quay, mobile and other cranes to allow for technology differences across ports) — a key resource for handling containers and increasing container throughput.

A key implication of the set of variables included in the analysis is that the DEA only provides guidance on potential to improve technical efficiency in the long term. Many of these variables (such as the number of terminal operators and berths, and berth length) are effectively fixed in the short to medium term. Other factors that affect productivity are also ostensibly outside the control of port and terminal operators (such as the number of ship visits, their arrival times and the number of containers to be handled). And, aside from crane usage, there is minimal data on the inputs over which terminal operators have day‑to‑day control (such as employment and labour utilisation) that could influence their productivity.

Table 10 presents descriptive statistics for the 166 ports included in the DEA model. On average a port handles 1.5 million TEUs per year, using an average of two terminals, seven berths with a total length of two kilometres, 1.5 gantry cranes and 13.8 mobile cranes. The average maximum draft of visiting ships is 14.5 meters. There is significant variation in each of the variables. For example, ports in the sample used an average of 1.5 gantry cranes, but this ranged between 0 and 34 across the included ports.

There is variation in the size of the ports too. Throughput ranges between 0.3 and 5.7 million TEUs per year. The DEA model can account for different sizes of ports if a variable returns to scale production function (which is less restrictive than constant returns to scale) is estimated. This allows the best practice level of outputs to inputs to vary with the size of the ports in the sample. Results from a constant returns to scale model are presented for comparative purposes.

DEA can be applied in an input‑oriented and an output‑oriented way. An input‑oriented model measures the potential proportionate reduction in input quantity that could be achieved without changing the output quantity. An output‑oriented DEA measures the potential proportionate expansion in output quantity for a given input quantity. The Commission follows the literature in applying an input‑orientated model. This model is well‑suited to the port performance context because a port’s output is not controlled by the port or terminal operators: the number of containers that pass through a port reflects the demand for imports by the local community and world demand for local exports. As such, port throughput is a ‘derived’ demand.

Table 10 – Sample descriptive statistics, 2019

| Variable | Mean | Standard deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Throughput (million TEUs) | 1.5 | 1.3 | 0.3 | 5.7 |
| Number of terminals | 2.1 | 1.2 | 1 | 6 |
| Number of berths | 7.2 | 5.0 | 1 | 26 |
| Berth length (km) | 2.0 | 1.3 | 0.3 | 5.7 |
| Maximum draft (m) | 14.5 | 3.3 | 8.2 | 30.0 |
| Number of gantry cranes | 1.5 | 4.0 | 0 | 34 |
| Number of mobile cranes | 13.8 | 11.3 | 0 | 41 |
| Number of other cranesa | 0.4 | 1.6 | 0 | 11 |

**a.** These are other types of quay cranes that are not mobile or gantry cranes.

Source: IHS Markit’s Port Characteristics data.

#### Results

The DEA results point to most Australian ports having scope to improve the efficiency of their operations (table 11). If constant returns to scale are assumed, Melbourne is the most technically efficient of the Australian ports. Although when the more realistic and preferred variable returns to scale model is used, Adelaide is estimated to be fully technical efficient. Melbourne is found to have a score of 0.9 which is 10 per cent from the frontier and just above the average technical efficiency score for the sample of 0.89. Sydney, Brisbane and Fremantle have scores between 0.71 and 0.75 which are between 21 and 25 per cent from the frontier — well below the sample average. Technical efficiency scores for all ports can be found in annex B.

The results suggests that most Australian ports are not technically efficient. This implies that most ports could reduce their physical inputs to achieve the same level of output.[[26]](#footnote-27) An alternative interpretation is that most Australian ports should be able to cope with an increase in throughput by using their inputs more efficiently (figure 24 — the vertical distance between the port and the frontier). But this interpretation depends on the ability of port operations and the landside to cope with increased container traffic (more ships or larger call sizes). Inefficiencies in port operations and on the landside could restrict quayside productivity — an interlinkage of the system that is not taken into account with the DEA. Note that figure 24 depicts a two‑dimensional production function and because of this it depicts Adelaide within the frontier even though Adelaide is technically efficient.

Table 11 – Most Australian ports have scope for improvementa,b

Technical efficiency scores for Australian ports

| Port | CRS model | VRS model | VRS Rank (percentile) | VRS Peers |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Adelaide | 0.62 | 1.00 | 1 (0.01) | Batangas, Douala, Posorja |
| Melbourne | 0.87 | 0.90 | 101 (0.61) | Davao, Puerto Cortes, Chiwan, Qinzhou, Cat Lai |
| Sydney | 0.69 | 0.75 | 125 (0.75) | Douala, Qinzhou, Cat Lai |
| Fremantle | 0.56 | 0.73 | 128 (0.77) | Douala, Puerto Cortes, Chiwan, Taipei, Posorja |
| Brisbane | 0.53 | 0.71 | 135 (0.81) | Douala, Qinzhou, Cat Lai |

**a.** A variable returns to scale model was used to account for differences in throughput levels and economies of scale. **b.**There were 87 ports out of the 166 ports in the sample that received a technical efficiency score of one in the VRS model, indicating the port was fully efficient. So, even though Melbourne has quite a high technical efficiency score, their percentile rank is in the bottom 60 per cent.

Source: Commission estimates using IHS Markit’s Port Characteristics data.

How can Australian ports improve their technical efficiency? The model provides two suggestions:

* reduce level of inputs and achieve the same output (also to reduce slack in inputs)
* investigate the operations of peer ports.

The input‑oriented DEA model measures the potential proportionate reduction in input quantity without changing the output quantity. For example, Melbourne has an efficiency score of 0.9 which means that Melbourne could reduce all inputs by 10 per cent to be technically efficient. That is, for example, Melbourne would need to reduce berth length (2.5 km) by 10 per cent (by 0.25 km). Doing this reduction to all inputs in the model gets Melbourne to a point of efficiency called Farrell efficiency (Ji and Lee 2010, p. 270).

Figure 24 – Scope exists for most Australian container ports to improve their productivitya,b

The two‑dimensional estimated productivity possibility frontier

Figure 1.24 – This is a figure of the two dimensional estimated production function for ports. The y-axis is throughput and the x-axis is the sum of all inputs in the model and therefore has no interpretation. Each ports position in the production function is identified with a scatter plot. The ports along the frontier are identified, as well as the Australian ports.  

**a.** Adelaide is estimated to be technically efficient (on the frontier), but the two‑dimensional nature of this chart depicts Adelaide within the frontier. The production possibility frontier has multiple dimensions that cannot be depicted in a simple chart. **b.** ‘Inputs’ in the figure is the sum of all input variables in the model.

Source: Commission estimates using IHS Markit’s Port Characteristics data.

Looking to ‘peer’ ports or other efficient ports might provide insights on how to improve the efficiency of Australian ports over the longer term. For example, Australian ports could be compared with the peers identified by the model (table 11) or similar sized ports that are closer to being technically efficient (table 12). Operations at these ports could be compared to Australian ports to potentially identify areas of improvement. Before consulting with these ports, further investigation would be merited to see if they have fixed characteristics that are similar to the Australian ports, such as the type of port (deep water or river or height restrictions), that are not accounted for in the DEA. Differences in these characterises may be factors constraining Australian port efficiency.

Table 12 – Technical efficiency scores of similar sized ports

Scores in parentheses

|  | First | Second | Third | Fourth |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Brisbane (0.71) | Yarimca (0.67) | Da Chan Bay Terminal One (1) | Mawan (1) | Hamad (1) |
| Sydney (0.75) | Oakland (0.69) | Southampton (1) | Yokohama (0.65) | Yeosu (1) |
| Melbourne (0.87) | Houston (0.79) | Virginia (0.71) | Qinzhou (1) | Nagoya (0.82) |
| Adelaide (1) | Lyttelton (1) | Itapoa (1) | Tin Can Island (0.72) | Salerno (1) |
| Fremantle (0.73) | Trieste (1) | Aqaba (1) | Dublin (0.96) | Algiers (1) |

Source: Commission estimates using IHS Markit’s Port Characteristics data.

New Zealand ports are often compared to Australian ports and the model shows they have higher technical efficiency scores. Three NZ ports in the model are estimated to be fully technical efficient: Tauranga, Lyttelton and Napier. Auckland also received a high score of 0.9. This suggests that there might be scope to learn from these ports, especially the larger ones like Tauranga.

Further investigation of peer ports is needed before drawing conclusions about whether and how Australian ports can learn from them.

##### Caveats on main results

The potential efficiency gains suggested by the Commission’s preliminary benchmarking exercise should be interpreted cautiously.

* Investigations into the port characteristics data suggested that there are some inconsistencies with data found on port authority websites. Data for a significant number of ports has been verified (those ports on the frontier and those identified as peers), but further data verification is desirable.
* The performance of each port is based only on the inputs included in the DEA model; missing inputs may bias results. There are characteristics of ports that affect efficiency that cannot always be accounted for. For example, the port of Chattogram in Bangladesh, a potential peer of both Sydney and Melbourne, used their general terminal to move containers as well as their dedicated container terminals. Container ships docking at the general terminal also typically used on‑board cranes to move containers. As such, the port appears very efficient because it moved many containers with few inputs (as the general terminal did not factor into the inputs of the model). A greater understanding of how the peer ports differ from the Australian ones is required.
* The potential technical efficiency gains suggested by the model might not always be achievable. For example, there may be factors that constrain Australia’s port productivity relative to the international ports that are outside the control of the port (such as infrequent ship visits).
* Australian ports might operate below the frontier and underutilise capacity to prevent port congestion and cope with seasonality in demand (peaks in container volumes and ship arrivals, see chapter 2, inquiry report). Reducing the level of inputs could lead to greater inefficiencies, such as increasing ship turnaround times. This suggests there may be an optimal level of asset utilisation that strikes a balance between technical efficiency and turnaround times (and potentially cost minimisation).
* Changes in technical efficiency over time are not examined. The time‑series data needed to support such analysis are not available. Improvements in the technical efficiency scores of Australian ports over time would be reassuring, whereas a deteriorating trajectory would provide reason for concern.

It is also important to recognise that the Commission’s benchmarking exercise differs from the World Bank’s and, as such, the performance ranking of Australian ports does too. For example, Adelaide is ranked in the top 1 per cent for technical efficiency but bottom 25 per cent in the World Bank study. The World Bank’s benchmarking analysis did not account for the fact that some ports use relatively more inputs and can, therefore, turn ships around faster (while the Commission’s analysis does not take *time* into account). For example, the port of Yokohama, which topped the World Bank rankings, had a technical efficiency score (0.65), which is lower than all the Australian ports. Yokohama had the fastest ship turnaround times as indicated by the CPPI and higher gross crane rates, but they also had five container terminals, about 5.5 km of berths and about 40 quay cranes. In comparison, Melbourne and Sydney each had three terminals, about 2.5 to 3.6 km of berths and about 20 quay cranes each. Given Yokohama had similar throughput to Melbourne and Sydney, Yokohama’s capital utilisation was much lower, which reduced their technical efficiency, but helped them achieve faster turnaround times and might enable them to better cope with any increase in the volume of containerized trade.

##### Sensitivity analysis

To test the robustness of the DEA results for Australian ports a number of sensitivity tests were undertaken.[[27]](#footnote-28) These involved altering the input variables or specification of those variables and different sample restrictions.

* Excluding the number of terminals as an input (table 13, column 2). This variable is used to proxy the level of competition in a port on the grounds that greater competition might produce greater efficiency in the use of inputs, but it is rarely included in the literature.
* Not differentiating the types of quay cranes (column 3). That is, including one variable of the number of cranes, rather than three.
* Replacing berth length and number of berths with average berth length (column 4). This is because there is a high degree of correlation between these variables which can introduce bias into the model.
* Replacing berth length, number of berths and number of gantry cranes with average number of gantry cranes per kilometre (column 5). This is because there is a high degree of correlation between these variables which can introduce bias into the model.
* Running two separate DEA models for ports above and below the average throughput of the sample (1.5 million TEUs) (column 6). Under this definition, Melbourne and Sydney are above average size, and Brisbane, Fremantle and Adelaide are below average size.

The sensitivity analysis suggests that the DEA results are sensitive to some modelling choices but not all (table 13). The technical efficiency scores from the preferred VRS specification from table 13 are also presented to allow for comparison (column 1). Each model assumes variable returns to scale. A few notable differences include:

* when excluding the number of terminals as an input, the results are relatively robust however Adelaide is no longer technically efficiency (column 2)
* reducing the multicollinearity in the model reduces the technical efficiency scores of most ports, with the exception of Adelaide (columns 4 and 5).

Table 13 – Most Australian ports have scope for improvement a

Technical efficiency scores for Australian ports

| **Port** | Preferred specification (1) | Excluding terminals (2) | Number of cranes (3) | Avg berth length (4) | Avg gantry cranes per berth km (5) | Sample split by size (6) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Adelaide | 1.00 | 0.91 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Melbourne | 0.90 | 0.90 | 0.89 | 0.86 | 0.78 | 0.93 |
| Sydney | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.79 | 0.78 | 0.76 |
| Fremantle | 0.73 | 0.73 | 0.71 | 0.74 | 0.66 | 0.75 |
| Brisbane | 0.71 | 0.71 | 0.71 | 0.75 | 0.72 | 0.81 |

**a.** Variable returns to scale models were used to account for differences in throughput levels and economies of scale.

Source: Commission estimates using IHS Markit’s Port Characteristics data.

## Summary

The number of containers that pass through Australian ports reflects the demand for imports by the wider community and world demand for Australian exports.

Australian ports are primarily destination ports — they import more full containers than they export. This differentiates them from many overseas ports, particularly transhipment ports like Singapore and, to some extent, from origin ports like Shanghai.

The number of ships handled at Australian ports has increased over the long term as has the volume of cargo handled. However, the higher rate of growth in the number of containers handled has meant that the average call size — the average number of containers handled per ship visit — has also increased. This means that Australian ports are not only handling bigger ships but that they have relatively more cargo to un/load on each visit.

Adelaide and Fremantle generally performed well across a range of marine operations and landside productivity‑related metrics. These two ports also had the highest net crane rates in 2019. They used fewer cranes on average than the other ports but worked them harder. And truck turnaround times were fastest in Fremantle, while Adelaide trucks transported the most containers per trip, increasing their efficiency.

Of the bigger ports, Melbourne performed well on many quayside and landside measures. Melbourne moved more containers per hour than any other Australian port, owing to its use of more cranes per ship. Sydney, on the other hand, has scope to improve their utilisation and turnaround times of trucks.

Quayside productivity varied across terminal operators within a port and, for each operator, over time. This suggests that there is scope for all terminal operators to improve the consistency, and therefore level, of their performance.

Ship turnaround times point to potential areas for improvement. The fact that ships in Sydney and Melbourne spent longer in port (42 hours and 36 hours, respectively) is unsurprising; they are bigger ports and handle more container movements, giving rise to longer operating times — the main component of port hours. However, the fact that ships spend longer at anchorage or steaming‑in in Sydney, Brisbane and Adelaide relative to Melbourne and Fremantle could be indicative of port congestion and/or port inefficiency. Addressing time spent at anchorage should be an easy way to improve port performance.

While the Australian data is not well suited to assessing long‑run trends in Australian container ports, the available data point to the quayside productivity at *all* Australian ports having grown since late 1989. Growth in crane and ship rates was strongest in the late 1990s following significant waterfront reforms. Since then, growth rates have been lower. However, the fact that Australian ports are handling larger containers and the crane rate (in terms of the number of containers) has been relatively stable may point to productivity improvements in terms of the quantity of goods being moved though the ports. Ports are also using more cranes to service ships and as such the ship rate has continued to improve.

Benchmarking is a useful exercise but it is also a challenging one. Different methods, samples, and data can produce different results, while focusing on different aspects of efficiency (physical inputs and outputs as opposed to time) make it difficult to reconcile why the performance of individual ports may differ across studies.

These challenges make it difficult to identify concrete ways of improving port‑wide efficiency, but comparisons across different types of studies can yield some powerful insights. For example, unpacking the results of the World Bank study revealed that Australia could improve turnaround times for large ships by reducing anchorage and cargo handling times (by allocating more cranes to these ships where feasible). It also revealed that Australian ports have similar gross crane rates to the average global port — in other words, Australia’s major container ports do not rank poorly in the World Bank analysis because ports move fewer containers per crane while ships are being worked. The Commission’s benchmarking analysis showed that Australian container ports could utilise their physical inputs more intensively (and improve their technical efficiency), but data limitations mean the analysis cannot shed light on ways in which productivity might be improved in the short to medium term.

The benchmarking results found here are broadly consistent with the other empirical studies of port productivity and with the findings of the World Bank — Australian container ports are generally less efficient than their international counterparts.

On balance, the empirical evidence suggests that there is scope for Australian container ports to improve their productivity.

Appendices

# Data sources

### BITRE data

The Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics (BITRE) publishes data on the performance of Australian container ports in their *Waterline* publication.

*Waterline* was first published in July 1994, initially on a quarterly basis. It is now published on an irregular basis. The latest issue, *Waterline 67*, was published in December 2021 and contains data through to December 2020, with some commentary on the statistics and on recent developments.

The recent *Waterline* reports consist of four sections:

* measures of container terminal throughput
* measures of container terminal productivity
* vehicle booking system and empty container park operations
* port interface cost index (used by the ACCC).

A range of indicators are published within these sections (table A.1). These indicators are published for the five main container ports in Australia (Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and Fremantle) and a ‘five ports’ total. Numerous metrics are expressed on both a container and twenty‑foot equivalent (TEU) basis.

The range of reported indicators has changed over time. The number of indicators has expanded and some metrics have been renamed and refined (so they are not consistent over time). Earlier editions included some discussion of employment and labour market issues; recent issues do not.

The duration of time series data varies by indicator. The crane rate, elapsed labour rate and ship rate span the longest period (1989–2020), enabling a longer‑term assessment of quayside productivity. Other measures have much shorter time series which limit their usefulness for examining long‑term trends. For example, metrics such as truck turnaround time, anchorage time and ship turnaround time only span 2011–2020.

### IHS Markit data

#### Port Performance Program

IHS Markit’s Port Performance Program started in 2009 with the goal of driving efficiency improvements in container port operations and supporting programs to optimize port calls. This unique and highly comprehensive dataset covers:

* data from 10 of the world’s largest liner shipping companies, which collectively operate 76 per cent of global fleet capacity
* 502 ports and 1014 terminals in 137 countries, with calls by 3860 individual vessels
* more than 180 000 port calls per year
* the calendar years 2017 to 2021 (with data collection continuing).

Table A.1 – Summary of recent *Waterline* indicatorsa

| Throughput | Productivity | VBS / ECP operations | Port interface cost index |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Number of ships handled | Net crane rate | Number of truck timeslots available | Total ship‑based charges by ship visit |
| Total containers handled | Net elapsed labour rate | Number of truck timeslots used | Total ship‑based charges for handling empty containers |
| 40‑foot containers (%) | Net ship rate | Timeslots used in off‑peak periods | Ship‑based charges (conservancy; tonnage; pilotage; towage; un/mooring; total) |
| Number of trucks | Containers per berth meter | TEUs handled per VBS/TAS truck timeslot (average) | Cargo‑based charges (wharfage; harbour dues) |
| Number of containers transported by truck/rail/joint | Containers per truck | Number of containers moved through ECPs | Other charges (stevedoring – wharfside; stevedoring – landside; terminal access charge; customs broker; total) |
| Total cargo throughput | Backloading of trucks (%) |  |  |
| Non‑containerised general cargo throughput | Truck turnaround time (average) |  |  |
| Number of full container imports and exports | Container turnaround time (average) |  |  |
| Number of empty container imports and exports | Ship turnaround time (median; 95th percentile) |  |  |
|  | Ships at anchorage (number; %) |  |  |
|  | Time at anchorage (average; median) |  |  |
|  | Total berth hours |  |  |
|  | Total time ship available to stevedores |  |  |
|  | Lifts per ship‑hour at berth (average) |  |  |
|  | Lifts per hour of stevedoring operation (average) |  |  |
|  | Lifts per berth visit (average) |  |  |

**a.** VBS = vehicle booking system. ECP = Empty Container Parks. TAS = truck appointments system.

Source: BITRE (2021).

The individual port call data are aggregated to monthly level data for each terminal within a port, for a given ship and call size.

Member shipping lines provide port call data to IHS Markit on a monthly basis. The data undergo a thorough checking and validation process including:

* the removal of records falling outside well‑defined data quality boundaries because those observations usually exist as a result of data input errors
* the matching of ship data to AIS historical vessel movements data to track and verify each individual ship call.

Table A.2 shows the variables included in the data.

All metrics are standardised (that is, calculated the same way) to enable a fair comparison across ports.

Table A.2 – Variables in the Port Performance Program, 2020a,b

| Time‑based metrics | Port performance | Port characteristics |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Anchorage time (hours) | Port moves per hour | Call size |
| Steam‑in (hours) | Berth moves per hour | Ship size |
| Arrival process (hours) | Gross crane rate |  |
| Start (hours) | Crane intensity |  |
| Cargo operations (hours) | Minutes per container move |  |
| Finish (hours) | Per cent of anchored calls |  |
| Port hours |  |  |
| Berth hours |  |  |
| Gross crane hours |  |  |

**a.** The Commission understands that IHS Markit are currently collecting data on throughput and dwell time in port to be incorporated in the next iteration of the CPPI.

Source: IHS Port Performance Program data.

##### Sampling

There are missing data in the Port Performance Program. For example, for a given ship call there may be missing data regarding anchorage times, operating times or gross crane hours. This is sometimes a result of IHS Markit not being able to verify the data using AIS or because the data provided were outside the data quality boundaries.

The Commission’s analysis uses observations with complete data for the measure presented in each chart. This means that the sample size differs across charts depending on the metric presented. This was done to ensure the maximum number of observations were used. The variable that had the most missing data was gross crane hours (about 40 per cent of all observations), therefore the charts that use this variable (such as gross crane rates) have the smallest underlying sample size.

##### How representative are the Port Performance Program data?

As noted above, the Port Performance Program is based on information from 10 of the world’s largest shipping lines. Because this is a sample, there is no guarantee that every ship call at Australia’s major container ports is captured in the data (that is, there may be ships from out‑of‑sample shipping lines calling at Australian ports). This raises a question about how representative the data are of Australian ports.

To address this question, a selection of metrics from *Waterline* and the Port Performance Program were compared (table A.3). Approximately 80 per cent of port calls to Australian ports are covered in the IHS data, suggesting relatively good coverage. The average call sizes are extremely close across the data sets, suggesting that while there is not full coverage of ships visiting the ports, on average the ships in the sample are representative of a typical port call. Ship turnaround times are also fairly similar for most ports. The exceptions are Sydney and Adelaide in which median turnaround times are longer in the Port Performance Program data. Removing observations that could be considered outliers does not improve the representativeness for these ports. It is unknown why there is a discrepancy.

Table A.3 – Port Performance Program data cover around 80 per cent of ship calls in Australian portsa

Various metrics from *Waterline* and Port performance Program data, 2019

| Measure | Brisbane | Sydney | Melbourne | Adelaide | Fremantle |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Number of ship calls |  |  |  |  |  |
| Waterline | 973 | 1158 | 1010 | 425 | 483 |
| Port Performance Program | 718 | 861 | 783 | 367 | 402 |
| Per cent | 74% | 74% | 78% | 86% | 83% |
| Average call size (containers) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Waterline | 846 | 1423 | 1684 | 709 | 1095 |
| Port Performance Program | 892 | 1470 | 1695 | 731 | 1086 |
| Median ship turnaround time (hours*)* |  |  |  |  |  |
| Waterline | 30.2 | 32.2 | 38.4 | 21.8 | 31.2 |
| Port Performance Program | 29.7 | 40.1 | 36.3 | 30.8 | 32.8 |
| 95th percentile of ship turnaround time (hours) | | | | | |
| Waterline | 55.8 | 65.0 | 64.3 | 37.0 | 54.7 |
| Port Performance Program | 54.4 | 90.3 | 64.3 | 49.1 | 54.9 |

**a.** There are limited comparable metrics between BITRE’s Waterline data and IHS Markit’s Port Performance Program data.

Source: BITRE (2021) and IHS Markit’s Port Performance Program data.

#### Port characteristics

IHS Markit’s Bespoke Maritime Data Services unit maintains the largest maritime databases available, covering ship characteristics, movements, owners and managers, ship and company sanctions compliance, casualty and risk events, ports, terminals and berths.

The Commission purchased data covering almost 1500 ports that receive containers including details of:

* ports — such as throughput, location, maximum port restrictions and port facilities
* terminals — such as name, terminal operator, facility type and location
* berths — such as name, operator, facility type, location, physical dimensions, maximum berth restrictions (beam, depth, weight) and tidal information
* berth cranes — such as crane type and use, quantity and maximum outreach.

The data also provide information on when the data were last updated.

# Supplementary figures and tables

### Long‑term trends

This section presents ‘longer term’ trends for selected measures of port performance. The analysis relies on *Waterline* data.

#### Port operations

Figure B.1 – Median ship turnaround time, 2011–2021

Figure B.1 -  This figure is a line chart that shows the median ship turnaround times for Australian ports (and the five-port median) between 2011 and 2021. Adelaide has the quickest turnaround times, likely because they have smaller call sizes. Median turnaround times remained steady until the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Source: BITRE *Waterline* (various editions).

Figure B.2 – Number of ships waiting at anchor for more than 2 hours, 2011–2021

Figure B.2 -  This figure is a line chart that shows the number of ships that waited at anchor for more than 2 hours for Australian ports (and the five-port total) between 2011 and 2021. Sydney has the largest number of ships waiting at anchor for more than 2 hours. The number of ships at anchor increased following the COVID-19 pandemic.

Source: BITRE *Waterline* (various editions).

Figure B.3 – Median waiting time at anchor, 2011–2021**a**

Figure B.3 -  This figure is a line chart that shows the median time at anchor if ships waited for more than 2 hours for Australian ports (and the five-port median) between 2011 and 2021. Median anchorage times fluctuate, especially for Melbourne which has a few spikes in the series. Median anchorage times at all ports increased following the COVID 19 pandemic. 

**a.** Only ships that waited more than 2 hours at anchorage are included in the calculation.

Source: BITRE *Waterline* (various editions).

#### Quayside operations

Figure B.4 – Long‑term productivity has risen in *all* Australian portsa

TEUs per hour, 1989Q4–2020Q4

1. Net crane rates

Figure B.4a – This is a line chart that shows the average quarterly net crane rate in terms of TEUs per hour for each Australian port between 1989 and 2020. There is a break in the series between 1992 and 1993. The net crane rates for all ports grew steadily between 1989 and 1998. There was a large increase in the crane rates between 1999 and 2000 due to the 1998 Waterfront reforms. Between 2001 and 2020 the crane rates continued but at a slower rate. 

1. Net ship rates

Figure B.4b – This is a line chart that shows the average quarterly net crane ship rate in terms of TEUs per hour for each Australian port between 1989 and 2020. The net ship rates at each port have grown steadily over the period. 

**a.** Data for both crane and ship rates were not published between 1992Q4 and 1993Q2.

Source: BITRE *Waterline* (various editions).

Figure B.5 – Long‑term productivity has risen in *all* Australian portsa

Containers per hour, **1995Q4**–**2020Q4**

1. Net crane rates

Figure B.5a – This is a line chart that shows the average quarterly net crane rate in terms of containers per hour for each Australian port between 1995 and 2020. There was a large increase in the crane rates between 1999 and 2000 due to the 1998 Waterfront reforms. Between 2001 and 2020 the crane rates have stabilised. 

1. Net ship rates

Figure B.5b – This is a line chart that shows the average quarterly net ship rate in terms of containers per hour for each Australian port between 1995 and 2020. There was a large increase in the ship rates between 1999 and 2000 due to the 1998 Waterfront reforms. Between 2001 and 2020 the ship rates have stabilised.

**a.** Data for both crane and ship rates were not published between 1992Q4 and 1993Q2.

Source: BITRE *Waterline* (various editions).

#### Landside operations

Figure B.6 – Truck turnaround times, 2011–2021

Figure B.6 - This is a line chart that shows the average truck turnaround time for each Australian port between 2011 and 2021. Fremantle has consistently had the fastest times, Brisbane appears to have the longest times. The Australian average has remained consistent at around 30 minutes.

Source: BITRE *Waterline* (various editions).

Figure B.7 – Truck utilisation rates, 2011–2021

Figure B.7 - This is a line chart that shows the average truck utilisation rate for each Australian port between 2011 and 2021. Fremantle improved utilisation rates from about 1 to 2 between 2011 and 2013. Other ports have seen no real change in their utilisation rates. 

Source: BITRE *Waterline* (various editions).

Figure B.8 – Proportion of trucks backloaded, 2014–2020

Figure B.8 -  This is a line chart that shows the proportion of trucks that are backloaded for each Australian port between 2011 and 2021. The proportion of backloaded trucks has remained consistent over the period. Adelaide has consistently had higher backloading rates than other ports. 

Source: BITRE *Waterline* (various editions).

### DEA modelling: additional results

Table B.1 – Technical efficiency scores for all portsa,b

| Port | CRS model | VRS model |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Aarhus | 0.50 | 1.00 |
| Abidjan | 0.51 | 1.00 |
| Adelaide | 0.62 | 1.00 |
| Aguadulce (Colombia) | 0.71 | 1.00 |
| Algiers | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Aqaba | 0.62 | 1.00 |
| Ashdod | 0.41 | 0.67 |
| Auckland | 0.66 | 0.90 |
| Baltimore (Usa) | 0.37 | 0.66 |
| Bangkok | 0.37 | 1.00 |
| Barcelona | 0.95 | 0.96 |
| Batangas | 0.94 | 1.00 |
| Beira | 0.31 | 1.00 |
| Beirut | 0.51 | 1.00 |
| Bejaia | 0.39 | 1.00 |
| Belawan | 0.32 | 1.00 |
| Bilbao | 0.26 | 0.35 |
| Boston (Usa) | 0.31 | 1.00 |
| Brisbane | 0.53 | 0.71 |
| Buenaventura | 0.37 | 0.68 |
| Cai Mep | 0.78 | 0.87 |
| Callao | 0.90 | 0.92 |
| Cape Town | 0.62 | 1.00 |
| Cat Lai | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Charleston | 0.57 | 0.75 |
| Chattogram | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Chiwan | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Colon | 0.92 | 0.93 |
| Da Chan Bay Terminal One | 0.62 | 1.00 |
| Dakar | 0.34 | 1.00 |
| Damietta | 0.51 | 1.00 |
| Dammam | 0.49 | 0.69 |
| Dar Es Salaam | 0.38 | 1.00 |
| Davao | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Djibouti | 0.36 | 0.53 |
| Douala | 0.51 | 1.00 |
| Dublin | 0.50 | 0.96 |
| Dunkirk | 0.44 | 1.00 |
| Durban | 0.75 | 0.81 |
| El Dekheila | 0.43 | 0.59 |
| Felixstowe | 0.88 | 0.88 |
| Fremantle | 0.56 | 0.73 |
| Fuzhou | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Gdansk | 0.93 | 1.00 |
| Gdynia | 0.48 | 0.73 |
| Genoa | 0.62 | 0.75 |
| Gothenburg | 0.37 | 1.00 |
| Guayaquil | 0.38 | 0.93 |
| Halifax | 0.25 | 0.55 |
| Hamad Port | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Houston | 0.74 | 0.79 |
| Incheon | 0.80 | 0.80 |
| Iquique | 0.34 | 1.00 |
| Itajai | 0.99 | 1.00 |
| Itapoa | 0.41 | 1.00 |
| Jacksonville | 0.37 | 0.77 |
| Jawaharlal Nehru Port | 0.92 | 0.92 |
| Johor | 0.83 | 1.00 |
| Karachi | 0.50 | 0.63 |
| Keelung | 0.31 | 0.69 |
| Khalifa Port | 0.47 | 0.65 |
| King Abdullah Port | 0.62 | 0.70 |
| Klaipeda | 0.49 | 0.72 |
| Kobe | 0.45 | 0.71 |
| Koper | 0.75 | 1.00 |
| Kotka | 0.46 | 1.00 |
| La Spezia | 0.47 | 0.70 |
| Lagos (Nigeria) | 0.60 | 1.00 |
| Lazaro Cardenas | 0.43 | 0.66 |
| Le Havre | 0.47 | 0.49 |
| Leixoes | 0.62 | 0.85 |
| Lianyungang | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Limassol | 0.30 | 1.00 |
| Lirquen | 0.59 | 1.00 |
| Livorno | 0.40 | 0.81 |
| Lome | 0.69 | 0.75 |
| London | 0.71 | 0.82 |
| Lyttelton | 0.49 | 1.00 |
| Manila | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Mariel | 0.39 | 1.00 |
| Marseille | 0.44 | 0.50 |
| Mawan | 0.69 | 1.00 |
| Melbourne | 0.87 | 0.90 |
| Mersin | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Miami | 0.47 | 0.70 |
| Mobile | 0.28 | 0.70 |
| Moji | 0.34 | 0.86 |
| Mombasa | 0.60 | 0.78 |
| Montreal | 0.59 | 0.96 |
| Muhammad Bin Qasim | 0.63 | 0.82 |
| Mundra | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Nagoya | 0.70 | 0.82 |
| Naha | 0.79 | 1.00 |
| Napier | 0.86 | 1.00 |
| Naples | 0.75 | 0.80 |
| Nemrut Bay | 0.29 | 0.64 |
| New Orleans | 0.61 | 1.00 |
| Novorossiysk | 0.40 | 0.57 |
| Oakland | 0.46 | 0.69 |
| Odessa | 0.27 | 0.73 |
| Osaka | 0.59 | 0.79 |
| Owendo | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Papeete | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Paranagua | 0.74 | 1.00 |
| Penang | 0.72 | 1.00 |
| Philadelphia | 0.18 | 0.79 |
| Pipavav | 0.87 | 1.00 |
| Port Everglades | 0.82 | 1.00 |
| Port Louis | 0.32 | 1.00 |
| Port Of Virginia | 0.60 | 0.71 |
| Port Reunion | 0.30 | 1.00 |
| Posorja | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Prince Rupert | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Puerto Cortes | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Qinzhou | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Riga | 0.42 | 0.75 |
| Rio De Janeiro | 0.31 | 1.00 |
| Rio Grande (Brazil) | 0.68 | 1.00 |
| Rio Haina | 0.63 | 1.00 |
| Salerno | 0.34 | 1.00 |
| Salvador | 0.42 | 1.00 |
| San Antonio | 0.72 | 0.81 |
| San Juan | 0.55 | 0.82 |
| San Vicente | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Santo Tomas De Castilla | 0.67 | 1.00 |
| Santos | 0.72 | 0.78 |
| Savannah | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Seattle | 0.28 | 0.60 |
| Sepetiba | 0.25 | 1.00 |
| Shantou | 0.44 | 0.68 |
| Shekou | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Shimizu | 0.31 | 0.66 |
| Shuaiba | 0.17 | 1.00 |
| Shuwaikh | 0.52 | 0.96 |
| Sines | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Sohar | 0.36 | 0.52 |
| Southampton | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Suape | 0.41 | 1.00 |
| Sydney | 0.69 | 0.75 |
| Tacoma | 0.35 | 0.68 |
| Taichung | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Taipei, Taiwan, China | 0.80 | 1.00 |
| Tanjung Perak | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Tauranga | 0.89 | 1.00 |
| Teesport | 0.46 | 0.64 |
| Tema | 0.42 | 0.54 |
| Tin Can Island | 0.37 | 0.72 |
| Tokyo | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Tomakomai | 0.48 | 1.00 |
| Trieste | 0.49 | 1.00 |
| Tuticorin | 0.76 | 0.91 |
| Ulsan | 0.60 | 1.00 |
| Umm Qasr | 0.49 | 0.86 |
| Valencia | 0.96 | 1.00 |
| Vancouver (Canada) | 0.89 | 0.93 |
| Venice | 0.58 | 1.00 |
| Veracruz | 0.56 | 0.90 |
| Vladivostok | 0.42 | 0.74 |
| Vostochny | 0.41 | 1.00 |
| Wilhelmshaven | 0.33 | 1.00 |
| Yarimca | 0.65 | 0.67 |
| Yeosu | 0.52 | 1.00 |
| Yokohama | 0.47 | 0.65 |
| Zeebrugge | 0.47 | 0.65 |

**a.** A variable returns to scale model was used to account for differences in throughput levels and economies of scale. **b.** Interpret results for specific ports with caution as explained in section 7.

Source: Commission estimates using IHS Markit’s Port Characteristics data.

# Review of international container port productivity literature

This annex reviews the literature regarding the productivity and benchmarking of container ports.

Three approaches to benchmarking port performance are typically used:

* comparisons of performance metrics across ports
* creation of indexes based on port performance measures, characteristics or expert knowledge
* estimation production possibility frontiers (common in the academic literature[[28]](#footnote-29)).

Each of these approaches are discussed below with a focus on Australian studies and results. Where relevant, the two main challenges associated with benchmarking are also discussed, these are:

* making like‑for‑like comparisons
* obtaining international data (particularly data that is comparable).

### Comparisons of performance metrics

Benchmarking port performance by comparing productivity measures is typically conducted by government bodies and international organisations. This approach involves the comparison of a performance measure, such as gross crane rates, for a selection of ports in order to assess which port is most efficient, and where productivity gains can be achieved.

The Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics (BITRE) and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) have monitored and benchmarked the performance of Australian container ports for numerous years (BITRE since 1994 and the ACCC since 1998‑99).

As discussed in annex A, BITRE publishes *Waterline* (2021), which provides the latest available data on container terminal productivity for the five major Australian container ports. Throughput indicators, landside and quayside productivity indicators, and port interface costs are published. *Waterline* allows for productivity to be benchmarked domestically and over time.

BITRE conducted their own benchmarking study in 2009. Australia’s five main container ports were compared with 29 overseas ports, most of which were selected because they are located in countries that are ‘end of shipping line’ trading countries. A number of measures were compared. The study found:

* net crane rates at Australian ports were below the median for overseas ports
* four Australian ports had vessel turnaround times that were longer than the median for overseas ports
* the duration of export and import procedures is faster in Australia than the median (as estimated by the World Bank) (BITRE 2009, p. 19).

The ACCC monitors and make an assessment of the productivity of Australian container ports. The ACCC (2021) recently compared net crane rates, elapsed labour rates and net ship rates of Australian container ports to those of New Zealand ports.[[29]](#footnote-30) Tauranga and Auckland outperformed Australian ports on these measures. Data from UNCTAD were also used to benchmark median in‑port time across countries. Median time in port for container ships visiting Australia was 1.4 days in 2020 — ‘more than four times as long as Japan, more than double compared to China and 67 per cent greater than time that ships spent in Singapore or New Zealand’ (p. 62). They cited industrial port action combined with port congestion and delays stemming from the COVID‑19 pandemic as the reasons behind an increase of time in port from 1.2 to 1.4 days between 2019 and 2020 (p. 62). Overall, the ACCC conclude that ‘although there has been productivity improvement at Australian ports … [they] are lagging behind [their] international counterparts’ (p. 64).

The Commission has previously published two benchmarking studies of container ports, although these are now quite dated. The earlier study (1998) was broadest in scope, benchmarking different types of ports and operations within ports, while the follow‑up study (2003) was focused on container stevedoring productivity.[[30]](#footnote-31) Both relied on consultants to collect data and sampled overseas ports that had direct liner services to Australia, such as Singapore, Los Angeles, Hamburg and Auckland. Yet, most of these ports had a larger throughput than all the Australian ports combined making comparisons less informative (PC 1998, p. 16). Both reports compared static measures of performance, such as net and gross crane rates, lifts per employee and gross ship rates. Australian container stevedoring productivity was lower than the international ports included in the analysis, but productivity had improved between 1997 and 2002, such that there was an ‘appreciable reduction in the overall productivity gap between Australian terminals and those at the overseas ports’ (PC 2003, p. VII).

Turning to studies by international organisations, there are two notable organisations that have published reports on port performance — JOC Group and The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

The JOC Group launched the Port Productivity Project, a precursor of the CPPI (JOC Group was acquired by IHS Global in 2014), which collected productivity information from 17 shipping lines representing over 70 per cent of global capacity (JOC Group 2013, p. 3). Gross berth productivity (that is, the number of container moves divided by hours at berth) was analysed for a global sample of ports (JOC Group 2013, 2014), stratified by the type of port (such as transhipment), ship size, location (continent) and by terminal (where possible). In 2013, the most productive ports were located in China (including Qingdao, Ningbo and Tianjin), the United Arab Emirates (Jebel Ali and Khor al Fakkan) and Japan (Yokohama). These ports moved between 106 and 130 containers per berth hour (JOC Group 2014, p. 17). The most efficient terminal was APM Terminals Yokohama which moved 163 containers per berth hour (JOC Group 2014, p. 19). Australian results were not reported.

The UNCTAD publishes an annual review of maritime transport, which includes a series of time‑based performance measures at the country level. Using data from MarineTraffic, the study found that among the top 25 countries in terms of container port calls, only Australia, Indonesia, Vietnam and the United States recorded median port times (time spent within port limits) of more than one day (2020, p. 71). The report also used data from IHS Markit to analyse ship turnaround times (the time from when a ship reaches port limits (anchorage) to when it departs the berth). Australia took 34.6 hours on average to turn a ship around — half the time of the worst performing ports, but double the time of the best (2020, p. 85).

### Performance indexes

A number of indexes benchmark logistic systems internationally. Few focus on ports specifically, and fewer focus on efficiency. The Container Port Performance Index (CPPI) is most closely tied to efficiency, while others, such as the Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI) and Logistics Performance Indicators (LSI), are further removed. Each are discussed briefly below.

#### Container Port Performance Index (CPPI)

As discussed in the paper, in 2021, the World Bank (together with IHS Markit) released the inaugural CPPI, which benchmarked the efficiency of 351 international container ports. The index was created to compare operational performance across ports. It used time in port as a measure of performance and used two methods (a statistical and administrative approach) to derive two indices. The work attempts to compare similar ports by taking into account call and vessel size (see annex D for a comprehensive review).

The data come from IHS Markit’s Port Performance Program — a new collection and the most comprehensive port performance data available. Ten of the world’s largest shipping carriers (accounting for 76 per cent of global fleet capacity) participate in the program and provide data on a number of performance measures such as gross crane rates, berth hours, anchorage times, call and vessel size. The data cover more than 1000 terminals in over 500 container ports (The World Bank 2021, p. 41).

The top ranked container ports in the CPPI were Yokohama (Japan) and King Abdullah (Saudi Arabia). Australian ports were relatively inefficient and ranked below international best practice. The main Australian container ports, except for Brisbane, were found to be in the bottom 25 per cent of ports in the study. Brisbane was found to be in the bottom 50 per cent.

#### Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI)

The UNCTAD (2021c, p. 93) provides an indicator of a port’s position within the liner shipping network (that is, the level of maritime connectivity for container shipping) using the Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI). The index was first created in 2004 at a country level, and in 2018 changed to port level, drawing on data from a number of sources (such as MDS Transmodal and Containerisation International Online). The World Bank (2021, p. 30) noted that ‘while a port’s position is in part determined by the port’s performance, the LSCI does not directly measure it’, but it is ‘highly correlated with performance and low trade costs’ (p. 36).

The index is generated from data on container ship deployment and has six components: the number of companies (shipping lines) that provide services; the number of scheduled services; the number of ships that call per month; the total annualised deployed container carrying capacity; ship sizes; and the number of countries that can be reached without the need for transhipment.

At a country and port level, the performance of Australia has improved since 2006, but still lags behind international ports (UNCTAD 2021a, 2021b). Melbourne is the top ranked Australian port, followed by Sydney, Brisbane, Fremantle and Adelaide. This is perhaps unsurprising given that Melbourne is the largest port and therefore likely the most connected. Also, there is a high correlation between port throughput (TEUs) and LSCI scores (UNCTAD 2020, p. 81). The export‑oriented economies and ports of China, Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore dominate the rankings.

#### Logistics Performance Indicators (LPI)

The Logistics Performance Indicators (LPI) are produced by the World Bank. The LPI is the weighted average of a country’s performance scores on six key dimensions of logistics systems. The data come from a survey of logistics professionals at multinational freight forwarders and the main express carriers, for example, the 2018 LPI was based in a survey of 869 respondents at international logistics companies in 108 countries (Arvis et al. 2018, p. 63).

In the 2018 LPI, Australia ranked 18th of 160 countries, moving up one position since 2016 (Arvis et al. 2018, p. 45). Australia is performing at 90 per cent of the top performer, indicating that there are efficiency gains to be made, especially in the area of international shipping (Arvis et al. 2018, p. x). The six dimensions are (including Australia’s ranking in 2018):

* customs: efficiency of the customs clearance process (that is, speed, simplicity and predictability of formalities) by border control agencies, including customs (Australia ranked 7th)
* infrastructure: quality of trade and transport related infrastructure (such as, ports, railroads, roads, information technology) (16th)
* international shipments: ease of arranging competitively priced shipments (40th)
* services quality: competence and quality of logistics services (such as, transport operators, customs brokers) (21st)
* tracking and tracing: ability to track and trace consignments (20th)
* timeliness: shipments in reaching destination within the scheduled or expected delivery time (21st).

### Estimating production possibility frontiers

The academic literature analyses the technical efficiency (the effectiveness of converting inputs to outputs) of ports by estimating production possibility frontiers. The estimated frontier, which is identified by the best performing ports, represents the efficient standard against which other ports can be compared. These models have also been used in other sectors including education, health care, airports, electricity and other transport systems.

Two main methods are used for frontier analysis: data envelopment analysis (DEA, non‑parametric model) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA, parametric model). These models require data on the inputs (land, labour and capital) and outputs of container ports. DEA is a deterministic means of constructing a frontier such that the distribution of sample points is observed and a ‘kinked’ line is constructed around the outside, ‘enveloping’ the points to draw the frontier. SFA is a regression technique which tries to take account of outliers which either are atypical or appear to be exceptional performers as a result of data measurement errors. There is no consensus on which method is best; both have advantages and disadvantages but there is evidence to suggest the two approaches produce similar results and conclusions (Wang and Cullinane 2015, p. 256).

There are numerous applications of both methods to container ports, but DEA tends to be more commonly used. Table B.1 summarises over 50 studies of container port efficiency, including the number of ports studied, the method and the input variables and output variables used in the model.

A number of observations are made from the Commission’s review, in combination with a number of other recent literature reviews (Gil-Ropero, Cerban and Turias 2015; Kutin, Nguyen and Vallée 2017; Mustafa, Khan and Mustafa 2021; Odeck and Bråthen 2012; Odeck and Schøyen 2020).

* Most studies used DEA (likely because SFA requires larger samples and assumptions on the functional form adopted).
* For a small sample with homogenous ports, DEA‑CCR (constant returns to scale) is used, but for a larger sample with heterogenous ports, both DEA‑CCR and DEA‑BCC (variable returns to scale) is used (Kutin, Nguyen and Vallée 2017, p. 68).
* Data are usually collected manually (for example, from port authorities, terminal operators, industry reports, or the Containerization International Yearbooks).
* Samples are usually concentrated in a specific country or geographic region, with few studies of ports globally. This could be due to data availability or an attempt to benchmark comparable ports.
* Sample sizes usually range from 5 to 70 ports, few have larger samples.
* The output variable most commonly used is annual container throughput (TEUs). Less commonly used output variables include ship calls or ship rates.
* The inputs most commonly used are terminal area, quay length, number of container berths, and number of quay cranes.
  + Few studies account for labour inputs because obtaining the requisite data is difficult (sometimes because it is commercially confidential). Some studies use poor proxies such as the number of port authority employees.
* Few studies try to identify the determinants of port efficiency.

#### Australian container port findings

A handful of papers include Australian ports in a frontier analysis. All followed a DEA approach.

* Tongzon (2001) applied a DEA (constant returns to scale and additive) to analyse a sample of four Australian (excl. Adelaide) and 12 international container ports using data for 1996. The study found that Melbourne, Rotterdam, Yokohama and Osaka were inefficient, mainly due to the enormous slack (excess capacity) in their container berths, terminal area and labour inputs.
* Bray et al. (2014) applied a fuzzy DEA (that is, a variant on the standard DEA model) to analyse a sample of four Australian and 12 international container ports using data from 1996. The study found that Melbourne, Sydney, Hamburg and Rotterdam were inefficient.
* Hui et al. (2019) applied a DEA (constant and variable returns to scale) to analyse a sample of Australian, Indonesian and Chinese container ports for data for 2015. The study found that Melbourne, Sydney and Fremantle were all technically efficient, as was the port of Shanghai. The Indonesian ports were not.

These studies relied on small sample sizes which can bias DEA results towards identifying more ports as efficient when they actually are not. Further, ports that are of a different type (hub or feeder ports) and that are much larger than the Australian ports are included — such as, Shanghai, Singapore and Rotterdam — which may limit comparability to Australian ports.

Two studies overcome the small sample bias. One also accounts for differences in port size.

* Merk and Dang (2012, p. 35) applied a DEA (constant, variable and non‑increasing returns to scale) to analyse a sample of 126 container ports using data for 2011. Three Australian ports were included — Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane — none of which were found to be technically efficient. But Brisbane performed the best with a ranking of 35 (and DEA‑BCC score of 0.6), Melbourne was ranked 87 (0.16), and Sydney was ranked 121 (0.01).
  + This study also applied DEA to other types of ports, including oil terminals, bulk coal, bulk iron ore and grain terminals. Australian ports were among the most efficient in handling bulk coal (Hay Point, Newcastle and Gladstone) and bulk iron ore (Port Walcott and Gladstone).
* Ghiara and Tei (2021) applied a DEA (constant and variable returns to scale) to analyse a sample of 213 container ports, including seven Australian ports (the main five and two Tasmanian ports), using data from 2017. The authors stratified their DEA by the size of the port’s throughput (small, medium and large) recognising that economies of scale are likely present and that stratification enables fairer comparisons to be made. They found the Tasmanian ports of Burnie and Devonport were among the most efficient performers for their small size. The other Australian ports considered were in the 2nd quartile for their respective sizes.

In contrast to the World Bank’s CPPI rankings, these studies show that Australian container ports are not among the most inefficient ports internationally. Yet, most studies find Brisbane to be relatively more efficient than the other Australian ports. It is also worth noting that:

* the method and therefore underlying measures of efficiency differ between the typical DEA study and the World Bank’s CPPI methodology. The typical DEA focuses on how well inputs are converted into port throughput, while the CPPI focuses on the time it takes to turn over a ship (a measure of port call hours)
* trying to compare like‑for‑like ports is handled differently. The CPPI analyses performance within call and ship size range, while some DEA studies stratify results by port size.

Overall, these studies indicate that there is scope for efficiency improvements in Australian ports.

**Table C.1** – **Literature review of DEA and SFA studies of container ports**

| **Author (Year)** | **Region and sample** | **Year(s) studied** | **Model** | **Inputs** | **Outputs** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Almawsheki and Shah (2015)** | 19 ports, Middle East | 2012 | DEA‑CRR | Berth area; quay length; quay crane; handling equipment | Container throughput |
| **Barros (2005)** | 10 ports, Portugal | 1990‑2000 | SFA | Operational costs; total salary / number of employees; earnings / book value of premises; number of ships | Total cargo |
| **Bergantino, Musso, and Porcelli (2013)** | 30 ports, Europe | 1995‑2009 | Three stage DEA‑BCC; SFA | Berth length; No. of terminals; port area; handling equipment | Container throughput |
| **Bichou (2012)** | 420 container terminals | 2004‑2010 | DEA‑CCR; DEA‑BCC; Panel data | Terminal area; Max draft; Quay length Quay crane Index; Yard‑stacking index Gates | Container throughput |
| **Bray et al. (2014)** | 16 ports (4 Australian) | 1996 | Fuzzy DEA | Number of cranes; Container berths; Number of tugs; Terminal area; Delay time; Number of port authority employees | Container throughput; Shiprate; Shipcalls; Crane; productivity |
| **Coto‑Millan, Banos‑Pino, Rodriguez‑Alvarez (2000)** | 27 ports, Spain | 1985‑1989 | SFA | Employee costs, depreciation and intermediate consumption | Throughput |
| **Cullinane and Song (2003)** | 5 ports, UK and Korea | 1996 | SFA | Remuneration of directors or executives; total wages; book value of fixed assets; book value of mobile assets | Container throughput |
| **Cullinane and Wang (2007)** | 57 container terminals | 2001 | DEA‑CCR; DEA‑BCC; | Terminal Area; Quay cranes; Yard cranes; Straddle Carriers | Container throughput |
| **Cullinane et al. (2002)** | 15 ports, Asia | 1989‑1999 | SFA | Quay length; terminal area; No. container handling equipment | Container throughput |
| **Cullinane, Song, Ji, and Wang (2004)** | 25 container terminals, global | 1992‑1999 | Window, CCR and BCC | Berth length; terminal area; no. of berth cranes; no. of yard cranes; no. straddle carriers | Container throughput |
| **Cullinane, Wang, Song, & Ji (2006)** | 30 container ports | 2001 | DEA‑CCR; DEA‑BCC | Terminal length; Terminal area; Quay cranes Yard gantry cranes; Straddle carriers | Container throughput |
| **Dan et al. (2013)** | 19 container ports, China | 2010 | Three stage (Input Oriented DEA‑BCC) | Berth length; Handling equipment & staff quantity | Container throughput |
| **Demirel et al. (2012)** | 16 container ports, Turkey, Greece, Egypt, Romania, Russia, Israel | 2006‑2008 | DEA‑CCR; DEA‑BCC | Quay length; Terminal area; Quay cranes; Yard equipment; Maximum draft | Container throughput |
| **Dong et al. (2019)** | 10 ports, Maritime Silk Road | 2017 | DEA‑CCR, DEA‑BCC | No of berths; berth length; no. of quay cranes | Container throughput |
| **Ghiara and Tei (2021)** | 213 ports in 30 countries (some Australian ports included) | 2017 | DEA‑CCR DEA‑BCC | Berth length; average depth; no. of berths | Container throughput |
| **Gil‑Ropero et al. (2013)** | 13 container ports, Spain | 2008‑2011 | DEA‑CCR, DEA‑BCC | Number of gantry cranes; Terminal area; Berth length | Container throughput |
| **Gil‑Ropero et al. (2019)** | 16 container ports, Spain and Portugal | 2008‑2014 | DEA‑CCR, DEA‑BCC, DEA bootstrapped | total quay length; the terminal area; the number of quayside cranes; the number of yard gantry cranes; the number of straddle carriers | Ship calls; Container throughput |
| **Hai‑bo and He‑zhong (2009)** | 13 ports, China | 2004‑2006 | SFA | Net permanent asset; Total employees | Main business revenue |
| **Hlali (2018)** | 26 ports, global | 2015 | DEA; SFA | Quay length; draught; terminal area; storage capacity | Container throughput |
| **Hui et al (2019)** | 3 Australian ports; 2 Indonesian ports; 1 Chinese port | 2015 | DEA‑CCR; DEA‑BCC | Land size; length of berths; no. of berths; no. of cranes; operating expenses; net assets; number of employees | Container throughput; bulk throughput; crane rate; ship rate |
| **Hung et al. (2010)** | 31 container ports, Asia‑Pacific | 2003 | DEA‑CCR; DEA‑BCC; DEA with bootstrap method | Terminal area; STS container gantry cranes (No); Berths (No); Total quay length | Container throughput |
| **Jiang and Li (2009)** | 12 container ports, Asia | 2007 | DEA‑CCR; DEA‑BCC. | Import/Export by customs; GDP by regions; Berth Length; Crane number | Container throughput |
| **Kamble et al. (2010)** | 12 ports, India | 2020 | Output oriented DEA‑BCC | Storage yards; No. of berths & cargo handling equipment | Avg. total turnaround time; Avg. output/ship berth day |
| **Konstantinidis and Pelagidis (2018)** | 6 ports, Africa | 2006‑2012 | DEA; SFA | Quay length; terminal area; no. quay cranes; no. gantry cranes; no. reach stackers | Container throughput |
| **Kutin et al. (2017)** | 50 ASEAN container ports and terminals | 2014 | DEA‑CCR; DEA‑BCC. | Max depth at berth; yard size; qual length; no. of cranes; no. of yard cranes; no. of fork lifts; no. of trucks | Container throughput |
| **Li et al. (2013)** | 42 ports, China | unknown | DEA; SFA | Terminal length Handling equipment (bridge, mobile and beam cranes) Number of employees | Container throughput |
| **Li, Kyu‑seok, Ki‑Chan, and Young‑Mo (2015)** | 16 ports, North East Asia | unknown | DEA‑CCR, DEA‑BCC | No. of berths; berth length; depth; no. of cranes; terminal area | Container throughput |
| **Lim, Bae and Lee (2011)** | 26 container terminals, Asia | 2004 | Additive non‑oriented DEA RAM | Quay length; Total area; Gantry Cranes | Container throughput |
| **Lozano, Villa and Canca (2011)** | 28 ports, Spain | 2006 | Centralised DEA using a non‑radial Russell measure of technical efficiency. | Land and stacking area; Total quay length Total number of cranes; Number of tugs | Total port traffic; Container Throughput; Ship calls |
| **Medda and Liu (2013)** | 165 world container terminals, global | 2006 | SFA | Berth depth; quay length; yard space; number of gantry cranes spacing; terminal type (container versus multipurpose); operation type (global versus local) | Container throughput |
| **Merk and Dang (2012)** | 126 ports (Brisbane, Melbourne, Sydney included), global | 2011 | DEA‑CCR, DEA‑BCC, bootstrapped, non‑increasing returns to scale | Quay length; terminal area; refeer points; no. of quay cranes; no. of yard cranes | Container throughput (both DWT and TEU) |
| **Merkel (2018)** | 77 ports, Europe | 2002‑2012 | SFA | Terminal area; berth length; No. quay cranes; No. reach stackers; draught | Container throughput |
| **Munim et al. (2021)** | 38 container terminals, 17 ports, Asia | 2009 | DEA‑CCR; DEA‑BCC; FDH | No. of berths; berth length; depth; terminal area; no. of yard cranes; no. of quay cranes | Container throughput |
| **Mustafa et al (2021)** | 30 ports, East and South Asia and the Middle East | 2018 | DEA‑CCR; DEA‑BCC | No. of cranes; berth length; no. of berths; draught | Container throughput |
| **Nguyen et al. (2016)** | 43 ports, Vietnam | 2013 | Bootstrap DEA; SFA | Berth length; Terminal areas; Warehouse capacity; Cargo handling equipment | Container throughput |
| **Odeck and Schøyen (2020)** | 24 ports, Nordic and UK | 2002–2014 | SFA | Berth length; terminal area; No. cargo handling machines | Container throughput |
| **Rajasekar and Deo (2018)** | 8 ports, India | 1993‑2011 | DEA Additive; DEA‑CCR; DEA‑BCC | No. of berths; berth length; no. of equipment; no. of employees | Total traffic; Container throughput |
| **Rios and Maçada (2006)** | 15 Brazilian; 6 Argentinean; 2 Uruguayan container terminals | 2002‑2004 | DEA‑BCC | No. of cranes; no. of berths; no. of employees; terminal area; amount of yard equipment | Container throughput; ship rate |
| **Serebrisky et al. (2016)** | 63 ports, Latin America and the Caribbean | 2009 | DEA‑CCR DEA‑BCC | Quay length; Terminal area; Mobile cranes with more than 14T. capacity; STS gantry cranes | Container throughput |
| **Seth and Feng (2020)** | 15 ports, United States | 2001‑2015 | DEA Window analysis | Cost of port security measures; Cost of container infrastructure; Dredging cost; Berth length; Number of cranes; Container terminal area | Net income; container throughput |
| **Sharma and Yu (2010)** | 70 container terminals, global | unknown | DT based context‑dependent DEA | Quay cranes; Transfer cranes; Straddle carriers; Reach stackers; Quay length Terminal area | Container throughput |
| **Suárez‑Alemán et al. (2016)** | 203 ports, in 70 developing countries | 2000‑2010 | SFA | Terminal area; No. of mobile cranes; No. of gantry cranes; Berth length; Exogenous variables | Container throughput |
| **Tongzon (2001)** | 4 Australian and 12 international ports | 1996 | DEA‑CCR; Additive DEA. | Number of cranes; Number of container berths Number of tugs; Terminal Area; Delay time; Labour (units) | Container throughput Number of ship calls |
| **Tongzon and Heng (2005)** | 25 ports | 1999 | SFA | Quay length; terminal area; no. quay cranes; port size; private participation | Container throughput |
| **Trujillo and Tovar (2007)** | 22 ports, Europe | 2002 | SFA | Average number of persons employed by the port authority; port land; containerization rate | Throughput |
| **Wang and Cullinane (2015)** | 104 ports, Europe | 2003 | DEA‑CCR, DEA‑BCC | Terminal length; terminal area; equipment cost | Container throughput |
| **Wanke (2013)** | 27 ports, Brazil | 2011 | Network‑DEA centralized efficiency | Number of berths; Warehousing area Yard area; Container frequency (shipments) | Container throughput |
| **Wilmsmeier et al. (2013)** | 40 ports, Central and South America | 2005‑2011 | Malmquist index | Terminal area; Quay crane capacity equivalent; Number of employees | Container throughput |
| **Wilmsmeier, Tovar, and Sanchez (2013)** | 10 ports, Latin America, Caribbean and Spain | 2005‑2011 | DEA | Berth area, quay crane; labour capacity | Container throughput |
| **Wu and Goh (2010)** | 21 ports, global | 2005 | DEA‑CCR; DEA‑BCC; DEA Windows Analysis | Terminal area; Total quay length; No. of pieces of equipment | Container throughput |
| **Zarbi, Shin, and Shin (2019)** | 5 ports, Iran | 2008‑2017 | DEA Windows | Quay wall length; no. of berths; no. of gantry cranes; yard space | Container throughput |
| **Zheng and Park (2016)** | 20 ports, Korea and China | 2014 | DEA‑CCR, DEA‑BCC | Berth length; Yard area; No. of quay cranes; No. of yard cranes | Container throughput |

Notes: DEA‑CCR = constant returns to scale; DEA‑BCC = variable returns to scale.

# The World Bank’s Container Port Performance Index

This annex summarises the World Bank and IHS Markit’s (2021) *The Container Port Performance Index 2020: A comparable assessment of container port performance* study, covering:

* the motivation for the study
* the data and analysis sample
* how port productivity is conceptualised, and the two types of methodologies used
* the CPPI results, with a focus on Australia’s performance.

Throughout the annex, caveats on the study are mentioned as well as instances where the World Bank intend to make improvements upon the 2020 methodology in future iterations of the CPPI . While there is a focus on the caveats and areas for improvement, the Commission notes that the CPPI is an admirable attempt at aggregating a wealth of data into an index that has encouraged conversations about the efficiency of container ports, which are critical the global economy.

## Motivation for the CPPI

Efficient container ports matter because:

… over the medium to longer term, an inefficient port will result in slower economic growth, lower employment, and higher costs for importers and exporters. (The World Bank 2021, p. 8)

Data in the area of container port efficiency has been lacking:

… the quality, consistency, and availability of data, the definitions employed, and the capacity and willingness of the organizations to collect and transmit data to a collating body, have all precluded the development of a comparable measure (or measures) to assess performance across ports, and time. (The World Bank 2021, p. 8)

The 2020 index is the first time a *global* benchmarking exercise has been undertaken for container ports:

… CPPI is intended to identify gaps and opportunities for improvement and hopefully stimulate a dialogue among key stakeholders and move this essential agenda forward. (The World Bank 2021, p. 9)

## Data: IHS Markit’s Port Performance Program

The data used to compile the CPPI 2020 are gathered from the IHS Markit’s Port Performance Program (see annex A for more details).

### Sample

This first iteration of CPPI utilised data for July 2019 to June 2020 and included ports that had a minimum of 10 valid port calls (and hours data) within the two six‑month periods covered. A total of 351 ports out of 502 ports in the IHS Markit database are included in the 2020 CPPI (covering 765 terminals and 2877 vessels). This covered 67 798 distinct port calls, representing more than 50 per cent of the world’s total container ship port calls. Future iterations of the CPPI will look to:

* include data for additional, often smaller, ports that have significant issues with automatic identification systems (AIS, maritime communications device aiding in navigation) coverage (The World Bank 2021, p. 51)
* offer some comparative analysis on year‑to‑year changes (The World Bank 2021, p. 69).

### Caveats

* A matching process is undertaken to verify the call data provided by shipping lines with the data collected from AIS systems. This process successfully verifies around 90 per cent of port calls. This means that data for 10 per cent of port calls failed validation. The main reason that some ports were excluded is because they used satellite AIS systems, which are less reliable than comparable land‑based systems, meaning that port calls could not be verified.
* Some ports did not meet the inclusion criteria for the construction of the CPPI (that is, they had a lack of port call data: fewer than 10 valid port calls in previous six months with data on port hours), these were typically smaller ports.
* Overall, 151 ports were excluded from the CPPI. As a result, the performance results are skewed towards larger ports and towards the performance of large container ships because the data was collected from larger container ship operators. To overcome this limitation, data for many sister or subsidiary companies that specialize in intraregional or feeder operations for program participants were also included.

## Methodology

### Conceptualising port performance

Many factors affect the efficiency of a port:

… the efficiency of the port itself, the availability of sufficient draught, quay, and dock facilities, the quality of the connections to road and rail services, the competitiveness of those services, and the efficacy of the procedures employed by the public agencies involved in container clearance. (The World Bank 2021, p. 28)

The focus of the CPPI ‘is **purely on quayside performance** (including marine operations) to be reflective of the experience of a ship operator, the port’s main customer’ (The World Bank 2021, p. 31).

Shipping line (container) services are generally highly structured, service rotations. These services are typically set up with weekly departure frequencies, a fixed sequence of port calls, and standard day and time‑specific berthing windows. This structure should result in high levels of reliability and predictability and enable shippers to make long‑term supply decisions and enable ports/terminals to schedule and balance their resources to meet expected demand.[[31]](#footnote-32)

Shorter port times can allow ship operators to reduce vessel speed between port calls, thereby conserving fuel, reducing emissions, and lowering costs in the process (The World Bank 2021, p. 44).

Conversely, any increase in time in port or anchorage can lead to delays to shipments and disruption to supply chains, higher sailing speeds, increased fuel consumption, emissions and costs, or the omission of a port or ports from a standard rotation. Time delays may result in higher costs (for shippers, shipping liners, container terminal operators and other participants in maritime supply chains).

Recognising the importance of **time** for stakeholders, the CPPI measured port performance based upon the total amount of time that ships spend in port (The World Bank 2021, p. 44).

The key performance variable in the CPPI is **total port hours per ship call**, defined as the elapsed time between when a ship reaches a port (either port limits, pilot station or anchorage zone) and its departure from the berth having completed its cargo exchange. This time consists of two components:

* the time between when a ship reaches a port and when the ship is securely berthed (referred to as ‘all lines fast’)
* the on‑berth time.

Time taken to leave the port is excluded, because departure delays (such as pilot or tug availability, readiness of the mooring gang, channel access and water depths, and ship readiness) will be incurred while the ship is still berthed.

#### Caveats

* After cargo operations, ships may not leave the berth immediately. The study claimed most of these delays are generally not inefficiencies at the port, with the obvious exception of waiting for clearance to be authorised. Instead, ships may not be operationally ready, need repairs or fuelling. The nature of the timing data makes it impossible to isolate these different effects. Instead, the study ‘presumes the percentage of ships idling alongside after completion of cargo operations for reasons unrelated to port performance is modest, and thus continued inclusion will have no significant effect on the CPPI results’ (The World Bank 2021, p. 46).
* In consultations, DP World commented that the World Bank study only focuses on one key measure of performance (that is, it does not consider the time taken to move a container out of the terminal and to its destination, which is typically longer than port operations and critical for the supply chain). DP World claimed that Australia would rank higher if this was considered, since a container sits on dock for 2.5 days, a lower time than many other ports. The World Bank do not have data that enables them to take a more holistic approach.
* Smaller ships (<1500 TEUs) tend to wait longer to berth, so ports with more smaller ships may look relatively more inefficient (unless the method accounts for this). The study claimed that these types of calls accounted for less than 10 per cent of all ship calls and this issues therefore has a minimum impact on the CPPI (The World Bank 2021, p. 48).

### Method

#### Key data observations that shape the analysis

* Port time is dominated by container handling operations (averaging 75 per cent of total port time) (The World Bank 2021, p. 52). The ratio of time spent on handling operations generally increases with ship size and call size (the number of containers that need to be moved). This is partially offset by larger ships spending less time waiting in port, as they ‘potentially enjoy a slightly higher priority and assignment of resources’ (p. 52).
* There is a high correlation (60 per cent) between call size and crane intensity, meaning that more cranes are typically deployed to handle larger call sizes (The World Bank 2021, p. 53).
* Average call size increases as ship size increases, but not proportionately with ship size (The World Bank 2021, p. 54).
* Average global gross crane rates differ by ship size. Ships under 5000 TEUs generally have lower gross crane rates, ranging from 22‑23 moves per hour compared to ships larger than 5000 TEUs, which have crane rate of around 25 moves per hour (The World Bank 2021, p. 55).
* Crane intensity (that is, the average number of cranes deployed to a ship’s berth call) differs by call size, and therefore has a major impact on handling time and, by extension, total port time (The World Bank 2021, p. 56).

These observations suggested that the CPPI (especially the operating hours productivity component) should take into account both ship size and call size. Ports that deploy more cranes would appear relatively more efficient and, therefore, rank higher than ports that handled smaller loads and could deploy fewer cranes, if ship and call size were not accounted for.

Ship and call sizes used by the World Bank are presented in figure D.1.

* Call size groups need to be such that they neutralise the impact of call size and crane intensity on productivity, but do not to spread the data too thinly (too few observations in each category cell). The CPPI evaluated 10 call size groups.
* Ship size groups (although less important once call size is taken into account) are included because larger ships use more fuel and thus present an opportunity to save fuel and reduce emissions. Ship size could also be important for routes serviced by a large vessel stopping at multiple ports because the call size could be very different from the ship size (this could be the case for Australian ports). The CPPI evaluated 5 ship size groups ranging from feeders, intraregional, intermediate, Neo‑Panamax and ultra‑large container carriers.

Figure D.1 – Structure of the CPPI

Call size and ship size categories selected

Figure D.1 – This chart shows the structure of the CPPI, including the call size groupings and ship size groupings.

The CPPI considers 50 (5 by 10) potential ship and call size categories. Some of these categories are omitted because of insufficient data (for example, it is impossible for a ship with a capacity of 1500 TEUs has a call size greater than 4000 moves). Seven ship‑call size categories are removed, which results in 43 ship‑call size categories in the analysis.

#### Constructing the analysis data

Data for each ship size group were extracted from the full port call dataset, and aggregated to calculate average port hours within each call size group for each port. There is an inherent limitation in this approach in that, while there is ample data for each category for larger ports (the top 100), this is not always the case for smaller ports, particularly those with a few hundred port calls. The study stated:

If these unpopulated categories are ignored, the performance appraisal would be undertaken on different quantities of categories, which is likely to unduly disadvantage smaller ports that might well be quite efficient despite their modest size and throughput. (The World Bank 2021, p. 60)

As a result, two **imputation** methods were used to impute missing data (one for each of the two methods used in deriving the index).

* The **administrative** approach uses an imputation method that examines whether a port performed better or worse than the average port for a call size category, and then assumes that the port would have also performed better or worse in the adjacent missing call size category and then imputes a value.
  + The risk is that this approach assumes that poor/good performance within one call size range (for a given ship size), cascades across other call sizes. It also assumes a port can add cranes to larger call size groups, which may not be the case.
* The **statistical** approach uses an expectation–maximization (EM) algorithm to provide a maximum likelihood estimator for each missing value. This relies on two assumptions:
  + missing values are random, that is, not due to some bias in the sample selection process
  + all variables under consideration are normally distributed.

The study claimed that these are both realistic assumptions. (In addition, to run the factor analysis used in this approach (explained below), complete data is needed for each of the 43 distinct ship‑call categories, meaning missing data had to be imputed. Without imputation many ports would be dropped from the sample.)

Importantly, data is not imputed in all cases. Not all ports are included within each ship size category. For example, if it is impossible for a small port to accommodate a large ship (or has very few calls from large or small ships) then that port is excluded from the ship size category (table D.1). In the Australian context:

* all ports are *excluded* from the largest ship category (more than 13 500 TEUs)
* Melbourne, Adelaide and Fremantle are *excluded* from the smallest ship category (less than 1500 TEUs).

Table D.1 – Quantity of ports includes per ship size group

| Ship size range (TEUs) | Number of ports included | Base call size |
| --- | --- | --- |
| <1500 | 219 | 251-500 |
| 1500-5000 | 331 | 501-1000 |
| 5001-8500 | 213 | 1001-1500 |
| 8501-13500 | 162 | 1501-2000 |
| >13500 | 99 | 2001-2500 |

#### Constructing the index

As noted above, the study used two approaches to constructing the CPPI:

* administrative approach
* statistical approach.

The study claimed that ‘neither methodology is better than the other; rather, the two different approaches complement each other’ (The World Bank 2021, p. 67) and this is why both methods were used.

Both approaches go some way to comparing like‑for‑like by comparing port performance within ship and call size categories. But aggregation of these comparisons to a port‑wide measure of efficiency does risk the introduction of bias (for example, by giving larger weightings to the performance of handling large ships in the aggregation process).

##### Administrative approach

… the administrative approach reflects … an aggregate of the performance of the port, weighted relative to the average, across call and vessel size. Accordingly, the score can be negative, where a port compares poorly to the average in one call size and vessel size category, particularly if they do not have an offsetting positive score(s) in other cell(s). (The World Bank 2021, p. 12)

The administrative approach is described in steps below.

* Step 1: sum arrival and berth hours to form total port hours (with a weighting of 1.0 each).
* Step 2: within each ship‑call size category: compare a port’s average port hours with the group average to construct a ratio of performance (for example, drawing on the example presented in table D.2 below, 22.71/19.72 = 1.152). This is multiplied by the call size group weight (the share of all port calls in the ship size category that were in that call size category). A higher result indicates better productivity.

Table D.2 – Administrative example

| Port | Port hours | Score | Call size group weight | Result |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Example port | 19.72 | 1.152 | 0.232 | 0.2672 |
| Group average | 22.71 |  |  |  |

* Step 3: within ship size category, sum the results across all call size categories.
  + Caveat: the imputation method might bias a port’s performance if it only had data for limited call size ranges. For example, if the performance in a few call size groups was worse than the average for all ports within the ship size group, this would be prorated to all call size groups. The study argued that the alternative of a zero score would not necessarily result in a better outcome.
* Step 4: aggregate across all ship sizes to determine a final score. This a sum of the weighted average of the scores for each ship size category, weighted by a fuel consumption index (where larger ships have higher weights). The premise underlying use of the fuel consumption index is that if a large ship spends longer in port, it will have a larger negative impact (costs, fuel consumption, environment etc.), therefore performance in turning around a larger ship is recognised as being of greater significance than performance in turning around a smaller ship. Similarly put, larger ships present a greater potential opportunity to save fuel and reduce emissions.
  + Ports that could not handle larger ships receive a zero (or a missing) score for that ship size group (as indicated in table D.1 above). The study noted:

The omission of scores within some ship size groups would only be an issue if attempting to compare the performance of major mainline ports with those of far smaller ports; however, this comparison is neither objective nor valuable. (The World Bank 2021, p. 64)

Further, assigning a zero score or missing is essentially the equivalent of assigning that port the average score for that ship size group. Therefore, it should not bias rankings.

* + Caveat: if fuel consumption index values are adjusted so that larger ship size groups have lower indices than smaller ones, the overall ranking results can change **radically**. Further, after applying this index, the ranking now incorporates some measure of environmental externalities, rather than focusing on port efficiency in handling ships. It begs the question, how would the rankings change with equal weights?
* Step 5: the scores are ranked in descending order, where **positive** scores are indicative of a more efficient port.

##### Statistical approach

The statistical approach uses factor analysis to ascertain the performance of ports.

Factor analysis (FA) can:

* summarise data in large datasets efficiently
* ascertain the impact of a series of measured variables (which contain information about the efficiency of a port, in this case time‑based measures) on an unseen latent variable (efficiency), which cannot be measured directly with a single variable. The actual values of these time‑based measures are determined by a small number of unobserved factors, such as the availability and quality of the infrastructure, the layout of the port, the expertise of the employees, the available depth in the channel and at the berth, and so on. The latent variable, efficiency, is considered to be a function of each of the measured variables (the time‑based measures) and an error term for each.

The steps involved are:

* Step 1: conduct a factor analysis for the five ship size categories individually (that is, run a factor analysis using the port time data for all the call sizes within a ship size category).
* Step 2: identify how many latent factors should be included (typically factors with an eigen value greater than one).[[32]](#footnote-33) The study identifies three factors that contribute to efficiency (and cover 80 per cent of the total variance), loosely speaking these are related to inefficiencies in handling small, medium and large calls.
* Step 3: the factor score is calculated and standardised (with mean 0, standard deviation 1), such that a **negative** score is indicative of a port being more efficient than the average port.
* Step 4: create a weighted average score (a weighted average sum of the factor scores for each ship size category), where the weights are the same as those used under the administrative approach — that is, the fuel consumption index.
  + Some ports will not have a score for some ship sizes (for example, greater than 13 500 TEUs for Australia’s container ports), and in these cases the assumed imputation is zero. By construction, zero is always the group average score of observed ports in the factor analysis, thus assigning zero to ship size categories where ports that do not have a score does not penalise those ports unfairly. However, the application of the fuel consumption index which gives higher weights to larger ships means that ports that efficiently handle larger ships will receive higher scores than those that efficiently handle smaller ships, all else equal.

The key difference between the approaches: Under the factor analysis (or statistical) approach, the scores are not calculated for each call size range. Instead, the whole dataset is used to simultaneously obtain latent factors. This means that the statistical approach factors in all correlations among hours for various call size bands but does not consider the fact that some observations might be more reliable than others as there are more port calls data underlying the observation (under the administrative approach the score for a ship‑call size is multiplied by the share of calls in the category to apply more weight to call‑sizes with more underlying port calls data). The study stated that:

This implies the results, and potentially the ranking, for some of the ports could be distorted in the presence of large outliers. (The World Bank 2021, p. 67)

Interestingly, neither of the approaches use individual port call data, and instead rely on a measure of average port hours (in each ship‑call size category for each port). For the factor analysis, port call data could have been used, but presumably the shipping lines did not give permission for their port call data to be used or there was too much data to manipulate.

## CPPI results

This section presents the results for the CPPI, highlighting the performance of Australian container ports.

### Overall results

There is a high degree of correlation between the ranking of ports using the administrative and statistical approach (figure D.2). The World Bank noted that:

Just under 18 percent of all ports (61 ports) are ranked within three places or less from themselves in the two rankings. Approximately 40 percent (137 ports) are ranked with ten places or less of themselves in the respective rankings, while 80 percent (282 ports) fall within 10 percent of their respective rankings in the two indices. (The World Bank 2021, p. 13)

However, there are some exceptions such as Jebel Ali which is ranked 59th under the administrative approach but 323rd under the statistical approach or Dunkirk which is ranked 305th under the administrative approach but 118th under the statistical approach (these lie further off the 45 degree line in figure D.2). The World Bank noted:

… the approach taken in the CPPI 2020 has been not to try and explain every discrepancy, but rather to make the methodology and assumptions explicit and let the data speak. (The World Bank 2021, p. 26)

In future revisions of the CPPI, the World Bank will ‘seek to investigate and explain divergences between the two approaches, while also gaining a further understanding of key determinants or influences on container port performance’ (The World Bank 2021, p. 26).

The CPPI includes the five main Australian container ports:

* Port of Melbourne
* Port Botany (Sydney)
* Port of Brisbane
* Port of Fremantle
* Port Adelaide (Flinders).

The port of Bell Bay in Tasmania was also included in the CPPI. Bell Bay can be regarded as a domestic port rather than an international port because it mostly receives containers from Melbourne, and it has a small annual throughput (26 000 TEUs) compared with the other ports. For these reasons, Bell Bay port is not the focus of this analysis, although it is ranked higher in efficiency than the other Australian container port.

The Australian ports rank similar under both approaches (figure D.2). For this reason, the remainder of the results are presented for the statistical approach. This approach assigns each port a score which ranges from ‑6 to 8.4, where, as noted above, negative numbers indicative of greater efficiency. For ease of interpretation, the scores have been converted to an index of efficiency, with the most efficient port given a score of 100 and most inefficient port given a score of zero.

Figure D.2 – Statistical and administrative approach broadly comparablea

Port rank using each method

Figure D.2 – This is a scatter plot of each country’s statistical and administrative rank. There is a high degree of correlation between the rankings as indicated by most ports lying on the 45 degree line from the origin. 

**a.** There are 351 ports in total. The correlation coefficient between the rankings is 0.91.

Source: The World Bank(2021).

Four of the five main Australian container ports ranked in the bottom 20 per cent of the CPPI — meaning they are relatively inefficient (figure D.3). Brisbane was the found to be the most efficient of the main Australian ports, but still ranked in the bottom 30 per cent. The most efficient port was Yokohama in Japan, and the most inefficient port was Ngqura in South Africa.

Figure D.3 – Most of Australia’s ports ranked poorly

Each port’s efficiency score (CPPI)

Figure D.3 – This is a bar chart that depicts each ports CPPI score from most efficient to least efficient, highlighting the poor ranking of Australian ports. 

Source: The World Bank(2021).

#### Appendix A

Appendix A in the study provides ranking for the administrative approach in each ship size category (that is, before the result for each ship size is aggregated into a weighted average total score). This permits identification of a port’s ranking within different ship size groups (across all call sizes). For example, the Port of Melbourne’s rankings are:

* Ships <1500 TEUs: nil (Melbourne does not accommodate ships this small)
* Ships 1501—5000 TEUs: 238 out of 331 ports
* Ships 5001—8000 TEUs: 159 out of 213 ports
* Ships 8001—13 500 TEUs: 143 out of 162 ports
* Ships >13 500 TEUs: nil (Melbourne does not accommodate ships this large).

This reveals that the Port of Melbourne is not in the bottom quintile of the ranking when handling ships between 1501‑8000 TEUs, but is in the bottom quintile when handling ships between 8001‑13 500 TEUs.

#### Caveats

* While there is an attempt to make fair comparisons by taking into account ship and call sizes docking at ports, there may be other factors that impact on how efficient ports are. For example, transhipment ports will likely have different operations to destination–origin ports, making them more (or less) efficient on average.
* Despite having access to data at a terminal level, the method does not account for differences in productivity levels between terminals (or stevedores) at a port, and rather takes an average. For example, the AMP Terminal in Yokohama outperforms the other container terminals in Yokohama. An interesting extension would be to examine terminal performance.
* The use of an aggregate measure of performance (port hours) does not shed light on which processes at a port are efficient or inefficient. This makes it difficult to make sound operational strategy and policy recommendations. Many ports around the world follow a landlord model, where marine services are managed and operated by port authorities or by specialised companies other than terminal operators. A single CPPI score cannot be used to pinpoint the sources of delays and congestion in a multi‑institutional port setting.
* The CPPI does not assess the ability of a port to use and allocate its resources in an economically efficient way. This is a fundamental principle in productive efficiency because a port that unnecessarily throws extra capacity resources to improve berth performance may not necessarily be efficient, yet it could end up achieving a high score under the CPPI. The top 50 ranked CPPI ports are dominated by deep‑sea hub ports with ample spare capacity. These are typically located in East Asia and the Middle East and North Africa regions.
* The CPPI is exclusively focused on port operations and quayside performance which is unfairly skewed towards the interests of one set of port customers (shipping lines) and does not address the needs of cargo interests nor cover landside and hinterland sources of port congestion and inefficiency. This could explain the ranking prominence of ports with a high transhipment incidence — the latter require little or no inland and hinterland efficiency. A more holistic view (if data were available) might alter these rankings.

References

ACCC (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission) 2019, *Container Stevedoring Monitoring Report 2018-19*, October, Canberra.

—— 2021, *Container Stevedoring Monitoring Report 2020-21*, October, Canberra.

APM Terminals 2015, *APM Terminals? Productivity Performance Again Tops Global Rankings in Annual Industry Study*, https://www.apmterminals.com/en/news/news-releases/2017/news/apmt-productivity-performance-tops-global-rankings (accessed 26 May 2022).

—— 2022a, *Qingdao*, https://www.apmterminals.com/en/  
qingdao (accessed 22 June 2022).

—— 2022b, *Yokohama - Facility Introduction*, https://www.apmterminals.com/en/yokohama/about/facility-introduction (accessed 22 June 2022).

Arvis, J.-F., Ojala, L., Wiederer, C., Shepherd, B., Raj, A., Dairabayeva, D. and Kiiski, T. 2018, *Connecting to Compete 2018: Trade Logistics in the Global Economy*, World Bank, Washington, DC.

Bichou, K. 2013, ‘An empirical study of the impacts of operating and market conditions on container-port efficiency and benchmarking’, *Freight Transport and Sustainability*, vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 28–37.

BITRE (Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics) 2009, *Australian Container Ports in an International Context*, Information Paper, 65, Canberra.

—— 2021, *Waterline 67*, Statistical report, December, Canberra.

Bray, S., Caggiani, L., Dell’Orco, M. and Ottomanelli, M. 2014, ‘Measuring transport systems efficiency under uncertainty by fuzzy sets theory based data envelopment analysis’, *Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences*, vol. 111, pp. 770–779.

BTCE (Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics) 1994, *Waterline 1*, Statistical report, July, Canberra.

—— 1995, *Review of the Waterfront Industry Reform Program*, 91, Canberra.

Cheon, S., Dowall, D.E. and Song, D.-W. 2010, ‘Evaluating impacts of institutional reforms on port efficiency changes: Ownership, corporate structure, and total factor productivity changes of world container ports’, *Selected papers from the Second National Urban Freight Conference, Long Beach, California, December 2007*, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 546–561.

CRI Online 2018, *Automated port terminal in Qingdao marks remarkable first year*, People’s Daily Online, http://en.people.cn/n3/2018/0609/c90000-9469182.html (accessed 26 May 2022).

Cullinane, K. 2010, ‘Revisiting the productivity and efficiency of ports and terminals: methods and applications’, in Grammenos, C. (ed), *The Handbook of Maritime Economics and Business*, 2nd edn, Informa Law from Routledge, London, pp. 907–946.

Ghiara, H. and Tei, A. 2021, ‘Port activity and technical efficiency: determinants and external factors’, *Maritime Policy & Management*, vol. 48, no. 5, pp. 711–724.

Gil-Ropero, A., Cerban, M. and Turias, I.J. 2015, ‘Analysis of the global and technical efficiencies of major Spanish container ports’, *International Journal of Transport Economics*, vol. XLII, no. 3, pp. 377–408.

Hamilton, C. 1999, *Measuring Container Port Productivity*, Background Paper No. 17, March, The Australia Institute, Canberra.

Hui, K., Duffield, C., Chin, A. and Huang, H. 2019, ‘Comparative efficiency analysis of Australian and Indonesian ports’, *Infrastructure Investment in Indonesia: A Focus on Ports*, Colin Duffield, Felix Kin Peng Hui, Sally Wilson, Open Book Publishers, Cambridge, UK.

iMove Australia 2019, *Freight Data Requirements Study*, February, iMove, Melbourne.

Ji, Y. and Lee, C. 2010, ‘Data envelopment analysis’, *The Stata Journal*, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 267–280.

JOC Group 2013, *Key Findings On Terminal Productivity Performance Across Ports, Countries And Regions*, White paper, July.

—— 2014, *Berth Productivity: The Trends, Outlook and Market Forces Impacting Ship Turnaround Times*, White paper, July.

King Abdullah Port 2022a, *Container Terminal*, https://www.kingabdullahport.com.sa/terminals/container/ (accessed 26 May 2022).

—— 2022b, *Masterplan*, https://www.kingabdullahport.com.sa/masterplan/ (accessed 26 May 2022).

—— 2022c, *The Story of King Abdullah Port*, https://www.kingabdullahport.com.sa/port-story/ (accessed 26 May 2022).

Kutin, N., Nguyen, T.T. and Vallée, T. 2017, ‘Relative Efficiencies of ASEAN Container Ports based on Data Envelopment Analysis’, *The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics*, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 67–77.

Manly Hydraulics Institution 2020, *NSW Wave Climate and Costal Air Pressure Annual Summary, 2018-2019*, January, NSW Department of Planning, Industry and Environment, NSW.

Mary R. Brooks Transportation Consulting 2015, *Port Performance Measures: Identification, Summary and Assessment of Port Fluidity and Congestion Measures*, Research for the Canada Transportation Act Review Panel, 16 July, Mary R. Brooks Transportation Consulting, Canada.

Merk, O. and Dang, T.T. 2012, *Efficiency of World Ports in Container and Bulk Cargo (Oil, Coal, Ores and Grain)*, 2012–09, OECD Regional Development Working Papers, OECD Publishing, Paris.

Ministry of Transport 2021, *Te Kawe Rawa me ngā Whakaritenga | Freight and logistics*, Ministry of Transport, https://www.transport.govt.nz/statistics-and-insights/freight-and-logistics/ (accessed 21 April 2022).

Morley, H. 2018, *Port of Halifax: Halifax port responds to meet pressures on fluidity*, JOC Group, https://www.joc.com/port-news/international-ports/halifax-port-responds-meet-pressures-fluidity\_20180803.html (accessed 21 April 2022).

Mustafa, F.S., Khan, R.U. and Mustafa, T. 2021, ‘Technical efficiency comparison of container ports in Asian and Middle East region using DEA’, *The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics*, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 12–19.

Notteboom, T., Pallis, A. and Rodrigue, J.-P. 2022, ‘Ports and container shipping (chapter 1.3)’, *Port Economics, Management and Policy*, 1st edn, Routledge, Milton, UK.

NSW Ports 2020, *NSW Ports CEO Update*, NSW Ports, https://www.nswports.com.au/nsw-ports-ceo-update (accessed 20 May 2022).

Odeck, J. and Bråthen, S. 2012, ‘A meta-analysis of DEA and SFA studies of the technical efficiency of seaports: A comparison of fixed and random-effects regression models’, *Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice*, vol. 46, no. 10, pp. 1574–1585.

—— and Schøyen, H. 2020, ‘Productivity and convergence in Norwegian container seaports: An SFA-based Malmquist productivity index approach’, *Transportation research. Part A, Policy and practice*, vol. 137, pp. 222–239.

PC (Productivity Commission) 1998, *International Benchmarking of the Australian Waterfront*, Research Report, Canberra.

—— 2003, *International Benchmarking of Container Stevedoring*, Commission Research Paper, Canberra.

—— 2013, *On Efficiency and Effectiveness: Some Definitions*, Staff Research Note, Canberra.

—— 2017, *Data Availability and Use*, Report no. 82, Canberra.

—— 2019, *Economic Regulation of Airports*, Report no. 92, Canberra.

SCRCSSP (Steering Committee for the Review of Commonwealth/State Service Provision) 1997, *Data Envelopment Analysis*, AusInfo, Canberra.

The World Bank 2021, *The Container Port Performance Index 2020: A Comparable Assessment of Container Port Performance*, Washington, DC.

—— 2022, *The Container Port Performance Index 2021: A Comparable Assessment of Container Port Performance*, Washington, DC.

Tongzon, J. 2001, ‘Efficiency measurement of selected Australian and other international ports using data envelopment analysis’, *Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice*, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 107–122.

Tongzon, J.L. 1995, ‘Systematizing international benchmarking for ports’, *Maritime Policy and Management*, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 171–177.

UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) 2020, *Review of Maritime Transport 2020*, Geneva, Switzerland.

—— 2021a, *Liner shipping connectivity index, quarterly*, https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=92 (accessed 7 March 2022).

—— 2021b, *Port liner shipping connectivity index, quarterly*, https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx (accessed 7 March 2022).

—— 2021c, *Review of Maritime Transport 2021*, 18 November, Geneva, Switzerland.

Wang, T. and Cullinane, K. 2015, ‘The efficiency of European container terminals and implications for supply chain management (chapter 11)’, in Haralambides, H.E. (ed), *Port Management*, 1st ed, Palgrave Macmillan, London, UK, pp. 253–272.

Yokohama Port Corporation 2022, *Port of Yokohama Specifications*, http://www.yokohamaport.co.jp.e.df.hp.  
transer.com/effort/predominance/ (accessed 22 June 2022).

1. Reliability covers whether goods are delivered undamaged/unspoilt and certainty around container delivery/departure. Certainty enables importers/exporters to plan their businesses with greater confidence. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. A recent World Bank study also included Bell Bay Tasmania (which was serviced by the international shipping line MSC), and their data source also included Townsville in Queensland. In keeping with official Australian data sources, this paper focuses on the five main container ports. These ports are listed in the order in which international shipping lines generally service them. Sydney refers here to the container port at Port Botany (as Sydney has more than one port). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. COVID‑19 was first detected in Wuhan, China in December 2019. The first case in Australia was confirmed on 25 January 2020. The World Health Organization declared it a pandemic on 11 March 2020. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. IHS Markit supplied the Port Performance Program data used in the study. The Program collects data from ten of the world’s largest shipping carriers (accounting for 76 per cent of global capacity). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. Transhipment ports pass the bulk of the cargo unloaded from one ship to another ship. These ports are typically the ‘hub ports’ in the series of ‘hub and spoke’ networks that service international maritime trade. These ports are strategically placed on, or close to, major international shipping routes and channels (such as the Panama Canal, the Strait of Malacca, the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar) and typically handle much larger ships than other ports. Transhipment ports include, for example, Singapore, Port Said and Cristobal. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. Moreover, while partial measures of landside productivity exist for Australian container ports (such as truck turnaround times), comprehensive measures of landside productivity do not exist. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. This gives rise to two different representations of technical efficiency. The first measure relates to the extent to which the existing level of output could be produced using *fewer* inputs (referred to as ‘input‑augmenting technical change’). The second measure relates to the extent of the *increase* in output that could be achieved from the existing inputs (referred to as ‘output‑augmenting technical change’). Curvature of the underlying production function means that these two measures will often differ. This paper focuses on the potential for input‑augmenting technical change because, as far as ports are concerned, the demand for imported containers is outside their control. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Some landside operations may be involved in transhipping a container onto another ship (such as temporary storage in a container yard). Such operations are relatively small in the Australian context. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. The difference between these measures reflects the size of the containers handled. The movement of one forty-foot container (FEU) constitutes the movement of one container that is equivalent to two 20‑foot containers (TEU). The TEU is the international standard size measurement for maritime containers. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. The premise being that ports with more terminal operators have increased competition and are therefore likely to be more productive. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. In 1992, the Australian Government directed the BTCE to produce a six monthly indicator on port interface costs; this formed part of *Waterline* (Hamilton 1999, p. 4)*.* [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. Labour and capital productivity are each influenced by both capital and labour initiatives. For example, improvements in crane technology may improve both the productivity of labour and capital. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. The extended framework could also be applied in an international context. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. Although some terminals such as the Victorian International Container Terminal (VICT) at the port of Melbourne are often described as being ‘fully automated’, they still employ labour. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. The ABS provide some information on port workers through the census, labour force and characteristics of employee datasets. However, none of this data is sufficiently granular to be able to be used to measure labour productivity of container terminal operations. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. Information on the productivity of pilots and tugs may also help to unpack and understand anchorage times. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. Further, information on the per cent of goods that arrive damaged or that are lost could provide more information on the reliability of the maritime logistics system more broadly. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. Quarantine and customs processes may also increase dwell times for some containers, therefore information on durations of customs clearances would be beneficial. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. Chapter 11 of the inquiry report discusses maritime logistics system data more broadly than the data specifically required for the extended performance framework. It includes a discussion of public and private data sources, data gaps identified by stakeholders, the siloing of data and the role for government in sharing data. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. Ideally the index would also incorporate information about the distribution of these times. Doing so would capture an element of how dependable the port system is. For example, a port with fast container turnaround times with a narrow distribution would be both highly efficient and dependable. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. In 2019, 93 per cent of ships anchored in Brisbane. These vessels waited an average of 3 hours (median 2.1). For Sydney, almost 50 per cent of ships anchored. These vessels waited an average of 4.3 hours (median 1.9). In contrast, only 3 per cent of ships anchored in Melbourne but they waited 13 hours on average (median 9 hours). [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. The time taken to un/load a ship will also depend on the extent of operational and non‑operational delays if a net crane rate measure is being used. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. Thisresult also holds for each port (see technical paper). *Net* rates are presented reflecting the limited long‑term data available in *Waterline*. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. The three-year program reformed the stevedoring industry with a move from industry-based to company employment, and the creation of career structures in the industry with suitable training and incentive arrangements. An evaluation found efficiency indeed improved (BTCE 1995, p. xviii). [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. Australia imported few empty containers in 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. Port’s capital investment cycles may affect DEA results. A port may appear inefficient following a capital expansion and appear more efficient when approaching a capital expansion. Capital investment data is unavailable and as such the effect of investment cycles on the results is unknown. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. DEA results are sensitive to the size of the sample used. Smaller samples tend to result in more ports being identified as technically efficient (Cullinane 2010, p. 923). Given the large sample size used here this is unlikely to be an issue.

    [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. Another strand of the academic literature assesses the impact of reforms on port efficiency. For example, Cheon, Dowall and Song (2010) evaluated how port institutional reforms influenced efficiency gains between 1991 and 2004 for a sample of 98 ports. But this is not strictly a benchmarking technique. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. New Zealand’s Ministry of Transport collects the same stevedore performance measures as BITRE’s Waterline making enabling comparisons. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. The two previous benchmarking studies were conducted by the Bureau of Industry Economics (BIE) and were published in 1993 and 1995. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. As discussed in the body of the paper, the structured nature of these services has been adversely affected by COVID‑19 pandemic. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. Rotation of the factors also takes place to allow for ease of interpretation. The study employs the common varimax rotation. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)